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serena mayeri

Foundling Fathers: (Non-)Marriage and Parental
Rights in the Age of Equality
abstract.

The twentieth-century equality revolution established the principle of sex neutrality
in the law of marriage and divorce and eased the most severe legal disabilities traditionally imposed
upon nonmarital children. Formal equality under the law eluded nonmarital parents, however.
Although unwed fathers won unprecedented legal rights and recognition in a series of Supreme Court
cases decided in the 1970s and 1980s, they failed to achieve constitutional parity with mothers or with
married and divorced fathers. This Article excavates nonmarital fathers’ quest for equal rights, until
now a mere footnote in the history of constitutional equality law.
Unmarried fathers lacked a social movement of their own, but various groups and interests
fought for their own causes on the battleground of nonmarital parenthood. Nonmarital fathers’ claims
posed a particular dilemma for feminists, who promoted gender-egalitarian parenting within marriage
but struggled over the implications of unmarried fathers’ rights for women’s autonomy and for
substantive sex equality. The Justices’ deliberations, in contrast, focused on the rights of men and on
ensuring the smooth functioning of adoption procedures. The Court largely avoided the feminist
dilemma, instead framing cases as disputes between husbands and unwed fathers. Denying
nonmarital fathers’ request to be treated as “de facto divorced fathers,” the Court reaffirmed the legal
supremacy of marital families.
The Court’s failure to engage difficult questions about substantive sex equality reverberated
beyond the parental rights cases to leave its mark on the twenty-first century jurisprudence of
citizenship. As nonmarital parenthood becomes the American norm, recovering its constitutional
history illuminates how and why marital status still delimits the boundaries of equality law.
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in t r o d u c t io n
The twentieth-century constitutional equality revolution transformed the
laws of marriage, divorce, and parenthood. As a matter of formal law, though
not social reality, husbands and wives turned into spouses with identical rights
and duties; divorcing mothers and fathers became parents with sex-neutral
obligations of care and support. Formal equality under the law eluded
nonmarital parents, however. Marital status remained a legitimate basis of
legal differentiation. The legal primacy of marriage endured, even as rates of
nonmarital cohabitation and childrearing soared.
Today, sex neutrality in the law of parenthood depends upon marital
status. Mothers and fathers generally enjoy formally equal rights to the
custody, care, and control of their marital children. In contrast, a nonmarital
father does not possess the same parental rights—or responsibilities—as his
female counterpart. And although nonmarital fathers won unprecedented legal
rights and recognition as parents, they never achieved parity with married and
divorced fathers.
Traditionally, fathers had few rights or responsibilities to their nonmarital
children. In the early 1970s, nonmarital fathers seized upon emerging
constitutional equality principles to challenge their inferior parental status.
Over the next two decades, the Supreme Court decided a series of cases that
first expanded and then contracted “unwed fathers’” constitutional rights.
Behind the scenes, the Justices wrestled with, but to a surprising degree
ultimately avoided, a central question presented by these cases: how the
evolving jurisprudence of equal protection, which made marriage and divorce
formally sex-neutral, should apply to the parental rights of nonmarital fathers.
The Court also declined advocates’ invitation to treat nonmarital fathers like
“de facto divorced fathers” and to condemn discrimination based on marital
status. Today, the unwed fathers cases are a mere footnote to the story of the
constitutional equality revolution.
In the twenty-first century, as a widening “marriage gap” separates the
well-off, highly educated haves from impoverished, less educated, have-nots,
nonmarital parenthood is the dominant reality of American family life.1 Yet, as
Clare Huntington observes, “the marital family serves as a misleading
synecdoche for all families,” leaving family law ill equipped to address the

1.

See, e.g., JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW INEQUALITY IS
REMAKING THE AMERICAN FAMILY (2014) (describing the causes and consequences of the
marriage gap).
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needs of many families and communities.2 An economically stratified legal
regime reproduces fault lines based on race, class, gender, and marital status:
many elite, college-educated couples seek relatively egalitarian partnerships
and negotiate under a default rule of shared parenting, while the state’s efforts
to privatize dependency through stringent child support enforcement
discourage parental involvement by poor fathers.3
The anomalous legal treatment of unmarried fathers looms large for
commentators who decry family law’s failure to protect nonmarital families.4
Because parental rights and responsibilities are inextricably intertwined,
mothers who bear the default burden of care and support also endure the
consequences of sex and marital status inequality in parenthood.5 Nonmarital
2.

Clare Huntington, Postmarital Family Law: A Legal Structure for Nonmarital Families, 67
STAN. L. REV. 167, 167 (2015).

3.

June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, The Triple System of Family Law, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1185,
1222-24. Between these two poles are nonmarital families who operate in the “shadows” of
the law. Id. at 1189. In these economically precarious families, mothers act as “gatekeepers,”
often maintaining a modicum of control over family life by avoiding a formal paternity
determination and acting as primary breadwinners and caregivers for their children. Id. at
1207. For a discussion of maternal “gatekeeping” in impoverished urban communities, see
KATHRYN EDIN & TIMOTHY J. NELSON, DOING THE BEST I CAN: FATHERHOOD IN THE INNER
CITY 169-74 (2013).

4.

See, e.g., Huntington, supra note 2, at 203-05 (focusing on nonmarital fathers’ inferior status
as a paradigmatic example of how family law ill-serves the never-married); Solangel
Maldonado, Perspective: Shared Parenting and Never-Married Families, 52 FAM. CT. REV. 632
(2014) (describing barriers to shared parenting among the never-married); Melissa Murray,
What’s So New About the New Illegitimacy?, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 387 (2012)
(critiquing the Court’s bias toward fathers who act like husbands). The unequal treatment
of nonmarital fathers has made headlines recently. See, e.g., Clare Huntington, What
Unmarried Fathers Have To Worry About, N.Y. TIMES: ROOM FOR DEBATE (July 8, 2015,
2:34 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/06/13/fathers-rights-and-womens
-equality/what-unmarried-fathers-have-to-worry-about
[http://perma.cc/KDQ4-BGDL]
(arguing that it is “much harder” for unmarried than for married fathers “to sustain a
relationship with their children” over a mother’s objection); Kevin Noble Maillard, A
Father’s Struggle To Stop His Daughter’s Adoption, ATLANTIC (July 7, 2015), http://www
.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/07/paternity-registry/396044 [http://perma.cc/GVE6
-S9BN] (recounting the travails of a nonmarital South Carolina father in gaining custody of
his daughter); see also Child Welfare Info. Gateway, The Rights of Unmarried Fathers, U.S.
CHILDREN’S BUREAU 2 (2014), http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/putative.pdf [http://
perma.cc/E2CH-52DZ] ( “[I]n cases involving unmarried fathers whose legal relationship to
a child has not been established, States have almost complete discretion to determine the
parental rights for the purposes of termination or adoption proceedings.”).

5.

See, e.g., Mary L. Shanley, Unwed Fathers’ Rights, Adoption, and Sex Equality: GenderNeutrality and the Perpetuation of Patriarchy, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 60, 66 (1995) (explaining
that giving custody of nonmarital children to mothers reflects not “hostility to biological
fathers” but the “patriarchal roots of family law,” which produce “devastating social and
economic consequences” for women); Kristin Collins, Note, When Fathers’ Rights Are
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children, who are disproportionately poor and of color, suffer from the use of
marital status as a proxy for parental legitimacy.6 Yet concerns about
substantive sex equality left hardly a mark on the Court’s decisions, and marital
status remains a legitimate determinant of parental rights. This Article
investigates how and why this came to be.
***
Before midcentury, the parental rights of nonmarital fathers barely
registered as a question, much less a moral and constitutional dilemma. Unwed
fathers, long deprived of legal rights and usually liberated from legal
obligations, seemed largely irrelevant, except to the extent the state could call
upon them to support children who otherwise would depend on public
assistance.7 Profound legal and societal changes recast the problem of
nonmarital fatherhood in the 1960s and early 1970s. Rates of nonmarital
childbearing rose; women’s workforce participation grew; and divorce rates
climbed. Whereas in earlier decades, most unmarried white mothers had
relinquished their infants for adoption, more now raised them alone or with
nonmarital partners. African-American women had long cared for nonmarital
children with the support of extended families, largely excluded from public
aid to the presumptively white “deserving poor” and from adoption
opportunities. Now, poor women of color gained access to public assistance
benefits, heightening anxieties about “promiscuity,” “illegitimacy,” and

Mothers’ Duties: The Failure of Equal Protection in Miller v. Albright, 109 YALE L.J. 1669
(2000) (arguing that divesting nonmarital fathers of parental rights harms mothers who are
exclusively charged with the care and support of children). Denigrating the rights of
nonmarital fathers in the context of adoption may also redound to mothers’ detriment by
furthering policies that prioritize speedy adoptions by affluent couples of poor children of
color, and “condemn[ing]” or rendering “invisible” birth mothers. Bethany R. Berger, In the
Name of the Child: Race, Gender, and Economics in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 67 FLA. L.
REV. 295, 345 (2015) (citing LAURA BRIGGS, SOMEBODY’S CHILDREN: THE POLITICS OF
TRANSRACIAL AND TRANSNATIONAL ADOPTION 16-17 (2012)).
6.

See Solangel Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law, Stigma, and Discrimination Against
Nonmarital Children, 63 FLA. L. REV. 345 (2011).

7.

On early efforts to hold poor fathers responsible for child support, see Drew D. Hansen,
Note, The American Invention of Child Support: Dependency and Punishment in Early American
Child Support Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1123 (1999).
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“welfare dependency.”8 Efforts to hold nonmarital fathers financially
responsible for their children intensified.9
In this golden age of social movements, previously disenfranchised groups
organized and fought for recognition and redistribution. Civil rights advocates
dismantled de jure racial segregation.10 Feminists attacked discrimination in
education and employment, and sought reproductive freedom and equality in
public and private life.11 Anti-poverty activists fought for welfare rights.12
Defenders of a more traditional social order found these claims deeply
threatening. Conservatives charged feminists with destroying the very
foundation of American society. Punitive welfare regulations such as “suitable
home” and “substitute father” exclusions sought to deter nonmarital sex, limit
welfare expenditures, and force poor men and women of color into low-wage
work.13 Many anti-illegitimacy laws were thinly veiled attacks on civil rights
activism,14 but even those who embraced African-American civil rights often
believed a patriarchal family structure essential to racial progress.15

8.

For a discussion of the evolving politics of Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) at midcentury, see, for example, JENNIFER MITTELSTADT, FROM WELFARE TO
WORKFARE: THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF LIBERAL REFORM, 1945-1965 (2005).

9.

See JOCELYN ELISE CROWLEY, THE POLITICS OF CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA 97-105 (2003).

10.

For a review of the literature on the civil rights movement’s impact on the law, see, for
example, Risa Goluboff, Lawyers, Law, and the New Civil Rights History, 126 HARV. L. REV.
2312 (2013) (reviewing KENNETH W. MACK, REPRESENTING THE RACE: THE CREATION OF
THE CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYER (2012)).

11.

See SERENA MAYERI, REASONING
REVOLUTION (2011).

12.

For a sampling of the rich scholarship on welfare rights advocacy, see MARTHA F. DAVIS,
BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1960-1973 (1993); FELICIA
KORNBLUH, THE BATTLE FOR WELFARE RIGHTS: POLITICS AND POVERTY IN MODERN
AMERICA (2007); PREMILLA NADASEN, WELFARE WARRIORS: THE WELFARE RIGHTS
MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (2005); KAREN M. TANI, STATES OF DEPENDENCY:
WELFARE, RIGHTS, AND AMERICAN GOVERNANCE, 1935-1972 (forthcoming 2016).

13.

See ELIZABETH H. PLECK, NOT JUST ROOMMATES: COHABITATION AFTER THE SEXUAL
REVOLUTION 47-70 (2012); Alison Lefkovitz, Men in the House: Race, Welfare, and the
Regulation of Men’s Sexuality in the United States, 1961-1972, 20 J. HIST. SEXUALITY 594 (2011).

14.

See ANDERS WALKER, THE GHOST OF JIM CROW: HOW SOUTHERN MODERATES USED BROWN
V. BOARD OF EDUCATION TO STALL CIVIL RIGHTS (2009); Anders Walker, Legislating Virtue:
How Segregationists Disguised Racial Discrimination as Moral Reform Following Brown v. Board
of Education, 47 DUKE L.J. 399 (1997).

15.

See MAYERI, supra note 11, at 41-42.
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“Fatherlessness,” the corollary of “matriarchy,” emerged as a perceived threat
to family and social stability.16
Unlike divorced fathers, who mobilized to influence family law reform,17
nonmarital fathers generally did not form organizations to advocate for their
parental rights during this period. The plaintiffs in the unwed fathers cases
were not handpicked for their sympathetic characteristics by advocacy
organizations. Indeed, many of these men had checkered histories as partners
or as parents and were represented by organizations with goals orthogonal to
their own objectives and motivations. Various legal and social movements and
interests buffeted the men who claimed the role of father outside of marriage.
Feminists, civil libertarians, adoption advocates, child welfare organizations,
lawmakers, and judges offered competing visions of the relationship between
marriage, parenthood, and sex equality.
For feminists, the question of sex neutrality in nonmarital parenthood was
especially fraught. Many influential feminist advocates—most prominently,
law professor and ACLU lawyer Ruth Bader Ginsburg—promoted an
egalitarian model of marriage in which mothers and fathers shared caregiving
and breadwinning responsibilities.18 In cases such as Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,
which extended Social Security “mother’s insurance benefits” to widowed
fathers, Ginsburg and her allies insisted on the importance of fathers’ roles as
nurturers of children.19 The resulting constitutional sex equality canon
primarily featured married couples or widowers seeking equal rights for
husbands and wives.20 How this gender-egalitarian model applied to
nonmarital families remained an open question and one about which feminists
increasingly disagreed.
The paramount importance of shared parenting to sex equality within
marriage seemed evident. When feminists argued over the best way to promote

16.

See LOST FATHERS: THE POLITICS OF FATHERLESSNESS IN AMERICA (Cynthia R. Daniels ed.,
1998). On the racial dimension of “fatherlessness” in the late twentieth century, see Dorothy
Roberts, The Absent Black Father, in id. at 145.

17.

See Deborah Dinner, The Divorce Bargain: The Fathers’ Rights Movement and Family
Inequalities, 101 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).

18.

On Ginsburg’s constitutional strategy, see MAYERI, supra note 11; Cary Franklin, The AntiStereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83 (2010);
Serena Mayeri, Reconstructing the Race-Sex Analogy, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1789 (2008).

19.

420 U.S. 636 (1975).

20.

See, e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (invalidating Social Security provisions
that required widowers but not widows to prove financial dependence on their spouses);
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636; Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (overturning
discrimination against military servicewomen and their spouses in the provision of housing
and health benefits).
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egalitarian marital parenting through post-divorce custody rules, they
disagreed primarily about means rather than ends. When feminists challenged
laws and policies that withheld public benefits and private rights from
nonmarital families, they differed over matters of strategy but agreed that such
practices subordinated women, who most often cared for and supported
nonmarital children.21 Feminists’ dissension over sex equality in nonmarital
parental rights was more profound. When parents had never married, a
mother’s consent to a biological father’s relationship with her children could
not so easily be assumed. Nonmarital parenthood crystallized a larger feminist
dilemma: how to balance aspirations for a sex-neutral world with a social
reality of persistent inequality.
Feminist debates centered upon the consequences of nonmarital fathers’
rights for women’s autonomy and equal status and implicated growing
concerns about the unjust termination of poor parents’ parental rights. The
Justices, too, disagreed about nonmarital fatherhood but for very different
reasons. Court deliberations focused on the rights of men who fathered
children outside of marriage and on the smooth functioning of adoption
procedures. The robust debate among feminists about the meaning of
nonmarital fathers’ rights for substantive sex equality barely penetrated the
Justices’ internal deliberations, much less the Court’s opinions.
This Article excavates the history of nonmarital fathers’ constitutional
equality claims. Part I explores the renaissance of interest in unwed fathers in
the 1960s and early 1970s, as social scientists, social workers, and legal
professionals reexamined longstanding assumptions about their rights, roles,
and responsibilities. Using archival and other primary sources, this Part
examines the landmark case of Stanley v. Illinois22 to reveal the surprising
openness of the constitutional field for unwed fathers’ rights on the eve of the
sex equality revolution. Stanley came to the Court as an equal protection case,
and early draft opinions embraced expansive visions of sex and marital status
equality. But the ruling focused primarily on due process and left uncertain the
scope of this “revolution” in unmarried fathers’ rights.
The half-dozen years after Stanley brought rapid and deeply contested legal
and social change. Part II examines developments in constitutional law,
marriage and divorce, and social movements such as feminism, antifeminism,
and fathers’ rights that set the stage for conflict among feminists over the
meaning of sex equality for nonmarital parenthood. As Part III recounts, these
disagreements occurred largely behind the scenes in the 1970s, influencing
21.

On the 1970s feminist campaign against illegitimacy penalties, see Serena Mayeri, Marital
Supremacy and the Constitution of the Nonmarital Family, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1277 (2015).

22.

405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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amicus participation in Court cases about stepfather adoption but remaining
below the Justices’ radar.
In the 1980s, feminists’ disagreement about nonmarital fathers’ parental
rights surfaced in two cases that reached the Court but produced no decision
on the merits. These cases concerned biological fathers’ right to object to a
mother’s decision to place her newborn infant up for adoption, and feminists
filed briefs on both sides. As Part IV describes, the Court instead decided, on
due process grounds, two other cases framed as contests between husbands
and nonmarital fathers. The winner, by the end of the 1980s, was marital
supremacy, as the Court rejected nonmarital fathers’ rights in favor of
husbands’ and ignored feminists’ arguments both for and against sex
neutrality.
Part V examines how and why nonmarital fathers’—and feminists’—
campaigns for constitutional equality fell short. Whereas divorced fathers
successfully mobilized to make child custody law formally sex-neutral,
nonmarital fathers lacked comparable resources, cultural capital, and social
movement support. Feminists and their allies attempted to shape the law of
nonmarital parenthood, but the Justices’ debates and resulting jurisprudence
reflected instead the values of the divorced fathers’ rights movement and
traditionalist conservatism. After 1989, the Court largely withdrew from the
constitutional regulation of nonmarital fathers’ parental rights, leaving states
to go their own way.
The Justices’ failure to engage difficult questions about the relationship
between formal sex neutrality and substantive equality reverberated beyond the
parental rights cases to leave its mark on equality jurisprudence. At the turn of
the twenty-first century, when the Court considered discrimination against
fathers in their ability to transmit citizenship to nonmarital children, the
majority imported principles from the parental rights cases to reject fathers’
claims. More broadly, the unwed fathers cases helped to enshrine marital
supremacy in constitutional law. Marital status still delimits the boundaries of
constitutional equality in parenthood, even as nonmarital families become the
American norm.
The constitutional law of the family today stands at a critical turning point.
The advent of marriage equality marks the final triumph of formal sex
neutrality in the law of marriage, discarding archaic assumptions about the
proper roles of husbands and wives. Same-sex relationships have also
disrupted conventional definitions of parenthood, demoting formal indicia
such as marriage and biology in favor of more intent-based and functional

2301

the yale law journal

125:2292

2016

criteria.23 Whether marriage equality heightens or diminishes the legal and
constitutional significance of marital status, however, remains to be seen. For
those who hope to reshape the law to meet the needs of nonmarital families,
unwed fathers’ attack on marital supremacy illuminates the challenges ahead.
i. a le g a l r e n a is s a n c e f o r u n w e d f a t h e r s , 1 9 6 0 - 1 9 7 2
The social and legal revolutions of the 1960s and early 1970s transformed
unwed fathers from personae non gratae into individuals with constitutional
rights and obligations. An array of social movements, animated by issues from
civil rights to reproductive freedom to women’s equality, provided new
constitutional weapons for men who resisted the presumption that nonmarital
fathers were at best, irrelevant, and at worst, irresponsible derelicts.
Challenging decades of exclusive focus on unwed mothers, a small but
influential cadre of social work professionals and social scientists sought to
rehabilitate unmarried fathers and show them worthy of study and support.
On the eve of the constitutional sex equality revolution, when the Supreme
Court considered its first unwed father lawsuit, observers and litigants viewed
Stanley v. Illinois24 as presenting fundamental questions about equality between
men and women, and between marital and nonmarital parents. The field was
wide open: the Court had just begun to question “illegitimacy”-based
classifications and had yet to hold that any legal distinction between men and
women violated equal protection. Early draft opinions challenged
discrimination based on sex and marital status head-on, suggesting that any
differential treatment of mothers and fathers or of married and unmarried
parents might be constitutionally suspect. In the end, Stanley was decided
primarily on due process grounds. And while even the ultimately narrower
decision in Stanley initially seemed “revolutionary,” its implications for unwed
fathers’ rights and for the development of equality jurisprudence remained
uncertain.
A. “An [E]lusive Ghost”: Social Workers and Lawyers Discover the Unwed
Father
Nonmarital parenthood poses a conundrum in a society that privatizes
dependency in the nuclear family, channels government benefits through
marriage, provides minimal state support for caregiving, and engages in
23.

For pathbreaking work on this phenomenon, see Douglas NeJaime, Marriage and the New
Parenthood, 129 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).

24.

Stanley, 405 U.S. 645.

2302

foundling fathers

limited wealth redistribution. By the middle decades of the twentieth century,
American policymakers had constructed a social and legal infrastructure that
presumed wives and mothers would provide primary care for children and
other dependents, while husbands and fathers furnished financial support and
social insurance benefits through gainful employment.25 “Unwed mothers”
who kept and raised their children without a man’s support threatened not
only the public fisc, but also a political and legal system that assumed that
marital households are the basic economic unit of society and the primary site
of social provision. Thus the ideal cure for the “problem of illegitimacy” was
the marriage of the child’s parents or adoption into a two-parent marital
family.
At common law, an “illegitimate”26 child was filius nullius, a “child of no
one,” and her parents largely escaped legal responsibility for her care and
financial support. Whereas guardianship and custody of marital children
belonged to the father (eroded in practice by the “tender years”
presumption),27 nonmarital children traditionally were mothers’ responsibility
by default. In the nineteenth-century United States, legal reforms afforded
nonmarital children the right to support and to inheritance from their
mothers.28 Fiscal concerns spurred the enactment of statutes imposing some
financial liability on “natural” fathers when paternity was proven, though
enforcement was sporadic at best.29 But in the mid-twentieth-century United
States, illegitimate children’s paternal inheritance rights remained limited,30
and nonmarital fathers enjoyed parental rights decidedly inferior to those of
unmarried mothers and of married or divorced fathers.31 To many, this seemed
25.

See NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION (2000); ALICE
KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY: WOMEN, MEN, AND THE QUEST FOR ECONOMIC
CITIZENSHIP IN 20TH-CENTURY AMERICA (2001).

26.

I use the terms “legitimate” and “illegitimate” because they describe distinctive legal
categories not captured by neutral terms such as “marital” and “nonmarital.” However, I do
not endorse their denigration of nonmarital families. See Mayeri, supra note 21, at 1279 n.4.

27.

The tender years doctrine held that during a child’s early development the mother should
have custody, despite competing doctrines entrenching paternal primacy. See MICHAEL
GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY
AMERICA 248 (1985).

28.

See id. at 207-15.

29.

On child support enforcement generally in nineteenth-century America, see Hansen, supra
note 7.

30.

See Harry D. Krause, Bringing the Bastard into the Great Society—A Proposed Uniform Act on
Legitimacy, 44 TEX. L. REV. 829, 854-56 (1966).

31.

For a contemporaneous account of nonmarital fathers’ inferior legal rights with respect to
custody, visitation, adoption, and parental status, see Freda Jane Lippert, The Need for a
Clarification of the Putative Father’s Rights, 8 J. FAM. L. 398, 403-14 (1968).
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unremarkable: after all, if nonmarital fathers bore little or no responsibility for
their nonmarital children, then awarding sole rights to mothers was only fair
compensation for their social and economic burdens. Some feminists, in
contrast, had long protested the default assumption of maternal responsibility,
noting that it enabled nonmarital fathers to escape both the moral opprobrium
and the financial obligations of unwed parenthood.32
As rates of “illegitimacy” rose and became politically salient at midcentury,33 social scientists and social work professionals focused their efforts on
studying and “rehabilitating” unwed mothers.34 Experts analyzed young
women who became pregnant outside of marriage in racially differentiated
terms, often explaining nonmarital childbearing among young white women as
an individual neurosis and among young black women as cultural pathology.35
Fathers seemed largely irrelevant, except to the extent they could financially
support children not relinquished for adoption.36 Social worker and adoption
expert Leontine Young’s 1954 book Out of Wedlock devoted a single, short
chapter to “the unmarried father,” calling him “in almost every case a
counterpart of the neurotic personality of the mother.”37 In 1960, sociologist
Clark E. Vincent estimated the ratio of studies probing unmarried motherhood
versus fatherhood at twenty-five to one.38 With adoption by strangers the
favored solution to nonmarital childbearing among young white women,
fathers were cast as shadowy villains who had little to offer the women they
32.

See Collins, supra note 5, at 1694-97.

33.

See, e.g., Serena Mayeri, Historicizing the “End of Men”: The Politics of Reaction(s), 93 B.U. L.
REV. 729 (2013) (describing reaction to the 1965 Moynihan Report, which posited a “tangle
of pathology” in the “Negro family”).

34.

On these efforts, see REGINA G. KUNZEL, FALLEN WOMEN, PROBLEM GIRLS: UNMARRIED
MOTHERS AND THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF SOCIAL WORK, 1890-1945 (1993); RICKIE
SOLINGER, WAKE UP LITTLE SUSIE: SINGLE PREGNANCY AND RACE BEFORE ROE V. WADE
(1992). See also REUBEN PANNOR ET AL., THE UNMARRIED FATHER: NEW HELPING
APPROACHES FOR UNMARRIED YOUNG PARENTS 2 (1971) (“The mother is the person who has
stood out in bold relief—subject to pity, scorn, mysterious disappearance, even casual
acceptance and, in some measure, to professional care and mature attention.”).

35.

See SOLINGER, supra note 34; Regina G. Kunzel, White Neurosis, Black Pathology: Constructing
Out-of-Wedlock Pregnancy in the Wartime and Postwar United States, in NOT JUNE CLEAVER:
WOMEN AND GENDER IN POSTWAR AMERICA, 1945-1960, at 304 (Joanne Meyerowitz ed.,
1994).

36.

See, e.g., Education Is Urged for Unwed Parents, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1961, at 5 (“The Federal
Government . . . says unmarried fathers should be found and given educational help with
the aim of making them able to assume family responsibilities.”).

37.

LEONTINE YOUNG, OUT OF WEDLOCK: A STUDY
MOTHER AND HER CHILD 134 (1954).

38.

Clark E. Vincent, Unmarried Fathers and the Mores: “Sexual Exploiter” as an Ex Post Facto
Label, 25 AM. SOC. REV. 40, 40 (1960).
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impregnated or the children their illicit liaisons produced. As social worker
Linda Burgess wrote in 1968, “[T]he unmarried father has remained an illusive
ghost in most adoption placements.”39
The problem of unwed fatherhood gained prominence in the following
decade, thanks to a confluence of factors. As previously excluded families of
color gained access to Aid to Families with Dependent Children, growing
concerns about welfare expenditures and illegitimacy spurred punitive
attempts to hold the sexual partners of impoverished African-American women
financially responsible for their nonmarital children, including through
“substitute father” provisions withholding public assistance from households
containing a “man in the house.”40 At the same time, norms surrounding
nonmarital childbearing shifted: unmarried, middle-class white women less
frequently entered maternity homes and relinquished their infants for
adoption.41 Gradually, sociologists and social workers began to investigate the
emotional, psychological, and social needs of young unmarried fathers. An
early pilot program in Los Angeles, launched in 1963 and supported by the
U.S. Children’s Bureau, studied close to one hundred unmarried fathers
receiving services formerly reserved for mothers from a Jewish social service
agency. The results purported to defy “stereotypes” about feckless unwed
fathers, finding many young men to be receptive to counseling and interested
in participating in decisions about their child’s life.42 Other programs began to
serve young unmarried fathers of color in urban, high-poverty areas. In 1969, a
Harlem social worker told the New York Times that “working with putative
fathers is very fashionable now.”43
Unmarried fathers, long typecast as sexual exploiters of vulnerable, young
women who abandoned their children,44 began to appear in more varied
guises: the cohabiting parent-partner, functionally indistinguishable from his

39.

Linda C. Burgess, The Unmarried Father in Adoption Planning, 15 CHILDREN 71, 71 (1968).

40.

See Lefkovitz, supra note 13, at 597.

41.

See, e.g., REUBEN PANNOR ET AL., THE UNMARRIED FATHER: NEW HELPING APPROACHES FOR
UNMARRIED YOUNG PARENTS xii (1971) (reporting that in 1970 “[m]any, including an
increasing number of middle-class Caucasian girls, chose to keep their babies outside of
marriage”).

42.

See id. at 44-63.

43.

Judy Klemesrud, The Unwed Father, Long Ignored, Now Gets Counseling, Too, N.Y. TIMES,
July 25, 1969, at 56.

44.

See, e.g., PANNOR ET AL., supra note 41, at 15 (“When the father is thought of at all, he is often
imagined to be an older sophisticate who has lured a young innocent girl into a
compromising situation . . . . Or, perhaps the father is viewed as a sower of wild oats, and as
such is surreptitiously regarded as having behaved in a manner that is to be expected of redblooded youth.”).
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married counterpart but barred from a licit relationship because of an inability
to end a prior marriage; the well-intentioned young man willing to marry the
mother of his child but rejected by her; the poor but sympathetic teenaged
boyfriend, suffering from a dearth of parental supervision and paternal role
models;45 the father genuinely interested in maintaining a relationship with his
child after the breakdown of a nonmarital romance; the eager father bereft over
a mother’s decision to give up her child for adoption.46 One 1966 study
concluded that “[a] majority of young men who get girls pregnant out of
wedlock are neither irresponsible nor casual about their obligations to the girls
and their babies,” prompting a reporter’s observation that “unwed fathers are
more emotionally involved with the women they impregnate than is popularly
believed.”47 A 1969 article reported caseworkers’ newfound perception that
nonmarital pregnancies often “resulted not from a casual encounter but from a
long-term, meaningful relationship in which the young people expressed love
and affection for each other.”48 And social workers at a 1970 workshop on
unmarried teenage parents “testified that not only did the mothers want to
keep their babies but that unmarried fathers were also very concerned about
what happened to the children.”49
As social scientists and social work professionals began to show greater
interest in unmarried fathers, Vincent warned that legal rights could not be far
behind. “[A]s the father is given greater public visibility and receives some
services,” Vincent wrote, “greater attention will be given to his ‘rights,’ legal
and otherwise.”50 Vincent proved prescient, forecasting a development aided by

45.

See, e.g., Lynn Lilliston, Now What About the Unwed Father?, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 1967, at
H2.

46.

See, e.g., Lynn Lilliston, Father Vies for Custody of His Baby, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1972, at G1
(describing case of twenty-seven-year-old man who sought custody of baby born to his
seventeen-year-old former girlfriend, who declined to marry him).

47.

Unemployment a Factor in Illegitimate Births, N.Y. AMSTERDAM NEWS, Mar. 18, 1967, at 11; see
also Klemesrud, supra note 43 (“In unmarried pregnancies, people often think it’s the poor
girl and the ruthless seducer . . . . But very often it’s a frightened boy and an aggressive
girl.”).

48.

Klemesrud, supra note 43.

49.

Deirdre Carmody, Council Studying Teen-Age Parents, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1970, at 39.

50.

Clark E. Vincent, Illegitimacy in the Next Decade: Trends and Implications, 43 CHILD WELFARE
513, 518 (1964); see also Rita Dukette & Nicholas Stevenson, The Legal Rights of Unmarried
Fathers: The Impact of Recent Court Decisions, 47 SOC. SERV. REV. 1, 1 (1973) (quoting
Vincent, supra); Harry D. Krause, Legitimate and Illegitimate Offspring of Levy v. Louisiana—
First Decisions on Equal Protection and Paternity, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 338, 358 (1969) (“No
rational legislative reason justifies not hearing the interested father who fairly and regularly
contributes to the support of his child on issues such as the child’s general welfare,
including his custody and education.”).
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larger social and legal shifts in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The no-fault
divorce revolution created a growing contingent of noncustodial fathers whose
varying levels of post-divorce contact with their children raised questions about
the presumed correlation between marital status and paternal engagement.
Pressure began to build for more robust child support enforcement efforts as
divorce and nonmarital childbearing produced more impoverished singleparent households.51
At the same time, feminist attacks on sex-based stereotypes about women’s
natural superiority as mothers and inferiority as economic and political actors
undermined the notion that only mothers could nurture and form strong
psychological bonds with children. Some feminists, including leading legal
scholars and strategists, envisioned a more gender-neutral approach to the
family and to family law, arguing that men and women should be free to defy
traditional gender roles and build egalitarian marriages where both partners
shared breadwinning and caregiving responsibilities. Fatherhood itself “lost
cultural coherence,” in the words of historian Robert Griswold, as feminism
and the entrance of married women and mothers into the workforce in
unprecedented numbers “prompted a far-reaching cultural debate about
fatherhood never before known in American history.”52
Further, as the “best interests of the child” standard began to displace the
traditional maternal preference in child custody determinations at divorce, the
definition of children’s best interests evolved. A small but growing body of
literature suggested that a child’s relationship with his “natural” father was
crucial as a matter of psychological health as well as financial stability.53
Influential illegitimacy expert Harry Krause, a law professor at the University
of Illinois, declared in 1967 that it was “time that the matter be considered
from the standpoint of the child!”54 In the late 1960s, Krause collaborated with
the ACLU, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, and other advocates to attack legal
classifications based on illegitimacy. As I have described in detail elsewhere,
plaintiffs in these early illegitimacy cases were African-American women and
their children; opponents of illegitimacy penalties argued that laws excluding
illegitimate children from wrongful death and workers’ compensation
payments, from public assistance benefits, from parental inheritance, and from

51.

See generally CROWLEY, supra note 9 (describing efforts by social workers, conservatives, and
feminists to enact and enforce child support laws).

52.

ROBERT L. GRISWOLD, FATHERHOOD IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 244-45 (1993).

53.

In her history of child custody, Mary Ann Mason notes that, until the 1970s, “the literature
on fatherhood had been scant.” MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER’S PROPERTY TO
CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 171 (1994).

54.

Harry D. Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MICH. L. REV. 477, 484 (1967).
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child support laws constituted discrimination based on race and poverty. They
also argued that children should not be penalized based on the marital status of
their parents, a matter wholly outside their control. By 1972, the Court had
decided a handful of illegitimacy cases in the plaintiffs’ favor, on decidedly
child-focused grounds. Without questioning the legitimacy of promoting
marriage and discouraging nonmarital childbearing, the Court ruled that
“hapless” and “innocent” children should not suffer for their parents’
transgressions.55
The emerging consensus that punitive anti-illegitimacy measures should
not be permitted to harm blameless children papered over profound
disagreement about sex, gender, and the problem of illegitimacy. Whereas
some civil libertarians, anti-poverty advocates, and later feminists questioned
marital supremacy, championed sexual liberation, and viewed illegitimacy
penalties as unjustly subordinating women, Krause and other more
conservative reformers set out to rescue children from the scourge of
fatherlessness. The nonmarital child’s best interests, Krause believed, required
eliminating the legal disabilities that prevented illegitimate children from
calling upon their fathers’ resources. His proposed Uniform Parentage Act,
ultimately promulgated in 1973, recommended presumptions for determining
paternity with the aim of establishing legal relationships between nonmarital
children and their fathers.56 The fiscal imperative to secure all available private
sources of support for nonmarital children fused with a growing sense that
nonmarital fathers could provide less tangible benefits to their offspring—an
intact sense of self, a stable authority figure, even a sometime caregiver.57
By the early 1970s, many policymakers and social work professionals
agreed that previously overlooked nonmarital fathers warranted further study
and regulation.58 But there was little consensus about how to approach legal or
social reform of nonmarital fatherhood. Most could agree on the desirability of
securing paternal financial support from nonmarital fathers, though they
struggled over the practicalities of holding impecunious fathers responsible.

55.

See Mayeri, supra note 21, at 1280.

56.

On Krause’s involvement in drafting the Uniform Parentage Act, see Martha F. Davis, Male
Coverture: Law and the Illegitimate Family, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 73 (2003). For more on
Krause and his critics, see Mayeri, supra note 21, at 1288-89.

57.

See generally HARRY D. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY (1971) (setting out a
comprehensive case for judicial and legislative reform of the law governing illegitimacy).

58.

See PANNOR ET AL., supra note 41; Harry D. Krause, The Bastard Finds His Father, 3 FAM. L.Q.
100 (1969); Deborah Shapiro, Effective Services for Unmarried Parents and Their Children:
Innovative Community Approaches, 43 SOC. SERV. REV. 109 (1969) (book review); Pearl S.
Weisdorf, Illegitimacy: Data and Findings for Prevention, Treatment, and Policy Formulation, 40
SOC. SERV. REV. 112 (1966) (book review).
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But custody and control of children were another matter entirely. Should the
law continue to assume that nonmarital fathers would routinely shirk their
parental obligations, rendering them presumptively unfit to participate in their
children’s upbringing? Or did changing family structures warrant a rethinking
of nonmarital fathers’ roles? What would nonmarital fathers’ rights mean for
adoption law and practice? How should disputes between unmarried parents
be adjudicated? And if feminists hoped to remake marital families in a genderegalitarian image, what did sex equality require in the absence of marriage?
B. “Much is Not Challenged Until Now”: The Court Confronts Equality for
Unwed Fathers in Stanley v. Illinois
In the spring of 1970, less than two years after the death of his “commonlaw wife” of eighteen years, Peter Stanley looked on helplessly as a judge
declared his two young children wards of the state, condemning them to a
series of foster placements and their father to years of legal turmoil. Illinois’s
definition of “parent” excluded “natural” fathers of illegitimate children, thus
denying Stanley even a hearing to determine whether he was fit to parent the
children he loved and had helped to raise from birth.
These were the stark facts that Peter Stanley’s lawyers presented to the U.S.
Supreme Court in 1971. The reality of Stanley’s legal status and of his record as
a father was more complicated.59 But if Stanley had been a woman, married or
unmarried, or if he had been able to produce proof of a valid marriage to the
children’s mother, he would have been their legal parent and would almost
certainly not have lost his parental rights.
Stanley’s inability to produce a marriage certificate made him a legal
stranger to Kimberly, age two-and-a-half, and Peter Jr., age one-and-a-half.60
In some states, Stanley could have presented proof of a common law marriage,
but Illinois abolished that institution early in the twentieth century.61 Instead,
Stanley’s attorneys argued that Stanley “did build up and develop a father

59.

For one thing, Stanley’s fitness as a parent had in fact been questioned. See infra note 63 and
accompanying text.

60.

Claiming that he and Joan had married in November of 1950, Stanley asked his attorneys to
request a continuance in order to search the public records of Illinois and Indiana for
evidence. See Appendix at 12, Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 654 (1972) (No. 70-5014)
[hereinafter Stanley Appendix].

61.

On the decline of common law marriage in the twentieth century, see LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, PRIVATE LIVES: FAMILIES, INDIVIDUALS, AND THE LAW 44-55 (2005). See also
Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist Proposal To Bring Back Common Law Marriage, 75 OR. L.
REV. 709, 711 (1996) (arguing that common law marriage protected the interests of women,
especially poor women and women of color).
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relationship” with his children. “[W]e feel,” said Fred Meinfelder of Legal Aid,
that “while he was not legally married to his wife that that should not be a
basis for removing those children from him . . . .”62 State officials told the
judge that Stanley was “not in a position to provide financial support” for his
children but that “if he did have some progress and was to marry and establish
an orderly family situation” he might be able to petition for custody later.63 His
lawyers emphasized that if Stanley were not a legally recognized parent, he
would have no standing to petition later for custody or any other rights. And
while he might be able to find a wife and “establish an orderly family situation”
in the future, under Illinois law Stanley could do nothing to change his legal
parenthood status with regard to Kimberly and Peter, Jr. As an amicus brief
later put it, “there is no way to marry a dead person.”64
Before the Illinois Supreme Court, Stanley’s lawyers argued that the
exclusion of fathers of illegitimate children from the category of “parent”
violated the Fourteenth Amendment.65 In a cryptic opinion, the Illinois court
ruled that unmarried fathers had no rights to their natural children unless such
rights were granted to them by a court in an adoption or guardianship
proceeding.66 Stanley had not sought guardianship or custody of his children,
preferring to leave them in the care of a married couple whom he had asked to
look after Kimberly and Peter Jr. a few months earlier. Pursuing an adoption
would have been risky, as Stanley would have been required to meet a much
higher standard than mere fitness—he would have had to prove himself a
“suitable” parent.67 As a practical matter, then, the court’s ruling meant that he
could be denied all access to the children—and indeed, he later petitioned for
visitation to no avail.68

62.

Stanley Appendix, supra note 60, at 14.

63.

Stanley Appendix, supra note 60, at 29-30.

64.

Brief for Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law as Amicus Curiae at 8, Stanley, 405 U.S.
654 (No. 70-5014).

65.

In re Stanley, 256 N.E.2d 814, 815 (Ill. 1970), rev’d, Stanley, 405 U.S. 654.

66.

Id.

67.

See Brief for the Petitioner at 7, Stanley, 405 U.S. 654 (No. 70-5014) (noting that suitability
to parent was “no where defined”).

68.

Stanley’s visitation rights were apparently restored after he appealed to the Illinois Supreme
Court, but his lawyer reported that “[e]ach time the children would finish seeing their
father, they would become upset and complain to the foster parents that they wanted to stay
with their real father.” Fredric Soll, Father Has Hopes of Getting Kids Back, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 4,
1972, at 3. Kimberly and Peter, Jr. lived in five different foster homes in three years. See id.
According to Peter Stanley’s attorney, they were eventually reunited with their father and
his new wife, after several years of instability. See Josh Gupta-Kagan, Stanley v. Illinois’
Untold Story, 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. (forthcoming 2016).
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1. Sex and the Single Father: Stanley Before the Supreme Court
Stanley’s case reached the Supreme Court at a turning point in the law of
sex equality. The Court’s most recent ruling on a sex-based equal protection
claim had upheld Florida’s exemption of women from jury duty on the ground
that the “woman is still regarded as the center of home and family life.”69 In
1971, the Court had yet to extend the umbrella of equal protection to forbid sex
discrimination against women, much less against men.70 But lower courts were
beginning, in fits and starts, to rule for sex discrimination plaintiffs, and with
the women’s movement resurgent, the political climate seemed increasingly
hospitable. The Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) was before Congress;
advocates for abortion law reform argued that reproductive freedom was
central to sex equality;71 Ginsburg brought a lawsuit on behalf of a man who
cared for his elderly mother but was denied Social Security benefits awarded to
similarly situated female caregivers;72 and feminist lawyers from the Center for
Constitutional Rights demanded equal parental-leave benefits for a husband
who wished to stay home to care for his newborn child.73 Although feminists
who had long challenged women’s legal, political, and economic disabilities
were beginning to represent male plaintiffs disadvantaged by sex stereotypes,
nonmarital fathers’ claims under the Constitution were new.74
Illinois’s custody statute discriminated based on both marital status and
sex: the category of “legal parent” included unmarried mothers but not
unmarried fathers; marital fathers were parents, but nonmarital fathers were
not. Peter Stanley’s case, argued the same day as Reed v. Reed,75 a sex equality
challenge to Idaho’s preference for male estate administrators, struck many as
primarily involving a question of sex discrimination—or “sex discrimination in
reverse,”76 in one reporter’s characterization. A typical headline the day after
69.

Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961). For more on Hoyt, see LINDA K. KERBER, NO
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES 177-83 (1998).

70.

For more on this pivotal period, see MAYERI, supra note 11, at 9-75; and Serena Mayeri,
Constitutional Choices: Legal Feminism and the Historical Dynamics of Change, 92 CALIF. L.
REV. 755, 801-19 (2004).

71.

See Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their Critical Basis and
Evolving Constitutional Expression, 56 EMORY L.J. 815, 815 (2007).

72.

On Moritz, see Franklin, supra note 18, at 122-24.

73.

See Danielson v. Bd. of Higher Educ., 358 F. Supp. 22, 24-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).

74.

Constitutional sex equality arguments against illegitimacy penalties had yet to emerge fully
in the early 1970s. See Mayeri, supra note 21, at 1344-45.

75.

404 U.S. 71 (1971).

76.

John P. MacKenzie, Supreme Court Rules for Working Mothers, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 1971, at
A2. Justice Blackmun’s clerk Robert E. Gooding, Jr. initially characterized the question
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oral arguments announced, “Supreme Court Asked to Upset ‘Sexist’ Laws in
Illinois, Idaho.”77 Justice Blackmun’s clerk Robert E. Gooding, Jr. thought
Stanley should have argued that sex was a suspect classification as Ginsburg
and her ACLU colleagues were contending in Reed.78 Stanley’s briefs instead
focused on a “biological and cultural” father’s fundamental interest in his
children as triggering the compelling state interest test. Illinois’s interest, the
lawyers argued, was not sufficiently compelling to justify the “drastic means”
of extinguishing an unmarried father’s parental rights upon the death of his
children’s mother.79 Even under rational basis review, Stanley’s lawyers
argued, exclusion of unwed fathers from the legal definition of a parent did not
serve the interests asserted by the state—protecting the welfare of illegitimate
children and promoting “the procreation of the species by and through the
marriage relationship.”80 And if the state sought to promote marriage, why
were unmarried mothers not similarly excluded?81
Although Stanley’s supporters did not use the language of stereotyping that
soon would become prevalent in the Court’s sex equality jurisprudence,82 they
did contend that individuals should not be judged by group-based
presented in Stanley as “whether the Ill statutory scheme, which discriminates . . . solely on
the basis of the parent’s sex, denies the surviving natural father equal protection of the law.”
Memorandum from Robert E. Gooding, Jr., Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to Justice Harry A.
Blackmun (Nov. 18, 1970) (on file with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Library of Congress,
Box 143, Case No. 70-5014 [hereinafter Harry A. Blackmun Papers]).
77.

Glen Elsasser, Supreme Court Asked To Upset “Sexist” Laws in Illinois, Idaho, CHI. TRIB., Oct.
20, 1971, at D6; see, e.g., Father of 2 Asks Court for Children, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 26, 1971, at 5;
Fred P. Graham, High Court Bars Sex Bias in Hiring in Test of ‘64 Act, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25,
1971, at 1; MacKenzie, supra note 76, at A2.

78.

Gooding observed that it was “not always clear whether pet[itione]r is complaining of
discrimination as between sole surviving fathers of illegitimate children and sole surviving
mothers, or as between fathers of illegitimate children and married fathers, or both.”
Memorandum from Robert E. Gooding, Jr., Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to Justice Harry A.
Blackmun, supra note 76.

79.

Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 67, at 19.

80.

See id. at 23-36. Some saw this test of “means-ends rationality” as a way for the Court to
avoid difficult substantive questions in equal protection cases. See Gerald Gunther,
Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 21-24 (1972).

81.

As one Justice told Illinois Attorney General Morton Friedman during oral argument in
Stanley, “[Y]ou still have to reach the question of why does Illinois treat the man different
from the woman in this respect? I mean, this is sort of a bootstrap argument. We do not
make him responsible, therefore, we treat him differently and because we make the woman
responsible we can treat her differently?” Oral Argument at 28:45, Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 654 (1972) (No. 70-5014) http://apps.oyez.org/player/#/burger3/oral_argument_audio
/16813 [http://perma.cc/K9BV-NRBE] [hereinafter Stanley Oral Argument].

82.

See Franklin, supra note 18, at 91-114.
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generalizations. Even if most unmarried fathers did not develop stable and
caring relationships with their illegitimate children, some did, and presuming
otherwise was unjust and unconstitutional. And even married fathers
frequently did not develop strong and sustained bonds with their children,
especially if the marriage had dissolved. Why, they asked, should divorced
fathers who had not seen their children in years enjoy parental rights while
devoted, never-married fathers were legal strangers?
Stanley’s lawyers resisted attempts to frame the equal protection issue as
one of simple sex discrimination, emphasizing that Illinois singled out unwed
fathers for discriminatory treatment.83 Illinois’s defense, too, inextricably
intertwined marital status and sex. Mothers, the state maintained, generally
assumed legal and social responsibility for their children regardless of
legitimacy.84 A mother who abandoned her child at birth without arranging for
its care committed a crime; fathers of nonmarital children did the same with
impunity.85 Imposing “the full range of parental duties” on mothers and on
married fathers warranted granting them “the full range of parental rights.”86
Mothers, by definition, were present from birth. And “[m]othering,” the state
contended, “is the result of the primary sexual drives of females.”87
Fathers, on the other hand, required a state-sanctioned legal structure to
impress them into the bonds of parenthood. To accomplish this feat, Illinois
concluded, “[t]he chosen institution of the state is marriage.”88 To earn equal
status with a child’s mother, the state reasoned, a father must demonstrate his
commitment to the family by marrying her.89 Under Illinois law, in fact,
marriage was the only way, short of adoption, for a man affirmatively to
assume parental duties and obtain parental rights. Tying fatherhood to
marriage, Illinois had developed a “comprehensive statutory pattern” designed
to ensure that children were cared for by fit and responsible adults.90 Marriage
conferred parental rights, the state argued, because it entailed non-negotiable
83.

At oral argument, one Justice asked whether the equal protection argument boiled down to
the father/mother distinction, and Legal Aid attorney Pat Murphy replied, “That is the
narrow equal protection argument. We think it is broader than that. We think the lines are
just so arbitrarily drawn, in other words why treat Stanley any different than you would a
wed father in similar circumstances?” Stanley Oral Argument, supra note 81, at 14:31.

84.

Brief for Respondent at 26-27, Stanley, 405 U.S. 645 (No. 70-5014).

85.

See id. at 15-16 (noting that under then-current Illinois statutes unmarried fathers were not
“parents” and so could not be held criminally liable for abandonment).

86.

Id. at 27 n.25.

87.

Id. at 25.

88.

Id. at 26.

89.

Id. at 27-29.

90.

Id. at 32.
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duties. Married fathers assumed responsibility for children by virtue of the
marital bond—indeed, most states conclusively presumed husbands to be the
fathers of their wives’ children regardless of biology. In contrast, “[t]he
putative father normally does not live with the mother of his illegitimate
children on a permanent basis,” the state contended.91 “He establishes no fixed
family unit, but only a transient relationship . . . .”92 Moreover, unlike a
legitimate father, he “often has no responsibilities” to his children or their
mother.93 Even imposing the “pecuniary obligation of support” required legal
action by the mother.94
Illinois defended marital primacy both as consonant with children’s best
interests and as an end in itself. Unmarried fathers rarely took an interest in
their children, Illinois contended, and when they did, their motives were
suspect: in Stanley’s case, the state suggested that he wanted access to his
children’s Social Security survivors benefits but had no desire to assume
responsibility for their care.95 To ensure that unfit fathers could not manipulate
the system at their children’s expense, the state required them affirmatively to
demonstrate commitment and fitness by adopting their children.96
Stanley’s case against the exclusion of unwed fathers from parental status
challenged the Court to overturn decades, even centuries, of precedent denying
any legal relationship between a father and his illegitimate child. He attacked
the premise that marital status was a proxy for parental fitness. But in another
sense, Stanley did not radically challenge marital supremacy. His attorneys
emphasized how Peter and Joan Stanley had lived together in a marriage-like
relationship, referring to Joan as Peter’s “common-law wife.”97 Peter’s
relationship with Joan and their children was no different from that of a
husband and legitimate father, they said, and it was irrational to treat him as if
he were uninterested and irresponsible. “The fact [that] Peter Stanley was a
voluntarily acknowledging and supporting father who had created and

91.

Id. at 24.

92.

Id.

93.

Id.

94.

Id.

95.

See id. at 6 (“Peter Stanley . . . expressed his interest in continuing to receive the Social
Security benefits due Peter Jr. and Kimberly Stanley. No question of custody was raised.”).

96.

The Child Care Association of Illinois worried that giving unwed fathers equal rights with
mothers would impede the efficiency and finality of adoption proceedings, to the detriment
of children. See Brief for the Child Care Ass’n of Illinois as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 2, Stanley, 405 U.S. 645 (No. 70-5014).

97.

E.g., Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 67, at 9. Illinois had abolished common law
marriage in 1905. See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 663-64 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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maintained a family is not changed by the mere presence or absence of a
marriage certificate.”98
Indeed, Stanley’s lawyers suggested, couples who cohabited without
marriage were different from men and women whose casual liaisons produced
children.
Except for the legal factor, this may be a family like any other. . . . The
very fact that they are parents in the social and emotional as well as the
biological sense distinguishes them immediately from the unmarried
mother and the unmarried father who establish no real or lasting
relationship with each other.99
In other words, the brief implied, the quality of a father’s relationship to the
mother of his children was indeed relevant to determining his parental fitness,
but sociological reality, rather than legal formality, should guide recognition of
family status. Notably, such a functional definition of family still relied on
marriage as a model, maintaining the privatization of dependence and linking
parental rights to obligations. Even so, Stanley challenged fundamental
assumptions about sex and marital status as determinants of legal parenthood.
2. “The Mother-Father Dichotomy”: Sidestepping Sex Equality in the
Supreme Court
Internal correspondence reveals how much was up for grabs as the Justices
grappled with questions of sex equality, the significance of marital status, and
contested assumptions about unmarried fatherhood. Some early drafts of
Justice Byron White’s opinion in Stanley decried the Illinois law as sex
discrimination, pure and simple.100 A draft opinion by Justice Thurgood
Marshall excoriated the equation of nonmarital fatherhood with paternal
dereliction.101 Ultimately, however, White’s sex equality analysis did not
survive, Marshall never filed his opinion attacking marital status
discrimination, and Stanley’s legacy for equal protection law remained

98.

Id. at 22; see also Murray, supra note 4, at 399-413 (arguing that fathers who acted like
husbands elicited more sympathy from the Court than those who never lived with their
children’s mothers).

99.

Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 67, at 22 (quoting YOUNG, supra note 37, at 147) (internal
quotation marks omitted).

100.

See sources cited infra notes 131-132 and accompanying text.

101.

See sources cited infra notes 115-121 and accompanying text.

2315

the yale law journal

125:2292

2016

ambiguous.102 In the end, a case that seemed clearly to present questions of
discrimination based on sex and marital status became a due process case only
nominally decided on equal protection grounds.
The Stanley Court was a Court in transition. Since the first illegitimacy
cases in 1968, President Richard Nixon had replaced Earl Warren with Warren
Burger as Chief Justice. Abe Fortas, who, like Warren, voted with the plaintiffs
in those cases, resigned from the Court; Harry A. Blackmun took his place in
late 1970. Hugo Black and John Marshall Harlan, two of the Justices who voted
against the illegitimacy plaintiffs, retired from the Court in September 1971,
and Lewis F. Powell, Jr. and William H. Rehnquist were confirmed for their
seats in December. Because Stanley was argued in October 1971, neither Powell
nor Rehnquist participated; the case was heard and decided by a sevenmember Court.103
Framing Stanley as a sex discrimination case might have seemed a
promising strategy to overcome the Court’s apparent ambivalence about
nonmarital fatherhood. In the 1971 case Labine v. Vincent, the Court appeared
to retreat abruptly from its 1968 decisions in Levy v. Louisiana and Glona v.
American Guarantee & Liability Co. recognizing the rights of illegitimate
children to equal protection of the laws.104 Newly minted Justice Blackmun had
cast one of his first Supreme Court votes in Labine to uphold an inheritance law
that distinguished between the legitimate and illegitimate children of fathers
who died intestate. Yet Blackmun was inclined to sympathize with Stanley’s
plight. “This is a very appealing case on its facts,” he wrote in an internal
memo. “Those facts, of course, make it difficult to affirm if one is going to be
at all emotional.” After reading his clerk’s bench memo, Blackmun tentatively
changed his mind, but noted that he could “be persuaded otherwise.”105

102.

The Court’s decision in his favor did not guarantee Stanley parental rights. The day after the
ruling, the Chicago Tribune reported that Stanley had married a divorcée with three children
of her own and that his lawyer believed his “chances of regaining custody of [his] children
are good.” Soll, supra note 68. Almost a year later, he had not regained custody, as the State
of Illinois tried to prove Stanley was an unfit parent. See Father’s Custody Fight Continues,
CHI. TRIB., Feb. 8, 1973, at 5. In July 1973, a judge “declared the children were neglected . . .
after Karen Stanley, 21, another daughter, charged that Stanley assaulted her and made
sexual advances after the mother’s death in 1969.” Joseph Sjostrom, Unwed Dad Loses Rights
to Children, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 14, 1973, at A16. In September of that year, Kimberly and Peter
became wards of the state. Id.

103.

The same was true of Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).

104.

Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 537-39 (1971); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Glona
v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968). For more on Labine, see Mayeri, supra
note 21, at 1300-05.

105.

Memorandum from Justice Harry A. Blackmun 1-2 (Aug. 17, 1971) (on file with Harry A.
Blackmun Papers, supra note 76). At various points, Blackmun was persuaded otherwise,
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At first, it seemed this “close and interesting” case would be dismissed on
procedural grounds.106 At conference, four of the seven sitting Justices—Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Stewart—voted to dismiss
the petition as improvidently granted due to uncertainty about the Illinois
Supreme Court’s vague opinion interpreting the state law. Brennan drafted a
brief per curiam opinion to this effect.107
However, the other three Justices soon circulated dissents from the
proposed dismissal, some advancing views of the case not presented by the
litigants. Justice William O. Douglas, recently the author of the Court’s first
decisions invalidating illegitimacy-based discrimination,108 initially saw the
Illinois law not as “an invidious discrimination against unwed fathers, but
rather a protection of illegitimate children.” Most unmarried fathers, Douglas
opined, “are not present at their children’s births and like hit-and-run drivers
are difficult to locate.”109 Most unmarried mothers did not remain involved in
their children’s lives, either, he believed, but rather “decide[d] to place their
offspring in the care of the state.”110 Given children’s interest in “swift and
certain placement in adoptive homes,” and prospective parents’ likely
reluctance to adopt if a father might “later demand custody or visiting
privileges,” Douglas thought the Illinois scheme reasonable.111 Even when
unwed fathers volunteered for parental duty, Douglas, like Illinois’s lawyers,
suspected their motives might be more pecuniary than paternal.112 In any event,
he could not imagine “an alternative system which might more meticulously
tailor [the challenged law] to its legislative objective of ensuring the welfare of
illegitimate offspring.”113

though he eventually joined Burger’s dissent. See generally Memorandum from Justice Harry
A. Blackmun to Justice Byron R. White (Nov. 18, 1971) (on file with Thurgood Marshall
Papers, Library of Congress, Box 91, Folder 6 [hereinafter Thurgood Marshall Papers]).
106.

Memorandum from Justice Harry A. Blackmun, supra note 105.

107.

Josh Gupta-Kagan suggests that Brennan may have voted to dismiss the petition as
improvidently granted to avoid a ruling against Stanley. Gupta-Kagan, supra note 68, at 5.

108.

Levy, 391 U.S. at 68; Glona, 391 U.S. at 73.

109.

Justice William O. Douglas, First Draft Dissent in Stanley v. Illinois 4 (Nov. 4, 1971) (on file
with William O. Douglas Papers, Library of Congress, Box 1556, Case No. 70-5014(d)
[hereinafter William O. Douglas Papers]).

110.

Id. The reality was more complicated and varied significantly by race and class. See generally
SOLINGER, supra note 34.

111.

Justice William O. Douglas, First Draft Dissent in Stanley v. Illinois, supra note 109.

112.

Justice William O. Douglas, Second Draft Dissent in Stanley v. Illinois 4 (Nov. 5, 1971) (on
file with William O. Douglas Papers, supra note 109).

113.

Id. at 5.
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Douglas’s draft cast unmarried fathers as callous, irresponsible, and
opportunistic, in implicit contrast to married fathers, whose legal responsibility
for their legitimate children presumptively entitled them to parental rights.
His focus on adoption suggests that the mothers and children Douglas had
in mind were white (as the Stanleys were).114 Marshall likely perceived the
legal treatment of nonmarital parenthood as particularly affecting AfricanAmerican families. His draft opinion115 called the use of marital status as a
proxy for parental fitness an “overinclusive stereotype.”116 To presume that
an unwed father was “most likely to have weak emotional and practical ties
to his children, and little ability or willingness to assume parental
responsibilities” was to make a “judgment” that “suffers from the deficiencies
114.

Douglas, who authored the Court’s opinion in the first two “illegitimacy” cases in 1968, may
have been aware that adoption rates for nonwhite nonmarital children, especially African
Americans, were much lower than those for white nonmarital children. See Mayeri, supra
note 21, at 1291 (discussing, inter alia, the NAACP LDF’s brief in Levy v. Louisiana, which
pointed to the disparity in adoption rates to underscore the racially disparate impact of antiillegitimacy laws).

115.

Marshall’s draft apparently was initially conceived as a dissent from Brennan’s per curiam
opinion dismissing the opinion as improvidently granted, but by the time it circulated,
White’s draft dissent from the dismissal had become the majority opinion.

116.

Justice Thurgood Marshall, Draft Opinion in Stanley v. Illinois 6 (Nov. 1971) (on file with
Thurgood Marshall Papers, supra note 105, at Box 91, Folder 5). At oral argument, Marshall
had pressed Illinois Attorney General Morton Friedman on the relevance of marriage to a
father’s relationship with his children:
Marshall: Mr. Friedman, suppose Stanley had married this woman he had been
living with two days before she died, what would his position be?
Friedman: Mr. Justice Marshall, he would then be classified as a legal parent and
entitled automatically to custody and control of them.
Marshall: The same man?
Friedman: Yes, sir. He would be—
Marshall: But he changed, when he married he changed?
Friedman: No, he did not change one bit. He performed a legal act that imposed
on him by law responsibility for the children beyond mere money
payments by the act of marriage.
Marshall: I do not see any change of anything.
Friedman: He changed not at all but by the act the marrying the woman he
became liable under law for more responsibilities than he had before.
He became liable for the schooling, for sending the child to school.
Marshall:

That makes him [a] more fit parent? . . . [Y]ou said primary interest
of the child, I thought I understood you.

Friedman: That is correct sir.
Marshall: Well as to the child, what difference?
Stanley Oral Argument, supra note 81, at 43:09.
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of any stereotype.”117 The leap from illegitimacy to unfitness, Marshall argued,
was wholly unwarranted. “There are many reasons for illegitimacy in our
society . . . ,” he wrote, including incentives created by welfare programs.118 A
father “might decline to marry the mother of his children in order to maximize
the family’s eligibility for financial assistance,” in which case “the fact of
illegitimacy provides no support whatever for the inference that the father lacks
concern for his children; indeed, it may tend to suggest the contrary
conclusion.”119 Or, like Stanley, a father might have lived with his children and
their mother in what would, in some states, be a common-law marriage.120
Given the “enormous magnitude” of the deprivation suffered by fathers who
developed relationships with their children, and the low cost of giving fathers
notice and an opportunity to be heard, Marshall argued that Illinois law denied
unwed fathers equal protection.121
Of the three draft dissents from dismissal, only White’s survived, though
his eventual majority opinion in Stanley differed significantly from earlier
versions. White’s first draft castigated the state for “impos[ing] the
presumption that if a father did not engage in the formal ceremony which
would have bound his relationship with the now deceased mother until death
or divorce, that therefore he is now unfit to raise his children.”122 That
presumption, White insisted, “risks running roughshod over the interests of
both the surviving father and the children.”123 It also violated Stanley’s right to
due process, since “there is nothing in this record lending any assurance, much
less substantial assurance, to the proposition that Peter Stanley, having lived
with and supported his children all their lives, is an unacceptable father solely
because of his failure to participate in a marriage ceremony.”124 Before Stanley

117.

Justice Thurgood Marshall, Draft Opinion in Stanley v. Illinois, supra note 116, at 5.

118.

Id.

119.

Id.

120.

Id. at 5-6.

121.

Id. at 6.

122.

Justice Byron R. White, First Draft Dissent in Stanley v. Illinois 4-5 (Nov. 8, 1971) (on file
with Byron R. White Papers, Library of Congress, Box 227, Folder 8 [hereinafter Byron R.
White Papers]). The first part of White’s draft opinion explained why the per curiam
opinion was wrong to suggest that Stanley could just adopt, or that he could seek custody
and control. Adoption, for a poor father without a plan to change his circumstances, was not
a real option, and custody and control (guardianship) would not give Stanley full parental
rights. In any event, White wrote, “[T]o give an unwed father only ‘custody and control’
while an unwed mother or a married father retained the rights of natural parenthood, would
still be to leave the unwed father prejudiced by reason of his status.” Id. at 4.

123.

Id. at 5.

124.

Id. at 6-7.

2319

the yale law journal

125:2292

2016

could be deprived of his children, White wrote, he must at least have “the
opportunity . . . to demonstrate that he has not been a neglectful parent.”125
Unlike his final opinion, White’s first draft also tackled Stanley’s equal
protection claim head-on, framing the Illinois law as discriminating against
unmarried fathers as compared with all other biological parents. “It may be,”
White wrote,
that in general there is some relationship between unwed fathers and
incompetent fathers. It is plausible that the relationship between the set
of unwed mothers and the set of incompetent mothers is weaker than
the relationship between the counterpart sets of fathers. It even may be
that separated or divorced fathers are more likely to be competent than
are unwed fathers.126
White “doubt[ed] all these propositions. But even if they are all in general well
taken, some unwed fathers are fit parents, some married fathers and unmarried
mothers totally unfit.”127 The stereotype might have some basis, in other
words, but “convenient administrative discrimination of this nature cannot be
tolerated when the issue at stake is the potential dismemberment of a
family.”128
White’s draft apparently persuaded Douglas, who circulated a new draft of
his own, much shorter than the first, agreeing that Illinois’s presumption of
unfitness violated procedural due process.129 Douglas did not agree with
White’s equal protection analysis, however: he read White’s draft to forbid
states from “requir[ing] a stricter showing of parental fitness” from unwed
fathers than from other parents.130
White’s second draft—now styled as an opinion for the Court—possibly
appealed even less to Douglas, for it framed the equal protection claim as a sex
discrimination issue:
[O]n the death of a spouse, unwed fathers lose their children but
unwed mothers suffer no diminution of control. This discrimination
between natural parents according to the superficial mother-father
125.

Id. at 7.

126.

Id. at 8.

127.

Id.

128.

Id. at 9.

129.

Justice William O. Douglas, First Draft Dissent in Stanley v. Illinois 20, supra note 109.

130.

See id.; Memorandum from William H. Alsup, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to Justice
William O. Douglas (Nov. 10, 1971) (on file with William O. Douglas Papers, supra note
109).
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dichotomy unnecessarily ignores and impermissibly overrides the
relevant criterion of a parent’s capacity to raise his child. Under this
standard, capable men . . . are separated from [their children], simply
because they are men. Such a division of the class of biological parents
into two groups, each defined by an immutable characteristic that does
not reliably reflect the underlying realities with which the State is
concerned, cannot pass muster in the face of constitutional standards
long established and recently reiterated by this Court.131
White’s draft went on to quote at length from Chief Justice Burger’s yet-to-bereleased opinion in Reed v. Reed, which struck down Idaho’s preference for
male estate administrators and for the first time invalidated sex discrimination
under the Equal Protection Clause.132
White’s sweeping sex discrimination argument was risky, as it implied that
mothers and fathers should have equal rights to their children, perhaps
regardless of marriage or other factors. Neither Stanley nor his amici had gone
this far, and it seemed unlikely that this view could command a plurality, much
less a majority of the Court. Indeed, in his never-published draft opinion,
Marshall did not opine on whether nonmarital fathers were entitled to equal
rights with mothers in a custody dispute between parents; Stanley’s suit was,
crucially, “a contest with the state,” not with a mother or a married father.133
Neither White’s full-blown sex neutrality rationale nor Marshall’s
emphasis on marital status equality garnered a majority.134 In the end, White’s
131.

Justice Byron R. White, Second Draft Opinion for the Court in Stanley v. Illinois 8 (Nov.
18, 1971) (on file with Byron R. White Papers, supra note 122, at Box 227, Folder 8).

132.

404 U.S. 71, 74 (1971). Reed v. Reed was handed down several days later, on November 22,
1971. Id. at 71.

133.

Justice Thurgood Marshall, supra note 116, at 7 n.4. Marshall wrote:
This case does not present the question whether the father and the mother are
entitled to equal rights in a custody contest between them, and we intimate no
views on that question, which may involve considerations quite different from
those presented by this case. Here we are concerned only with the question
whether the father of an illegitimate child, in a contest with the State, is entitled
to the same recognition as a parent that would be afforded by the State to the
father of a legitimate child, or to the mother of any child.
Id. In Justice Marshall’s second draft, the text of this footnote appeared in the body the
opinion. Justice Thurgood Marshall, Second Draft Opinion in Stanley v. Illinois 3-4 (Nov.
1971) (on file with Thurgood Marshall Papers, supra note 105, at Box 91, Folder 6).

134.

The stronger due process holding in Justice White’s final opinion apparently persuaded
Marshall to join him and leave his own draft opinion unpublished. See Gupta-Kagan, supra
note 68, at 38; Memorandum from Barbara Underwood, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to
Justice Thurgood Marshall 1 (Feb. 4, 1972) (on file with Thurgood Marshall Papers, supra
note 105, at Box 91, Folder 5) (“I think Justice White’s revised opinion is a great
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opinion for the Court focused almost entirely on due process, affirming
Stanley’s “interest . . . in the children he has sired and raised” but leaving open
many questions about the ruling’s scope.135 A lengthy passage about parental
rights consigned to a footnote in earlier drafts appeared prominently in the text
of the finished opinion. “The rights to conceive and to raise one’s children have
been deemed ‘essential,’” White wrote.136 The interest of a “man in the children
he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful
countervailing interest, protection.”137 White used the early illegitimacy cases
to support the extension of this solicitude to unmarried fathers. “Nor has the
law refused to recognize those family relationships unlegitimized by a marriage
ceremony,” he wrote, characterizing the “familial bonds” of nonmarital families
as “often as warm, enduring, and important as those arising within a more
formally organized family unit.”138 Even if granting procedural protections to
unmarried fathers would be costly and time-consuming, “the Constitution
recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency,”139 White concluded, and to
deprive unwed fathers of a fitness hearing available to all other custodial
parents denied them equal protection.140 As constitutional scholar Gerald
Gunther observed, the Court’s decision relied only “marginally” on equal
protection, a back door through which to decide the case without relying on an
argument not raised in the state courts below.141
The Court’s opinion in Stanley sidestepped the questions White had faced
head-on in his earlier draft: could states deny unmarried fathers rights they
granted to unmarried mothers? How did the nascent jurisprudence of sex
improvement over his first draft. While I still prefer our approach . . . . I see no compelling
reason not to join Justice White’s opinion.”).
135.

Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). Gupta-Kagan suggests that White dropped
most of the equal protection language and strengthened his due process holding in an effort
to command a majority. See Gupta-Kagan, supra note 68, at 27-39.

136.

Id. (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).

137.

Id.

138.

Id. at 651-52.

139.

Id. at 656.

140.

Id. at 649 (“We conclude that, as a matter of due process of law, Stanley was entitled to a
hearing on his fitness as a parent before his children were taken from him and that, by
denying him a hearing and extending it to all other parents whose custody of their children
is challenged, the State denied Stanley the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment.”).

141.

Gunther, supra note 80, at 25. The Court’s analysis also avoided wading too deep into
substantive due process, a concern Marshall clerk Barbara Underwood expressed about
Justice White’s earlier drafts. See Memorandum from Barbara Underwood, Clerk, U.S.
Supreme Court, to Justice Thurgood Marshall 2 (Nov. 22, 1971) (on file with Thurgood
Marshall Papers, supra note 105, at Box 91, Folder 6).
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equality apply, if at all, to unwed parents’ rights and duties? Burger—author of
the cryptic opinion in Reed, which revitalized sex-based equal protection law—
made his views clear in dissent. He thought states were “fully justified in
concluding, on the basis of common human experience, that the biological role
of the mother in carrying and nursing an infant creates stronger bonds between
her and the child than the bonds resulting from the male’s often casual
encounter.”142 White’s majority opinion did not speak directly to this sex
discrimination question, which many believed to be central to the case.143
Stanley’s effect on marital primacy also remained nebulous. Certainly,
granting any rights to unwed fathers made paternal prerogatives less
dependent upon marital status than they traditionally had been.144 As Chief
Justice Burger wrote in an early draft of his dissent, “Unmarried fathers are not
recognized, they are given no rights, and they are burdened with no
responsibilities. . . . This has been the pattern of society’s dealing with the
support and paternity of illegitimate children for centuries and never
challenged until now.”145 In the margin of his copy, Justice Blackmun, who
eventually joined Chief Justice Burger’s dissent, wrote: “Well, much is not
challenged until now,” and cited Reed v. Reed.146 Although it opened the door
to further erosion, Stanley declared an end neither to the “mother-father
dichotomy” nor to the privileging of marital families.
Many saw Stanley as “revolutionary” in its unprecedented embrace of
biological fathers’ due process rights, and its declaration that children could
not be removed from a parent’s custody without a hearing to determine fitness.
But whether Stanley portended more than nominal parental rights for
nonmarital fathers remained to be seen.147 Stanley pitted an apparently involved
142.

Stanley, 405 U.S. at 665 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice Burger sarcastically noted in a
memo to the conference that his dissent contained “unacknowledged plagiarizing” from
Douglas’s “excellent” original opinion. Memorandum from Chief Justice Warren E. Burger
to the Conference (Dec. 2, 1971) (on file with Thurgood Marshall Papers, supra note 105, at
Box 91, Folder 6).

143.

Contemporaneous commentary recognized this limitation. See, e.g., Fred P. Graham, Male
Lib: No Relief for the Chauvinist Pigs, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1972, at E9.

144.

The Court’s contemporaneous decision in Eisenstadt v. Baird, extending constitutional
protection to unmarried individuals and couples who sought access to contraception,
seemed to bode well for equal protection challenges to law that discriminated based on
marital status, but it, too, had ambiguous ramifications. 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (applying
rational basis review under the equal protection clause).

145.

Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Draft Dissent in Stanley v. Illinois 8 (Dec. 2, 1971) (on file
with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, supra note 76).

146.

Id.

147.

On the questions left open by Stanley, see, for example, KENNETH DAVIDSON, RUTH BADER
GINSBURG & HERMA HILL KAY, TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION
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father against the state; when the interests of mothers, husbands, marital
fathers, or adoptive parents weighed in the balance, granting rights to unwed
fathers seemed more like a zero-sum game.148
ii. t h e e m e r g e n c e o f a f e m in is t d ile m m a : p a r e n t h o o d ,
(n o n )-m a r r ia g e , a n d t h e s e x e q u a lit y r e v o lu t io n ,
1972-77

The 1970s were transformative for feminism, family law, and not
coincidentally, the rise of conservative movements to reassert traditional
values. This Part describes developments in feminist legal advocacy, sex
equality law, marriage and divorce, fathers’ rights, and anti-feminism that
shaped how advocates and legal decision makers viewed nonmarital
fatherhood. Feminists agreed that sex neutrality for married parents served the
goals of women’s equality and liberation from traditional gender roles, and
they persuaded the Court to endorse their egalitarian vision of marital
parenthood. However, feminists were ambivalent about sex neutrality in
nonmarital parenthood, at least where the interests of mothers and fathers
diverged.
Second-wave feminist legal advocates set out to transform the traditional
marital bargain in which husbands supported wives and children in exchange
for wives’ caregiving labor and personal services. In the years after Stanley,
Ginsburg and her allies largely succeeded in persuading the Supreme Court to
require governmental neutrality with respect to the gendered division of labor
within marital households. Expanding fathers’ caregiving roles was a key
component of Ginsburg’s vision of egalitarian marriage, in which husbands
and wives enjoyed the freedom to choose nontraditional roles and to become
interdependent, even interchangeable spouses. A less visible and less successful
strand of feminist legal advocacy attacked illegitimacy penalties as an affront to
sex equality. Fathers played a more complicated role in this strand of advocacy,
depending on the context of the rights or benefits fathers claimed as rightfully
theirs. Feminism’s relationship to the movement for divorced fathers’ rights
was similarly complex. And increasingly, feminists disagreed among
themselves over the meaning of sex equality for nonmarital parenthood.

366-71 (2d ed. 1981); KENNETH R. REDDEN, FEDERAL REGULATION OF FAMILY LAW 73 (1982);
and David S. Baron, Constitutional Law—Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection—Rights of
the Unwed Father—Consent to Adoption, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 312, 316 (1976).
148.

Cf. Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 846 (1977)
(Brennan, J.) (noting the difficulty of finding a constitutionally protected liberty interest for
one individual when doing so would “derogat[e] from the substantive liberty of another”).
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A. “An Ideal Case”: Married Fathers as Equal Parents in Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld
In the years following Stanley, many of feminists’ greatest advances toward
constitutional sex equality came in cases involving sex-based classifications in
the provision of government benefits to married couples. Ginsburg’s
“grandmother brief” in Reed v. Reed contained a now-famous Appendix that
listed hundreds of sex-based distinctions in state and federal marriage laws.149
Many feminist legal advocates saw marriage as a primary vehicle for the
perpetuation of sex and gender roles that confined women to a stifling
domesticity and deprived them of political and economic power. Marriage also
loomed as a central locus of government complicity in sex inequality. Feminists
argued that by casting husbands as breadwinners and wives as dependent
caregivers, the state devalued women’s wage-earning and men’s caregiving
work, rewarding gendered division of labor in marital households and
penalizing couples who failed to conform to traditional gender roles.
Accordingly, many of the cases in the growing constitutional sex equality
canon involved married couples or widowers challenging the government’s
previously unquestioned prerogative to distinguish between husbands and
wives for the purposes of awarding government benefits. Ginsburg’s litigation
campaign convinced a majority of the Court that the government should
remain neutral toward gender roles in the marital family. In cases such as
Frontiero v. Richardson (1973) and Califano v. Goldfarb (1977), the Court struck
down government benefit schemes that assumed wives’ and widows’
dependence and deprived the families of women wage-earners of advantages
available to their male counterparts.150 Backed by a robust social movement
seeking equality on many fronts, including legislative and constitutional
amendment advocacy at the state and federal levels, these cases helped
feminists to achieve through litigation what they had originally sought to
accomplish through an equal rights amendment.151
Feminists’ vision of gender-egalitarian marriage extended beyond
breadwinning wives; they took care also to spotlight the abilities and
importance of fathers as caregivers and nurturers of children. Ginsburg and her
colleagues believed that encouraging husbands to take on greater
149.

Brief for Appellant at 69-88, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (No. 70-4). This appendix
was cited in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603 (2015).

150.

Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 217 (1977); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 69091 (1973); see also Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 282 (1979) (requiring alimony statutes to be sexneutral).

151.

See Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change:
The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1323-24 (2006).
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responsibilities at home was integral to enabling women to pursue rewarding
careers without sacrificing family relationships or well-being. Such active
fatherhood also benefited men and children, who would enjoy richer
relationships liberated from the traditional gender roles that, as Ginsburg often
emphasized, limited men as much as women. In Ginsburg’s “ideal case,”152
Stephen Wiesenfeld, widowed by his wife’s death in childbirth, challenged his
exclusion from Social Security “[m]other’s insurance”153 benefits, which would
have allowed a widowed mother to reduce her working hours and receive
government support to care for a child at home.
In a rare unanimous decision, the Justices agreed. Justice Brennan’s
majority opinion, drafted by his first female law clerk, Marsha Berzon,
embraced both of Ginsburg’s arguments. Men were, to be sure, “more likely
than women to be the primary supporters of their spouses and children,”
Justice Brennan wrote.154 “But,” he continued, “such a gender-based
generalization cannot suffice to justify the denigration . . . of women who do
work and whose earnings contribute significantly to their families’ support.”155
Paula Wiesenfeld, a schoolteacher and, for a time, the family’s primary
breadwinner, received fewer benefits from her hard-earned wages than a
similarly situated man, whose family could have collected “mother’s insurance”
benefits, would have. Further, the statute discriminated “among surviving
children solely on the basis of the sex of the surviving parent.”156 It was “no less
important for a child to be cared for by its sole surviving parent when that
parent is male rather than female,” Justice Brennan continued.157 “And,” he
wrote, quoting Stanley, “a father, no less than a mother, has a constitutionally
protected right to the ‘companionship, care, custody, and management’ of ‘the
children he has sired and raised, (which) undeniably warrants deference and,
absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection.’”158
Justice Powell’s concurring opinion, joined by Chief Justice Burger, agreed
that the “statutory scheme . . . impermissibly discriminates against a female
wage earner,” but attached “less significance” than the majority did to a father’s
nurturing role.159 “In light of the long experience to the contrary,” Justice
Powell wrote, “one may doubt that fathers generally will forgo work and
152.

An Open Discussion with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 36 CONN. L. REV. 1033, 1037 (2004).

153.

Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 402(g)(1970)).

154.

Id.

155.

Id.

156.

Id. at 651.

157.

Id. at 652.

158.

Id. (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)).

159.

Id. at 654 (Powell, J., concurring).
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remain at home to care for children to the same extent that mothers may make
this choice.”160 Privately, Justice Powell disapproved of fathers who would
abdicate the breadwinner role. When his clerk, Penny Clark, speculated that
fathers who elected to stay home with children would be “a small class, no
doubt,” Powell wrote in the margin of her memo, “I would hope so—though
the ever-increasing welfare rolls even in prosperous times suggest a high level
of indolence.”161 Wiesenfeld marked a triumph for the feminist vision of
egalitarian marriage and shared parenting, even as it exposed continuing
ambivalence among the Justices about the proper roles of mothers and fathers.
B. Fiallo v. Bell and the Feminist Argument for Nonmarital Parents’ Rights
As Ginsburg and her colleagues sought to encourage an egalitarian division
of labor at home and in the workplace, another strand of feminist legal
advocacy focused on alleviating discrimination against mothers of nonmarital
children. Far less coordinated than Ginsburg’s litigation strategy, the campaign
against illegitimacy penalties enlisted an assortment of self-identified feminist
advocates as well as civil rights, anti-poverty, and legal aid lawyers during the
1970s.162 Feminists argued that laws, policies, and practices that penalized
nonmarital childbearing had particularly devastating consequences for women,
who, as a matter of law and of custom, had long borne primary if not exclusive
responsibility for the care and support of nonmarital children.163 They attacked
laws that excluded illegitimate children from public benefits, from workers’
compensation, from recovery for parents’ wrongful death, and from paternal
child support and inheritance.164 And they challenged prohibitions on the
employment of “unwed mothers,” mandatory paternity disclosure
requirements that forced mothers to reveal the names of their nonmarital
children’s fathers, and the exclusion of never-married mothers from the Social
Security survivors’ benefits the Court had extended to marital fathers in
Wiesenfeld.165
160.

Id.

161.

Mayeri, supra note 18, at 1813 (quoting Memorandum from Julia “Penny” Clark, Clerk, U.S.
Supreme Court, to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 3 (Jan. 17, 1975) (on file with Lewis F. Powell,
Jr. Papers, Washington & Lee University School of Law, Box 168, Case No. 73-1892, http://
law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/73-1892_WeinbergerWeisenfeld.pdf [http://
perma.cc/U9YJ-H27Q] [hereinafter Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers]).

162.

I have explored feminist and other arguments against illegitimacy penalties in depth
elsewhere. See Mayeri, supra note 21.

163.

See id. at 1319.

164.

See id. at 1279-80.

165.

See id. at 1318, 1323.
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Nonmarital fathers appeared in various guises in feminist advocacy against
illegitimacy penalties. In litigation challenging Texas’s exclusion of nonmarital
fathers from civil and criminal liability for child nonsupport, these men were
deadbeats who, aided and abetted by the state, avoided the pecuniary
responsibilities of fatherhood. In other cases, such as employment bans that
singled out women with nonmarital children, advocates noted that mothers
who embraced the responsibilities of parenthood suffered while fathers who
abandoned their families escaped scot-free. Mandatory paternity disclosure
cases painted an especially unflattering picture of unwed fathers, with mothers
expressing their reluctance to involve fathers who might resent being called to
account, and might even resort to violence.
But in most illegitimacy penalty cases, the interests of nonmarital mothers
and fathers were not necessarily opposed. Laws that created obstacles to
paternal inheritance for illegitimate children thwarted fathers who might have
intended to provide for their nonmarital offspring. Excluding illegitimate
children from public benefits or private compensation available to legitimate
children injured the parent or parents with primary responsibility for those
children regardless of sex. Even employment bans that did not directly affect
fathers arguably discouraged them from maintaining potentially salutary
relationships with their nonmarital children.
Some of the 1970s cases involved illegitimacy and sex-based discrimination
that directly disadvantaged nonmarital fathers and, less obviously, harmed
mothers. One such lawsuit, Fiallo v. Bell, challenged several laws that denied
certain citizenship and immigration privileges to nonmarital fathers and their
children, but not to nonmarital mothers and their children.166 Each of the
plaintiff families in Fiallo included fathers who had supported and nurtured
their nonmarital children.167 Their briefs used Stanley, Wiesenfeld, and the
growing social science literature on fatherhood to extol the virtues of
unmarried fathers who defied stereotypes to participate fully in raising their
children, only to be unjustly denied the opportunity to transmit or receive
citizenship status on the basis of the parent-child relationship.
Fiallo presented a largely foregone opportunity to advance an explicitly
feminist argument for nonmarital fathers’ rights. Indeed, a footnote in the
plaintiffs’ brief in Fiallo suggested that eliminating the sex-based
discrimination in the challenged laws would actually benefit nonmarital
mothers.168 A U.S. citizen who fathered a child by a noncitizen could rest
assured that, if he could not care for his illegitimate U.S.-domiciled child, “that
166.

430 U.S. 787 (1977).

167.

Id.

168.

See Brief for Appellants at 24 n.17, Fiallo, 430 U.S. 787 (No. 75-6297).
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child can be united in this country with the other parent, the mother.”169 But a
U.S. citizen mother in the same circumstance “has no similar assurance . . .
since the father is effectively barred from entering this country.”170 Just as
Paula Wiesenfeld’s Social Security benefits were worth less to her family than a
husband’s would have been, so a mother’s U.S. citizenship did not guarantee
her and her children the care of their “sole surviving parent.”171 Ginsburg
wanted to file an amicus brief in Fiallo, presumably in order to make just such
an argument, but despite the support of several colleagues, ACLU Legal
Director Mel Wulf rejected the idea for reasons that are not clear.172
Some jurists did see the challenged distinctions between fathers and
mothers in Fiallo as constitutionally problematic because of their harm to
fathers and nonmarital children, as opposed to mothers. Judge Weinstein
dissented from the three-judge district court ruling upholding the laws, and
Powell’s clerk J. Philip Jordan initially called the laws “totally arbitrary sex
discrimination,” before concluding that Congress’s plenary immigration power
nonetheless counseled against striking them down.173 Powell ultimately wrote
the majority opinion upholding the provisions. His clerk Gene Comey
recommended that Powell avoid endorsing the government’s contention that
“natural fathers and illegitimate children” were less likely to have a “strong
interest in intimacy” than other parents and children.174 Comey saw “no reason
to rely on this somewhat ‘distasteful’ argument,” which contravened the
Court’s recent shift toward “a position where legitimate and illegitimate
families are generally considered to have a strong degree of family intimacy and
unity.”175 Justice Powell rejected Comey’s advice, referring in his opinion to “a
169.

Id. The footnote continued by noting that a citizen or permanent resident mother “could not
be assured that upon her death her children would be supported and cared for in this
country.” Id.

170.

Id.

171.

Id. at 35. The brief also cited Wiesenfeld throughout. See, e.g., id. at 20, 23, 25.

172.

For more, see Mayeri, supra note 21, at 1329-30, 1329 n.328.

173.

See id. at 1328, 1330 & n.330 (quoting Preliminary Memorandum to Justice Powell 1 (May 10,
1976) (on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, supra note 161, at Box 186, Case No. 75-6297,
http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/FialloBell.pdf [http://perma.cc/F3NH
-WRWY])); see also Kristin A. Collins, Deference and Deferral: Constitutional Structure and the
Durability of Gender-Based Nationality Laws, in THE PUBLIC LAW OF GENDER: FROM THE
LOCAL TO THE GLOBAL (Kim Rubenstein & Katharine G. Young eds., forthcoming 2016)
(describing interbranch dialogue about Fiallo and the plenary power doctrine).

174.

Memorandum from Gene Comey, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to Justice Lewis F. Powell,
Jr. 4 (Dec. 6, 1976) (on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, supra note 161, at Box 186, Case
No. 75-6297, http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/FialloBell.pdf [http://
perma.cc/F3NH-WRWY]).

175.

Id.
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perceived absence in most cases of close family ties” between fathers and their
nonmarital children as a legitimate rationale.176 Justice Marshall’s dissent in
Fiallo condemned the challenged provisions, citing the sex equality cases, the
illegitimacy cases, and the “fundamental ‘freedom of personal choice in matters
of marriage and family life.’”177 He saw the majority’s position as sanctioning
“invidious discrimination” against nonmarital fathers and children, contrary to
precedents such as Stanley and Wiesenfeld.178
In cases such as Stanley, Wiesenfeld, and Fiallo, fathers’ constitutional claims
dovetailed with feminists’ desire to encourage paternal caregiving and to
combat sex-stereotypes about maternal superiority that threatened women’s
status as full citizens. In these cases, the interests of mothers and fathers,
married or not, coincided: fathers’ rights served mothers’ rights. In the
increasingly contentious arena of divorce reform and child custody, however,
the story was quite different.
C. “The Cart Before the Horse”: Divorce, Fathers’ Rights, and the New
Nonmarital Bargain
Although unmarried fathers did not organize in large numbers during the
1970s, divorced fathers did. Legal historian Deborah Dinner has uncovered a
robust and influential mobilization of fathers’ rights activists intent on shaping
a new “divorce bargain” in the wake of the no-fault revolution.179 As Dinner
describes, rising divorce rates and feminist self-assertion threatened the
patriarchal ideal to which many fathers’ rights leaders subscribed.180 At the
same time, economic recession, wage stagnation, and rising unemployment
combined with increasingly vigorous child support enforcement efforts to put
financial pressure on divorced fathers.181 Fathers’ rights activists capitalized on
the rise of formal sex equality to argue for their own brand of gender neutrality
at divorce. Divorced fathers sought to minimize their financial obligations to
ex-wives and children, arguing that sex equality meant women should support
themselves post-divorce.182 Ex-wives, they argued, had no claim on their
former spouses’ income since they were no longer providing the homemaking
176.

Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 799.

177.

Id. at 810, 813-16 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414
U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974)).

178.

Id. at 810.

179.

See Dinner, supra note 17.

180.

See id. at 93-94.

181.

See id. at 105, 112.

182.

See id. at 110-11.
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services that underpinned the marital bargain. Moreover, fathers’ rights
advocates challenged maternal preferences in child custody as unjust sex
discrimination that deprived fathers of cherished relationships with children.183
Many feminists, too, scorned the maternal preference, but for very different
reasons. As Dinner recounts, “[f]eminists argued that the [maternal]
presumption entrenched gender ideologies that maintained mothers’ primary
responsibility for caregiving.”184
Since at least the late 1960s, some feminists had expressed misgivings
about the no-fault revolution’s consequences for women and children. Faultbased divorce, they believed, gave wives a valuable bargaining chip: the ability
to withhold consent if their husbands did not agree to fair financial and
custody arrangements. Easier divorce, they worried, would not liberate women
so long as courts did not ascribe value to wives’ homemaking and caregiving
labor when distributing property and fashioning alimony awards. Instead, men
would be free to discard their wives, abandon their children, and start life anew
while newly single mothers with few marketable job skills languished in
poverty. The decline of the maternal presumption in child custody decision
making also seemed to undermine women’s bargaining position. Whereas
maternal preferences placed the onus on fathers who genuinely desired
custody, the “best interests of the child” standard apparently penalized the
parent who most feared losing custody, pressuring her to trade away financial
support in exchange for uncontested custody rights.185
Anti-feminist activism also pushed more feminists to address the plight of
women who had devoted their lives to homemaking and motherhood, only to
find themselves in dire economic straits when their marriages ended. Phyllis
Schlafly’s campaign against the ERA excoriated the amendment’s proponents
for abandoning homemakers to the penury of divorce on demand, which, in
the colorful rhetoric of opponents, allowed husbands to abandon their wives
and children with impunity.186 Schlafly’s core constituency included women
who had counted on the traditional marital bargain, only to feel that feminists
had pulled the rug out from under them. ERA opponents argued that
egalitarian marriage threatened financial and existential insecurity for women
who had already chosen to specialize in caregiving. As the ERA ratification
battle wore on, proponents increasingly emphasized how fragile the traditional

183.

See id. at 113-16.

184.

Id. at 114.

185.

See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case
of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 979 (1979).

186.

See Mary Ziegler, An Incomplete Revolution: Feminists and the Legacy of Marital-Property
Reform, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 259, 275-81 (2013).
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marital bargain had been under the old regime of title-based property
distribution and unpredictable alimony awards. They framed the ERA as a tool
for equalizing the financial consequences of divorce by valuing homemakers’
contributions to the marital household and enforcing divorced fathers’ child
support obligations.187
By the mid- to late- 1970s, some had begun to question whether feminists
had put the cart before the horse, as ACLU Juvenile Rights Project director
and self-described feminist Rena Uviller suggested. “If sex-neutral custody
laws presently either reflected a reality of pervasive shared child care during
marriage or helped eliminate persistent sexual stereotyping in the job market,
they would be a legitimate feminist objective,” wrote Uviller.188 But the
economic and social reality of the late 1970s and early 1980s was no egalitarian
utopia. “The practical fact remains that the male-dominated working world
is not yet prepared to receive women on equal terms. Nor are fathers in
meaningful numbers assuming equal child care responsibilities during
marriage.”189 Fathers’ rights organizations might couch their arguments in
terms of sex neutrality and children’s best interests, but Uviller detected
“misogynist[ic] overtones” in their “excoriat[ion]” of wives as “blood-sucking
parasites” and alimony as “an undiluted evil.”190 In light of severe and
persistent inequalities in the workplace and at home, maintaining the maternal
presumption was more like affirmative action than invidious discrimination.
“[A]t this point in history,” Uviller concluded, “the law should recognize a
woman’s option to keep the children whose daily care she has so
disproportionately assumed.”191
Rising divorce rates converged with nonmarital childbearing to increase the
number and visibility of single mothers and female-headed households in the
1970s, plunging even formerly middle-class women and children into poverty.
Some feminists argued that for many poor women shared parenting was a pipe
dream. “[T]he vast majority of mothers below the poverty line are single:
either never married, separated, or divorced,” Uviller wrote in 1978. “For them,
the notion of shared child care . . . is sheer abstraction.”192 Others doubted that
paternal involvement in nonmarital families would benefit mothers, and
resented the state’s attempts to privatize dependence by forcing mothers either
187.

Id.

188.

Rena K. Uviller, Fathers’ Rights and Feminism: The Maternal Presumption Revisited, 1 HARV.
WOMEN’S L.J. 107, 117 (1978).

189.

Id.

190.

Id. at 116.

191.

Id. at 130.

192.

Id. at 119.
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to identify their children’s fathers and seek child support from them, or to lose
public assistance. Feminists such as Aleta Wallach and Patricia Tenoso
challenged the premise that women and children should be dependent upon
men for sustenance, insisting that mothers should be “treat[ed] . . . as an
economic resource.”193 The focus on ascertaining paternity obscured
alternatives, such as “adequate governmental support of all unmarried mothers
and their children.”194 Increasingly aggressive measures to secure child support
for poor children reduced welfare expenditures but provided paltry financial
benefit to mothers. For mothers, the old nonmarital bargain of full parental
rights in exchange for sole responsibility was eroding, and some feared that
any expansion of nonmarital fathers’ rights would come at their expense.
In the context of marriage and divorce, feminists largely agreed on the end
goal: to promote gender-egalitarian marriages and fairness at divorce. Their
internal disagreement mostly concerned means: how best to achieve the legal
and social changes required to transform the gendered division of family labor
so that women and men alike could participate fully in breadwinning and
caregiving. Feminists’ disagreement about unmarried parenthood arguably ran
deeper, and the feminist objective was less clear where a mother and father
never consented to a legal bond with one another. Should the law encourage
paternal involvement in nonmarital child rearing, or merely financial
responsibility? Was unmarried mothers’ primary responsibility for the care of
their children inevitable, or malleable? What role should individual mothers’
preferences about paternal involvement play in decisions about a father’s rights
and responsibilities? Was adoption by a two-parent family, if desired by the
mother, a better outcome than giving custody to an unmarried father over the
mother’s objection? And to what degree should mothers be able to rely on the
state for support in the absence of paternal involvement? By the mid- to late1970s, internal feminist dissension over strategies and priorities in the fight for
family equality had just begun to surface in public discourse; these disputes
influenced litigation strategy in unwed fathers’ cases in ways that would only
later become visible.

193.

Patricia Tenoso & Aleta Wallach, Book Review, 19 UCLA L. REV. 845, 850 (1972) (reviewing
HARRY D. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY (1971)).

194.

Id.
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iii. u n m a r r ie d f a t h e r s v s . h u s b a n d s in t h e s u p r e m e c o u r t ,
1978-79
Stanley v. Illinois raised serious questions for established adoption law and
practice.195 Most states had long allowed adoption of illegitimate children
without notice to the natural father, and some read Stanley’s infamous footnote
nine to require a dramatic expansion of unmarried fathers’ procedural rights.196
States scrambled to comply, implementing a patchwork of requirements
reflecting the idiosyncratic regulation of parental rights generally. Almost half
the states enacted statutes requiring notice only to fathers who were “either
known, identified by the mother or ha[d] acknowledged the child.”197 A few
states removed formal distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate children
for adoption purposes, but in practice procedures developed to bypass paternal
consent. In California, for example, a biological father could not object to an
adoption if he did not “receive the child into his home and openly hold out the
child as his natural child.”198 Adoption expert Ruth-Arlene Howe wrote that
despite the initial panic and temporary halt in adoptions post-Stanley, by the
end of the decade “the vast majority of states” placed on the unmarried father
“the burden . . . to affirmatively assert his paternal interests in the child” to
earn the right to notice and a hearing.199 Still, Stanley broke ground by giving
many unmarried fathers the opportunity to have a say in their children’s
future.

195.

Adding to observers’ sense that a sea change might be at hand, the Court remanded
Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Services, a case involving an unwed father’s opposition to the
adoption of his biological child, for reconsideration in light of Stanley. 405 U.S. 1051 (1972).
For a contemporaneous journalistic assessment, see, for example, Terry P. Brown, Fathers’
Rights: Supreme Court Rulings on Adoption Complicate the Placing of Children, WALL STREET J.,
July 9, 1973, at 1.

196.

Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657 n.9 (1972) (“We note in passing that the incremental
cost of offering unwed fathers an opportunity for individualized hearings on fitness appears
to be minimal.”).

197.

Ruth-Arlene W. Howe, Adoption Practice, Issues, and Laws 1958-1983, 17 FAM. L.Q. 173, 186
(1983).
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Id. at 187 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 7004(a) (West 1975)); see also Lynn Lilliston, Bill Spells
Out Unwed Fathers’ Rights, L.A. TIMES, July 8, 1974, at E1 (describing the California
legislative debate). Notably, the influential Uniform Parentage Act of 1973 recommended
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The prospect of enhanced rights for unmarried fathers troubled many
observers. If unwed fathers, like their married or divorced counterparts, were
entitled to object to their children’s adoption, then the difficulty of identifying
and locating them might derail the adoption process, consigning nonmarital
children not only to the stigma of illegitimacy but to the poverty and instability
of life in the care of a reluctant mother or a foster home. This genuine concern
for the welfare of illegitimate children also reflected the widely held
assumption that adoption into a two-parent marital family was the best
alternative for a child born “out of wedlock,” assuming her parents were unable
or unwilling to marry each other. As the New York Court of Appeals put it in
1975, giving nonmarital fathers the right to veto an adoption meant that “the
chances that such a child will have the equal rights and benefits of a home will
be immeasurably diminished and the likelihood that he or she will be a pawn
for the avaricious and embittered will be greatly enhanced.”200
The third-best option for nonmarital children, according to the
conventional wisdom, was for their mother to marry another man willing to
adopt them, thereby legitimating the children, offering them a “normal” family
life, and uniting the family under a single surname. The Supreme Court
tackled stepfather adoption in two cases decided at the end of the 1970s. Unlike
Stanley, Wiesenfeld, and Fiallo, where mothers’ and fathers’ interests aligned,
these cases involved disputes between mothers and fathers, implicating the
growing tensions among feminists over the meaning of sex equality for
nonmarital parenthood.
A. Not a “De Facto Divorced Father”: Rejecting Marital Status Equality in
Quilloin v. Walcott (1978)
In Quilloin v. Walcott, Leon Quilloin sought to prevent the adoption of his
eleven-year-old son Darrell by Randall Walcott, Darrell’s mother’s husband.201
Quilloin’s paternity was not in question, and the court gave Quilloin, unlike
Peter Stanley, an opportunity to be heard regarding his request for “partial
custody, in the form of visitation privileges.”202
200.

In re Malpica-Orsini, 331 N.E.2d 486, 491-92 (N.Y. 1975).

201.

Walcott’s petition for adoption, filed in March 1976, averred, “It is not necessary to attach
the consent of the father Leon Quilloin to the adoption . . . because he and the mother were
not married at the time of the child’s birth.” Petition for Adoption, In re Walcott, No. 8466
(Ga. Sup. Ct. Mar. 24, 1976), in Appendix at 3, 4, Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978)
(No. 76-6372) [hereinafter Quilloin Appendix].

202.

Writ of Habeas Corpus Establishing Visitation Rights to Minor Child, Quilloin v. Walcott,
No. C-18672 (Ga. Sup. Ct. May 11, 1976), in Quilloin Appendix, supra note 201, at 10, 10.
Quilloin simultaneously petitioned to legitimate Darrell. See Petition for Legitimation,
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A hearing revealed that Darrell’s mother, Ardell, gave birth to him
prematurely on Christmas Day in 1964.203 He had lived for the first year of his
life with his mother and maternal grandmother, and then for four years in
Savannah, while his mother worked in New York.204 Quilloin testified that he
had provided some financial support when Darrell was a baby, including
paying for surgery to repair a hernia, and that when Darrell had lived in
Savannah, the child spent about sixty percent of his time with Quilloin and
Quilloin’s mother, Mabel Dawson,205 and the remainder with Ardell’s mother,
Willie Mae Smith.206 Quilloin had purchased milk and clothing for Darrell,
and had arranged for him to start kindergarten early at the local Catholic
school.207 Quilloin recounted building a soundproof nursery in the Savannah
nightclub he managed so that his son could spend time with him at work, and
arranging for his employees to drive Darrell to and from school.208 Dawson
testified that the two grandmothers cooperated with Darrell’s parents to take
care of his needs, and that Quilloin had furnished financial support by
purchasing necessities or providing funds.209
In 1969, five-year-old Darrell joined Ardell in New York, where she had a
new husband and a baby son.210 In the two and a half years before the adoption
hearing, Quilloin had visited Darrell in New York after a period in which the
Walcotts “disappeared,” and he had paid for transportation by bus and
airplane so that Darrell could visit him in Georgia.211 There was some dispute
over the length and frequency of these visits, but all agreed that Quilloin had
given Darrell a number of gifts, which his mother felt were “disruptive” to
family harmony. Quilloin contended that he had always offered financial
support for Darrell and had provided basic necessities for him when Darrell
Quilloin v. Walcott, No. C-18673 (Ga. Sup. Ct. July 12, 1976), in Quilloin Appendix, supra
note 201, at 12, 12.
203.

Transcript of Hearing, Quilloin v. Walcott, No. C-18673 (Ga. Sup. Ct. July 12, 1976), in
Quilloin Appendix, supra note 201, at 20, 44, 51.

204.

Id. at 45.

205.

Ms. Dawson apparently was active in Savannah’s African-American community, including
in voter registration drives. Id. at 55. At the hearing, she refuted testimony suggesting that
she was too “sickly” to have cared for Darrell when he lived in Savannah. Id. at 61.

206.

Id. at 45.

207.

Id. at 44-47.

208.

Id. at 45.

209.

Id. at 44-47. “On both sides the family has always been agreeable, you know,” Dawson
testified. Id. at 60. Ardell sent part of her salary to her mother each week during this period,
and visited Darrell when she could. Id. at 24, 26.

210.

Id. at 48, 71.

211.

Id. at 27, 49-50.
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lived in Savannah.212 Quilloin “honestly believe[d] that [Darrell’s] rightful
place is with his mother,” and sought only visitation.213 “I was brought up
without a father,” Quilloin recalled:
[M]aybe if I had a father, you know, I [would have gone] on and
finished school. . . . I’m not married, so . . . with me, he’s in a broken
home more or less. I don’t have no objection to her keeping him. It’s
just a matter of, it’s a little bond between the kid and myself seldom as
it’s been.214
Quilloin did not seek full equality with Darrell’s mother; he simply wished to
be treated, as his lawyer put it, like a “de facto divorced father.”215
The facts on Quilloin’s side were arguably stronger than the courts
acknowledged: although Darrell’s parents had never lived together with him,
Quilloin had spent significant time with his son.216 Darrell himself expressed a
desire to continue seeing Quilloin, and to be adopted by Walcott; in a poignant
exchange at the hearing, he seemed not to understand that the two might be
mutually exclusive.217 Fulton County Superior Court Judge Elmo Holt
acknowledged Darrell’s wishes, but ruled that Walcott’s adoption, not
Quilloin’s legitimation and visitation, was in the child’s best interest.218
Quilloin argued unsuccessfully to the Georgia Supreme Court219 that the state
law, which considered the mother of an unlegitimated nonmarital child220 to be
212.

Id. at 51-54.

213.

Id. at 57.

214.

Id.

215.

Brief for the Appellant at 17, Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (No. 76-6372).

216.

Quilloin made an effort to visit Darrell, sometimes against Ardell’s wishes but apparently
with her mother’s cooperation. See Quilloin Appendix, supra note 201, at 49-52.

217.

See id. at 67-69. Quilloin’s lawyer tried to ask whether Darrell understood “that in the event
that the Court were to approve the adoption that you might never be able to see Mr.
Quilloin again?” Id. at 69. But the Walcotts’ attorney and the judge did not allow the
question. Id.

218.

In re Application of Randall Walcott for Adoption of Child, in Quilloin Appendix, supra note
201, at 70-72. Incongruously, Georgia amended its law to allow putative fathers to petition
for legitimacy after an adoption proceeding was underway, but too late for Leon Quilloin.
See Philip Hager, High Court Clarifies Rights of Parents, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1978, at B10.

219.

Quilloin v. Walcott, 232 S.E.2d 246, 248 (1977). In a case where the biological father had
“[taken] no steps to legitimate the child or support him,” Stanley simply did not apply. Id.

220.

Under Georgia law, courts applied the best-interests standard to petitions for legitimation,
which had to occur prior to a mother’s surrender of her child for adoption. See
Memorandum from S. Elizabeth Gibson, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to Justice Byron R.
White 3 (Nov. 10, 1977) (on file with Byron R. White Papers, supra note 122, at Box 424,
Folder 5).
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“the only recognized parent,” and entitled her to consent unilaterally to the
child’s adoption—violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal
protection.221
Whereas adoption advocates worried that Stanley would destabilize the
adoption process, civil libertarians lamented the trend toward terminating the
parental rights of impoverished parents and relegating their children to
adoption by more affluent parents or, worse yet, to the foster care system. In
the mid-1970s, the devastating effects of child removal on Native American
communities prompted the passage of the Indian Child Welfare Act. ACLU
Juvenile Rights Project director Rena Uviller testified before Congress in 1977
about the “tyranny of social work in which poor families are often subjected to
the imposition of standards upon them in the rearing of their children which
are wholly inappropriate, to say nothing of their questionable
constitutionality.”222 Yet feminists like Uviller also worried that equal rights for
nonmarital fathers would undermine the autonomy of women who had borne
primary or exclusive responsibility for their children.223
The tension between these two imperatives—limiting government
incursions into the lives of poor families and fighting against women’s
subordination—came to a head when Quilloin reached the Court.224 ACLU
leadership initially voted to file an amicus brief supporting Leon Quilloin, but
Uviller wrote to Legal Director Bruce Ennis of dissension among the national
office’s legal staffers. Siding with the unmarried father was “consistent” with
the ACLU’s position on sex-based classifications, “seemingly consistent” with
the ACLU’s position on illegitimacy-based classifications, and in keeping with
the view that child-parent relationships “should not be permanently severed

221.

Leon Webster Quilloin’s Second Amendment to Consolidated Actions, in Quilloin
Appendix, supra note 201, at 16-18. Quilloin’s lawyer cited Stanley for the proposition that
Quilloin’s demonstrated interest in Darrell entitled him to the same rights as if he had been
married to his son’s mother. Transcript of Hearing, in Quilloin Appendix, supra note 201, at
33. The judge replied, “As I understand that case, what that case says . . . is that the father
has a right to be heard. . . . And that is the purpose for this hearing right now.” Id. at 34.

222.

Indian Child Welfare Act of 1977: Hearing on S. 1214 Before the U.S. S. Select Comm. on Indian
Affairs, 95th Cong. 184 (1977) (statement of Rena Uviller, Director, Juvenile Rights Project,
American Civil Liberties Union).

223.

See supra text accompanying notes 188-192.

224.

In contrast to other prominent cases involving the rights of nonmarital fathers such as
Stanley, Caban v. Mohammed, Lehr v. Robertson, and Michael H. v. Gerald D., Quilloin stood
out for its lack of amicus participation at the merits stage. Compare Michael H. v. Gerald D.,
491 U.S. 110 (1989) (two amici), Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (two amici), Caban
v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (four amici), and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 654 (1972)
(two amici), with Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (zero amici).
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for reasons less serious than abandonment or child neglect.”225 But a majority
of the national office legal staff “believe[d] there [were] serious feminist
considerations against participating in this case”:
There is concern that we ought not be arguing that adoption decisions
of unmarried mothers who have borne sole responsibility for their
children be subject to the veto of men who have not assumed any
meaningful responsibility. Notwithstanding the rhetoric of equality,
the only real advantage that women have in this society is their children
and even this advantage was a hard-won feminist battle of the 19th
century, since fathers had sole right to custody of their [marital]
children until that time.226
Further, taking Quilloin’s side “could seriously harm the credibility of ACLU
with the feminist movement.” Moreover, “it could help solidify the opposition
of traditional housewives to women’s rights, and give them the feeling that
“women’s lib” is for professional women and against traditional women . . .
thus further eroding chances of [the ERA’s] ratification.227
Ennis was torn. He believed the “civil liberties argument” on behalf of
Quilloin was “extremely strong,” and that “giving fathers greater control over
the adoption and placement of their children (both legitimate and illegitimate)
may in fact liberate women.” Ennis reasoned: “To the extent that men accept,
or are forced to accept, increased responsibility for their children . . . women
will be freer to pursue other roles.”228 But he also credited the argument that
“as a practical matter, because of pervasive discrimination against women, true
225.

Memorandum from Rena Uviller, Dir., Juvenile Rights Project, ACLU, to Bruce Ennis,
Nat’l Legal Dir., ACLU 1-2 (July 7, 1977) (on file with Princeton University, Mudd
Manuscript Library, ACLU Records [hereinafter ACLU Records], Box 2881, Folder
(unnumbered), “Quilloin v. Walcott (unwed father)”).

226.

Id.

227.

Id.; cf. supra note 188 and accompanying text (questioning the wisdom of seeking equal
custody rights for divorced fathers before the actual distribution of parenting
responsibilities had caught up with the feminist egalitarian ideal). Uviller continued:
I find the feminist implications compelling, particularly when I consider that a
reversal could give an unmarried father who has had virtually no contact with
either the child or the mother, and who is not seeking custody for himself, at least
a veto over the mother’s (and the child’s) future.
Id. The Women’s Rights Project’s Kathleen Peratis dissented from this position, suggesting
that the ACLU file a narrowly written amicus brief supporting Quilloin. See Memorandum
from Bruce J. Ennis, Nat’l Legal Dir., ACLU, to General Counsel Mailing List 1 (July 6,
1977) (on file with ACLU Records, supra note 225, Box 2881, Folder (unnumbered),
“Quilloin v. Walcott, 1977)” [hereinafter July 6 Memorandum from Bruce J. Ennis].

228.

Id. at 3.
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equality is not possible at the present time, and theoretical equality between
men and women . . . will in fact disadvantage women.”229 Ultimately, the
“social and political consequences for women” of a victory for Quilloin were
“extremely difficult to predict” and this, combined with internal dissension,
counseled against the ACLU’s participation.230
It is impossible to say whether Quilloin’s claims would have fared better
with the ACLU’s support. Quilloin did earn some sympathy from the Justices’
clerks. Powell clerk Jim Alt thought it “irrational to give the divorced father a
voice in the adoption decision, but not the father who never married.”231
Georgia allowed nonmarital fathers to legitimate their children unilaterally,232
but, as Alt wrote, Quilloin “had no reason to go to court when, in practice, his
relationship with his son was satisfactory.”233 Alt thought the Georgia Supreme
Court’s equal protection ruling “extremely questionable.” He noted that “[a]ll
of the same state policies could be served and the rigid mother/father
distinction eliminated” if the state adopted a gender-neutral system “wherein
the control over consent to adoption of an illegitimate rests with the parent
‘providing for the wants of the child.’”234
Nevertheless, Powell alone tentatively voted to reverse the lower court’s
opinion upholding the statute.235 At oral argument, the Justices expressed
skepticism about Quilloin’s commitment to fatherhood. They repeatedly noted
the trial court’s factual finding that Quilloin had neither provided consistent

229.

July 6 Memorandum from Bruce J. Ennis, supra note 227, at 2.

230.

Id. at 3.

231.

Memorandum from Jim Alt, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 10
(Nov. 7, 1977) (on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, supra note 161, at Box 196, Case No.
76-6372, http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/QuilloinWalcott.pdf [http://
perma.cc/5P6G-L6X7]).

232.

See Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 355 (1979) (“[I]n Georgia only a father can by
unilateral action legitimate an illegitimate child.”).

233.

Memorandum from Jim Alt, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 10
(Nov. 7, 1977) (on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, supra note 161, at Box 196, Case No.
76-6372, http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/QuilloinWalcott.pdf [http://
perma.cc/5P6G-L6X7]).

234.

Id. at 6.

235.

Powell was not impressed with Quilloin’s facts, calling them “wholly unmeritorious,” and
looking askance at the fact that “appellant is in the whiskey business and operates a
nightclub,” and “when the child visited him he was kept in the nightclub.” Memorandum
from Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 3-4 (on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, supra note 161,
at Box 196, Case No. 76-6372, http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives
/QuilloinWalcott.pdf [http://perma.cc/5P6G-L6X7]). He noted that he wished the Court
could dismiss the case as improvidently granted, but it could not, since it was an appeal. See
id. at 1.
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financial support for Darrell nor taken the relatively simple step of filing a
legitimation petition.236 Marshall’s narrowly written draft opinion won over
the previously sympathetic Powell, as well as Blackmun.237
In the end, the unanimous decision upheld the Georgia adoption statute as
applied to Quilloin, leaving open the possibility of future challenges.238 But the
opinion dealt a blow to the argument that equal protection required similar
treatment for marital and nonmarital fathers. Although Quilloin had, under
Georgia law, substantially the same support obligation as a separated or
divorced father, Marshall wrote, “he has never exercised actual or legal custody
over his child, and thus has never shouldered any significant responsibility
with respect to the daily supervision, education, protection, or care of the
child.”239 By contrast, “legal custody of children” was “a central aspect of the
marital relationship, and even a father whose marriage has broken apart will
have borne full responsibility for the rearing of his children during the period
of the marriage.”240 The state “was not foreclosed from recognizing this
difference in the extent of commitment to the welfare of the child.”241 Marshall,
who had been incredulous that Stanley’s lack of a marriage certificate could

236.

See Oral Argument at 11:15, Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (No. 76-6372) http://
www.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-6372 [http://perma.cc/2JLE-JRQ5].

237.

Powell’s clerk Jim Alt apologized to Powell after Marshall circulated his opinion:
To the extent that you were left out on a limb because of my doubts (yours was
the only vote at Conference to reverse), I apologize. If the result on the facts of
this case seems correct to you—as it does to me—I think you could consider
joining the majority.
Memorandum from Jim Alt, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
(Dec. 13, 1977) (on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, supra note 161, at Box 196, Case No.
76-6372, http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/QuilloinWalcott.pdf [http://
perma.cc/5P6G-L6X7]). Powell wrote to Marshall the next day: “Although I voted
tentatively to reverse on equal protection grounds, you have written the opinion so skillfully
(and narrowly) on an ‘as applied’ basis that I am happy to join you.” Letter from Justice
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Justice Thurgood Marshall (Dec. 14, 1977) (on file with Lewis
F. Powell, Jr. Papers, supra note 161, at Box 196, Case No. 76-6372, http://law2.wlu
.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/QuilloinWalcott.pdf [http://perma.cc/5P6G-L6X7]).
Justice Blackmun wrote on Justice Marshall’s second draft: “narrowly & carefully drawn
opinion. Ok to join.” See Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Handwritten Notes on Second Draft in
Quilloin v. Walcott (Dec. 16, 1977) (on file with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, supra note 76,
at Box 270, Case No. 76-6372).

238.

Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 256 (“[W]e conclude that §§ 74-203 and 74-403(3), as applied in this
case, did not deprive appellant of his asserted rights under the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses.”).

239.

Id.

240.

Id.

241.

Id.
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nullify his parental rights, now allowed the termination of Quilloin’s: whether
Darrell would ever again see the man he had known as his father for eleven
years would be at the Walcotts’ discretion. The Quilloin Court did not,
however, pass judgment on the sex-based distinction embedded in Georgia’s
statute, which allowed unmarried mothers but not fathers to veto an
adoption.242 The sex discrimination question soon returned to the Court in the
second stepfather adoption case, Caban v. Mohammed.
B. “Shared By Both Genders Alike”: A Qualified Triumph for Sex Neutrality in
Caban v. Mohammed (1979)
Abdiel Caban, unlike Leon Quilloin, had lived with his two children and
their mother, Maria, for several years, and had since married another woman,
Nina.243 Even so, the New York Surrogate’s Court interpreted state law to
provide that Caban could prevent Maria’s new husband, Kazim Mohammed,
from adopting the children only if he could demonstrate that remaining with
the Mohammeds was not in the children’s best interests.244 Caban challenged
this application of the best-interests standard, arguing that it
unconstitutionally elevated mothers’ rights above those of equally caring
nonmarital fathers and violated his due process rights.245
Caban had stronger facts than Quilloin, and his case attracted amicus
support from the ACLU,246 the Legal Aid Society,247 and Community Action

242.

The question was not raised in Quilloin’s Jurisdictional Statement. After reading Alt’s bench
memo, Powell noted his view that “it makes no sense to give either parent a veto over
adoption. All that D/P requires is full opportunity to be heard. But there is [] E/P issue.”
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Handwritten Annotations on Memorandum from Jim Alt,
Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (Nov. 10, 1977) (emphases
omitted) (on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, supra note 161, at Box 196, Case No.
76-6372, http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/QuilloinWalcott.pdf [http://
perma.cc/5P6G-L6X7]). There was, as Blackmun clerk William Block wrote, “a square
conflict [among courts] over whether the father of an illegitimate is entitled to the same
parental rights as the mother of the illegitimate.” Memorandum from William H. Block,
Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to Justice Harry A. Blackmun 5 (Apr. 15, 1977) (on file with
Harry A. Blackmun Papers, supra note 76, at Box 270, Case No. 76-6372).

243.

Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 382-83 (1979).

244.

Id. at 387-88.

245.

Id. at 385.

246.

Brief for American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant, Caban, 441
U.S. 380 (No. 77-6431).

247.

Brief for Legal Aid Society of New York City as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant,
Caban, 441 U.S. 380 (No. 77-6431).
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for Legal Services (CALS).248 At the ACLU, Ennis noted that while the
organization had “not been overly anxious to speak on this subject” in the past
(clearly a reference to Quilloin), Caban “contains ideal facts,” in that the “father
has had a significant relationship with his children.”249 Whereas Quilloin posed
a dilemma for feminists like Uviller, Caban provided an “excellent
opportunity”250 to combat the “alarming trend” toward removing children
from their parents in the name of children’s “best interests,”251 in an amicus
brief Uviller co-authored with parental rights advocate Martin Guggenheim.252
Profound changes in marriage patterns and gender roles undermined
marital-status- and sex-based distinctions in the law of parenthood, the amici
argued. Their briefs questioned the premise underlying New York’s and many
other states’ statutory schemes: that adoption, when it entailed termination of
a parent’s rights, was presumptively in the best interests of illegitimate
children. The “cruel and undeserved out of wedlock stigma” was largely “a
thing of the past,” as the CALS brief put it253: “Not only has cohabitation
without marriage become more respectable, but the high divorce and
remarriage rates mean that there are many children whose last name may be
different from that of their remarried mother.”254 Further, the two-parent
marital family so prized by advocates of stepfather adoption might be just as
short-lived as the nonmarital relationship that produced the child. Conversely,
as the ACLU noted, “unmarried fathers may also get married and thus be able

248.

Brief for Community Action for Legal Services as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant,
Caban, 441 U.S. 380 (No. 77-6431).

249.

Memorandum from Bruce J. Ennis, ACLU Juvenile Rights Project, to General Counsel
Mailing List 3 (June 5, 1978) (ACLU Records, supra note 225, at Box 2788, Folder
(unnumbered), “Caban v. Mohammed (father’s rights), 1978”).

250.

Id. The ACLU’s “most important goal,” Ennis wrote, was “preserving the integrity of the
family.” Id.

251.

Memorandum from Albert G. Lauber, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to Justice Harry A.
Blackmun (Oct. 26, 1978) (on file with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, supra note 76, at Box
290, Case No. 77-6431).

252.

To Uviller, the best-interests standard, of questionable value in the custody context, was
often devastating when the possible termination of parental rights was at stake. See Uviller,
supra note 188. Martin Guggenheim later authored an important critique of the implications
of prioritizing children’s “best interests” over the interests of their parents. See MARTIN
GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS (2007).

253.

Brief for Community Action for Legal Services as Amicus Curiae, supra note 252, at 32.

254.

Id.
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to supply a ‘normal’ home for the children.”255 Indeed, Caban had done just
that.256
Amici elaborated on the anti-sex-stereotyping arguments made in Stanley
and Fiallo, citing social science literature to support their contention that many
unmarried fathers played active and crucial roles in their children’s lives, while
many divorced and separated fathers did not. After decisions such as
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld257 had condemned sex stereotypes, it was no longer
permissible to generalize about unmarried fathers’ irresponsibility and
dissolute character, amici contended. The briefs also emphasized that in other
areas of family law, sex-based discrimination between fathers and mothers had
receded.258 In 1973, for instance, a New York Family Court judge jettisoned the
tender years presumption favoring maternal custody for young children as
unconstitutionally “based on outdated social stereotypes” and a “traditional
and romantic view” of “mother love.”259
Caban and his amici also made substantive due process arguments. The
Legal Aid Society brief declared that
[t]he gravity of the deprivation and emotional turmoil imposed upon
Mr. Caban himself cannot be overestimated. Despite the fact that he
has shouldered far greater responsibilities for the care and supervision
of his children than have many married, separated or divorced fathers,
his familial bonds were afforded only the most cursory recognition in
the adoption proceedings.260

255.

Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae, supra note 246, at 14.

256.

Some scholars have suggested that outcomes in the unwed fathers cases can best be
explained by an emphasis on the nonmarital father’s relationship with the mother, and by a
preference for fathers who have acted like husbands, rather than by the strength of the
father-child relationship. See Janet L. Dolgin, Just a Gene: Judicial Assumptions About
Parenthood, 40 UCLA L. REV. 637, 649-63 (1993); Murray, supra note 4, at 389-90. But see
Jennifer S. Hendricks, Essentially a Mother, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 429, 448 (2007)
(“The Court’s emphasis on cohabitation between father and child seems driven more by its
interest in daily caretaking than by loyalty to the nuclear family.”).

257.

420 U.S. 636 (1975).

258.

See, e.g., Brief for the Legal Aid Society as Amicus Curiae, supra note 247, at 26 (describing
the trend toward sex neutrality in child custody cases).

259.

State ex rel. Watts v. Watts, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285, 288-89 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1973). Compare id. with
In re Malpica-Orsini, 331 N.E.2d 486, 486 (N.Y. 1975) (allowing a stepfather adoption and
terminating the parental rights of a nonmarital father who had lived with his daughter and
her mother for the first nineteen months of her life).

260.

Brief for the Legal Aid Society as Amicus Curiae, supra note 247, at 31-32.
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At oral argument, Caban’s attorney Robert Silk stopped short of contending
that all natural fathers had a constitutional right to veto adoptions, but made
clear that a father who had developed a significant relationship with his
children (in supposed contrast to Quilloin) deserved protection from
termination of his parental rights.261 Nor would it be enough, Silk argued, to
satisfy equal protection by denying both nonmarital parents the right to veto
an adoption, because “state power does not exist to break into the private
relationships of parents and their children when there has been no showing of
unfitness.”262 In other words, equality between unmarried mothers and fathers
was necessary but not sufficient: nonmarital parents of both sexes had
fundamental rights that the Constitution should protect.
The Justices struggled over whether their ruling in Caban should be
grounded in equal protection or substantive due process. Both options entailed
complications. Substantive due process might allow a decision specific to the
facts, but the facts of Caban were in “sharp dispute,” as Powell clerk David
Westin noted.263 Powell hesitated to paint in the broad strokes of substantive
due process analysis, with Westin worrying about the potential
“constitutionalization of state adoption law” and the prospect that functional
definitions of parenthood would require infinitely finer distinctions among
deeply contested relationships.264 White, meanwhile, insisted that his Stanley
opinion was a procedural due process decision only—despite many wishful
readings to the contrary.265 Stevens initially expressed willingness to rule for
Caban on substantive due process grounds. Blackmun, as the author of Roe v.
Wade, may have seemed positively inclined toward substantive due process,
and less toward equal protection, given his vote joining the Chief Justice’s
dissent in Stanley.266
A reversal on equal protection grounds also presented ideological and
practical challenges. If the Court focused on the distinction between unmarried

261.

Oral Argument, Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (No. 77-6431), http://www.oyez
.org/cases/1978/77-6431 [http://perma.cc/ZGK5-JMLA].

262.

Id. at 29:18.

263.

Memorandum from David Westin, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to Justice Lewis F. Powell,
Jr. 8 (Nov. 6, 1978) (on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, supra note 161, at Box 205,
Case No. 77-6431, http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/CabanMohammed
.pdf [http://perma.cc/BVN5-FQ2R]).

264.

Id.

265.

In cases decided since 1972, White had resisted substantive due process analysis. See Moore
v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 541 (1977) (White, J., dissenting); Doe v. Bolton, 410
U.S. 179, 221 (1973) (White, J. dissenting) (applying also to companion case Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973)).

266.

See discussion supra Section I.B.
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fathers and divorced fathers, finding a fundamental interest to justify
heightened scrutiny would, Powell feared, put them right back in substantive
due process territory, worrying about the “‘thicket’ of ‘strict scrutiny’ and
‘compelling state interest.’” Powell preferred instead to rely upon sex-based
equal protection, which would allow state legislatures to decide whether to
require the consent of both or neither of a child’s natural parents.267
The first draft Powell circulated to colleagues endorsed a robust sex
neutrality principle. Like White’s early drafts in Stanley, it implied that
virtually no distinctions between unwed mothers and fathers would pass
constitutional muster. The impulse to veto a proposed adoption “is likely to be
the result of a natural parental interest, shared by both genders alike; it is not a
manifestation of any profound difference between the affection and concern of
mothers and fathers for their children.” New York law treated married mothers
and fathers equally, so why should the same provisions not apply to unmarried
parents?268 Further, “[e]ven if perceived differences between maternal and
paternal relations were the basis for the gender-based distinction . . . [the]
classification is grounded on ‘archaic and overbroad generalizations,’
concerning the family.”269 Legislative classifications could not typecast women
as exclusively occupied with home and children. “Nor may we accept
uncritically the generalization . . . that mothers are closer to their children than
are fathers.”270 Even “[d]uring infancy . . . one cannot invariably assume that
the father’s role in his child’s life is less than that of the mother,” Powell
wrote.271
This was a bridge too far for Stewart, Stevens, and Blackmun, and Powell
needed at least one of their votes to make a majority. Justice Stevens worried
that if the consent of both “natural” parents were required, then delay and
uncertainty could discourage prospective adoptive parents and impede

267.

See Memorandum from Gary Sasso, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to Justice Byron R. White
7-9 (Sept. 20, 1978) (on file with Byron R. White Papers, supra note 122, at Box 455, Folder
10). The sex-based equal protection approach also seemed consistent in methodology, if not
in outcome, with the Court’s approach in Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979), decided on
the same day as Caban. See discussion infra Section II.C.

268.

Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., First Draft Opinion in Caban v. Mohammed 9-10 (Dec. 28,
1978) (on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, supra note 161, at Box 205, Case No. 77-6431,
http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/CabanMohammed.pdf [http://perma
.cc/BVN5-FQ2R]).

269.

Id. at 12.

270.

Id.

271.

Id. at 13.
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adoptions.272 Even if mere notice to nonmarital fathers were required, Stevens
thought that publicly identifying the mother “would offend her privacy
interests in the most outrageous fashion.”273 Stevens wrote privately to Powell
that he was “profoundly troubled” and asked him to consider revising his
opinion to “minimize its impact on the adoption of infants.”274
Powell quickly retreated. In response to Stevens’s objections, which were
shared by Stewart, Powell’s second draft “altered [Caban’s] holding
considerably” and “invalidate[d] the . . . statute much more narrowly,” as
Blackmun’s clerk put it.275 Powell eliminated nearly all of the broad language
and added caveats suggesting that the adoption of newborns presented
different problems than did the adoption of older children.276 His second draft
focused on case-specific facts, rather than generalizing about the constitutional
infirmity of sex-based distinctions. Comfortable with Powell’s revised opinion,
Blackmun announced his intention to sign, giving Powell (and Caban) a 5-4
majority.277

272.

Letter from Justice John Paul Stevens to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (Dec. 29, 1978) (on file
with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, supra note 161, at Box 205, Case No. 77-6431, http://law2
.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/CabanMohammed.pdf
[http://perma.cc/BVN5
-FQ2R]). Justice Stevens, an adoptive parent himself, consistently expressed such concerns
in cases implicating adoption procedures. See generally BILL BARNHART & GENE SCHLICKMAN,
JOHN PAUL STEVENS: AN INDEPENDENT LIFE (2010).

273.

Letter from Justice John Paul Stevens to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (Dec. 29, 1978) (on file
with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, supra note 161, at Box 205, Case No. 77-6431, http://law2
.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/CabanMohammed.pdf
[http://perma.cc/BVN5
-FQ2R]).

274.

Id.

275.

Memorandum from Albert G. Lauber, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to Justice Harry A.
Blackmun 1 (Jan. 17, 1979) (on file with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, supra note 76, at Box
290, Case No. 77-6431); see also id. at 2 (explaining that “L[ewis ]F[. ]P[owell] undertook
his revisions at the instance of P[otter ]S[tewart] and J[ohn ]P[aul ]S[tevens], both of
whom were concerned that the 1st draft would make adoptions difficult in the case of newborn children”).
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Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Second Draft Opinion in Caban v. Mohammed 11-13 (Jan. 12,
1979) (on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, supra note 161, at Box 205, Case No. 77-6431,
http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/CabanMohammed.pdf [http://perma
.cc/BVN5-FQ2R]).
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Blackmun acknowledged that his views had evolved since he joined Burger’s Stanley dissent
six years earlier. See Letter from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Chief Justice Warren E.
Burger (Jan. 29, 1979) (on file with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, supra note 76, at Box 290,
Case No. 77-6431) (“I have concluded that [Powell’s second, narrower draft opinion in
Caban] is not basically inconsistent with our dissenting posture in Stanley v. Illinois
(although I am frank to say I am not sure how I would vote in that case were it being
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Stevens and Stewart dissented in Caban, emphasizing their desire to protect
illegitimate children’s welfare by facilitating newborn adoptions. Stevens
articulated the view of “natural differences” between mothers and fathers that
would animate his—and ultimately a majority of the Court’s—treatment of
nonmarital fathers’ equal protection claims for the remainder of his tenure.
Unlike many if not most nonmarital fathers, a mother was identifiable, present
at her child’s birth, and would have “virtually inevitable” responsibility for
decisions made about an infant.278 As such, mothers and fathers of children
“born out of wedlock” simply were not similarly situated, so that granting
mothers and not fathers the right to consent to an adoption posed no
constitutional problem. More than the majority opinion, Stevens’s dissent in
Caban presaged the Court’s subsequent posture toward nonmarital fathers’
claims.
C. “Not Similarly Situated”: Rejecting Sex Equality in Parham v. Hughes
(1979)
Caban marked the zenith of nonmarital fathers’ constitutional rights in the
Supreme Court. Another 5-4 decision issued on the same day underscored the
divisions among the Justices about the meaning of sex equality for nonmarital
parents. When an automobile accident killed six-year-old Lemuel Parham and
his mother, Cassandra Moreen, the boy’s father sued for his son’s wrongful
death. Curtis Parham did not live with Lemuel and his mother, but averred
that he had supported Lemuel financially, visited him daily, and taken care of
him on many weekends. Parham had signed his son’s birth certificate but had
not completed legitimation paperwork.279
Parham v. Hughes presented a question virtually identical to the one
decided a decade earlier in Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co:
could a state bar a parent from recovering for the wrongful death of an
illegitimate child? The difference between Glona and Parham proved
determinative, however: Minnie Brade Glona, who lost her son Tommy to a

278.

Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 405-06 (Stevens, J., dissenting). His dissent also
expressed the hope that the Caban ruling would affect only the relatively few situations in
which an unmarried father had developed a relationship with his children that was truly
comparable to the mother-child bond. Id. at 415-17.

279.

Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 349-50 (1979). For Powell, the fact that Georgia allowed
nonmarital fathers to “legitimate” their children unilaterally distinguished the case from
Trimble v. Gordon, where Illinois law did not provide for legitimation except where the
parents married. The Georgia law was, therefore, more like the New York law requiring
illegitimate children to produce a court order of filiation, which the Court had upheld in
Lalli v. Lalli. Id. at 359-61 (Powell, J., concurring).
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negligent driver, was a mother, and her claim succeeded before the Warren
Court in 1968.280 In Parham, Stewart wrote for a plurality that the Georgia law
allowing mothers but not fathers to bring a wrongful death action for an
illegitimate child did not offend the constitutional principle of sex equality.
“The fact is,” Stewart wrote, “that mothers and fathers of illegitimate children
are not similarly situated.”281 In Georgia, only fathers could, “by voluntary
unilateral action,” legitimate a child, and, unlike a mother’s, a father’s identity
might be unknown.282 Excluding fathers of illegitimate children from wrongful
death recovery “does not discriminate against fathers as a class but instead
distinguishes between fathers who have legitimated their children and those
who have not.”283
A majority of the Parham Court did see the Georgia law as distinguishing
on the basis of sex, and therefore applied heightened scrutiny, but only four
Justices voted for invalidation. Powell, author of Caban, concurred, finding the
statute substantially related to the important governmental objective of
“avoiding difficult problems in proving paternity after the death of an
illegitimate child.”284 Four dissenters, including Blackmun, saw the law as
unconstitutional sex discrimination.285 Although Parham did not involve the
parental rights of unmarried fathers, it suggested that plaintiffs in future cases
might find it difficult to frame legal distinctions between nonmarital fathers
and mothers as impermissibly discriminatory.
Moreover, Parham, like Fiallo, rejected fathers’ sex discrimination claims
precisely when fathers’ and mothers’ interests in sex neutrality most
converged. In these cases, granting superior rights to mothers reinforced the
assumption that paternal involvement in the lives of nonmarital children was
worth less than maternal bonds, no matter how well the father had nurtured
and loved his child. Depriving fathers and their nonmarital children of
reciprocal citizenship rights and denying nonmarital fathers the right to sue for
the wrongful death of their children offered no benefit to mothers; indeed,
these decisions perpetuated mothers’ burden for the primary care of
nonmarital children by devaluing fathers’ contributions.
To be fair, the Justices did not yet have before them a full-throated feminist
argument for recognizing nonmarital fathers’ rights in contexts where men’s
and women’s interests converged. In the 1970s, feminist disagreement over the
280.

Glona v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968).

281.

Parham, 441 U.S. at 355.

282.

Id.

283.

Id. at 356.

284.

Id. at 359-60 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).

285.

Id. at 361-62 (White, J., dissenting). For more on Parham, see Mayeri, supra note 21.
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relationship between sex equality and nonmarital parenthood played out
mostly behind the scenes, in internal debates within the ACLU rather than in
dueling briefs in the Supreme Court. The ACLU’s legal director rejected
Ginsburg’s proposal to file an amicus brief in Fiallo, and the petitioners’ brief
relegated to a footnote the feminist argument that women are harmed by the
sex-stereotyping of nonmarital fathers. The fathers who defied such
stereotypes, whom the Court presumed were a small minority, suffered the
primary harm of the sex discrimination left intact by the unwed fathers cases.
In Caban, the only successful case of the three, amicus briefs focused on harm
to fathers and to children, reflecting their authors’ primary concern with unjust
terminations of parental rights generally. In Parham, the plaintiff had no
amicus support.
The juxtaposition of Fiallo, Caban, and Parham highlights how,
paradoxically, nonmarital fathers’ sex discrimination arguments fared better
when fathers faced off against mothers than when mothers, too, stood to gain
from a sex-neutral rule. And the paradoxes did not end there. In the 1970s,
feminist disputes over nonmarital fathers’ rights never made their way into
amicus briefs or otherwise influenced the Justices’ deliberations in cases before
the Court. Nevertheless, the Court decided Fiallo, Caban, and Parham on sexbased equal protection grounds. In the 1980s, by contrast, feminist arguments
played a key role in two of the nonmarital fathers cases that came before the
Court, but the Justices dodged them and instead decided two other cases
primarily on due process grounds. Although the Court for the first time heard
full-throated feminist arguments for and against nonmarital fathers’ parental
rights, the Justices sidestepped questions of sex equality altogether and
reaffirmed the state’s prerogative to privilege marital families at nonmarital
fathers’ expense.
iv . a v o id in g e q u a l it y : f e m in is m a n d f a t h e r h o o d in t h e
supreme court, 1980-89
Feminist legal advocacy in the 1970s and 1980s often suffered from
inauspicious timing. Feminists reasoned from race on the eve of civil rights
retrenchment, turning what seemed like fruitful analogies in the Warren Court
era into political and legal constraints before the Burger Court. 286 They sought
more expansive affirmative action and disparate impact doctrines at a time
when courts were cutting back these remedies in the context of race.287 They
286.

See generally MAYERI, supra note 11 (describing the historical trajectory of feminists’ use of
analogies between race and sex inequality).

287.

See generally id. chs. 3-6.
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presented compelling arguments that illegitimacy penalties subordinated
women after the Court articulated the primary harm of illegitimacy-based
classifications as their detrimental impact on “hapless” and innocent
children.288
Feminist advocacy in the unwed fathers’ cases suffered from a similar
temporal disconnect: by the time the feminist dilemma was squarely before the
Justices, with clearly articulated positions on both sides of the question, the
Court had both drawn its battle lines on other terms and moved further to the
right. Both of these developments likely made the Justices less receptive to
framing the unwed fathers’ cases in terms of substantive sex equality than they
might have been. Section IV.A. explains why the feminist dilemma came to the
fore in the 1980s, briefly outlining the legal and political factors that
heightened feminist disagreement over sex equality in nonmarital parenthood.
Sections IV.B. and IV.C. juxtapose the two unwed fathers cases decided by the
Court during this period with two other cases the Court dodged, revealing
both the contours of the feminist dilemma and the consequences of its
submergence in equality jurisprudence.
A. Parenthood After the Sex Equality Revolution
Developments in the late 1970s and early 1980s intensified debate among
feminists over the rights of nonmarital fathers. The divorced-fathers’ rights
movement enjoyed relatively rapid success in winning legislative and judicial
decisions approving joint custody. Sociologists exposed the economic
devastation of divorce for women and children. Litigation defeats, the failure to
achieve ratification of the ERA, and the ascendancy of conservatism in national
politics prompted feminists to examine the shortcomings of 1970s feminist
legal advocacy and to assess the future of sex equality.
The late 1970s and early 1980s witnessed profound changes in child
custody law.289 The maternal preference continued to erode and joint custody
gained ground in many states, thanks to an uneasy coalition between feminists
and divorced-fathers’ rights activists, as Deborah Dinner has recounted.290 For
feminists, joint custody held the promise of relieving divorced mothers of sole
responsibility for childcare, undermining stereotypes about motherhood as
women’s primary destiny, and, ideally, creating incentives for fathers to spend
more time caring for children during marriage.291 For fathers’ rights activists,
288.

See Mayeri, supra note 21.

289.

See Dinner, supra note 17, at 121-22.

290.

See id. at 122-23.

291.

Id. at 126.
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joint custody was an essential element of the new “divorce bargain,” in which
fathers received custody rights in exchange for fulfilling child support
obligations. As Dinner describes, fathers’ rights activists and feminists not only
favored joint custody for different reasons, they often diverged in their policy
prescriptions.292 In debates over joint custody in California, a bellwether state
for family law innovations, fathers’ rights activists fought for a categorical
presumption of joint custody, while feminists who favored the presumption
did so only when both parents wished to share custody. Without this caveat,
feminists feared, joint custody presumptions would devalue women’s
disproportionate responsibility for caregiving during marriage and reduce their
bargaining power at divorce, harming women and children.293
At the same time, feminists who had long worried about the economic
impact of no-fault divorce and marital breakdown on women saw their worst
fears confirmed. The “feminization of poverty” became a shorthand to describe
the rise of female-headed households born of rising rates of divorce and
nonmarital childbirth. Sociologist Lenore Weitzman spotlighted a chasm
between the economic fortunes of divorced men and women.294 While the
magnitude of post-divorce inequality remained in dispute, its existence did not,
and some feminists identified formal sex neutrality as the culprit. Reforms that
treated divorcing husbands and wives as if they were interchangeable spouses
in a presumptively egalitarian partnership could not produce substantive
equality of results, wrote feminist legal scholar Martha Fineman in 1983.295
Fineman argued that women’s socioeconomic disadvantage meant that, “at
least for the foreseeable future, genuine reform can only be achieved through a
rational, but potentially unequal, division of economic assets between
husbands and wives at divorce.”296 Treating men and women as equals under
the law exacerbated women’s inferior status so long as women shouldered the

292.

Id. at 129-35.

293.

Id.

294.

For early publications of Weitzman’s research on the economic consequences of divorce, see,
for example, Lenore J. Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences
of Property, Alimony, and Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1181 (1981). Weitzman’s
1985 book drew national attention to the phenomenon. See LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE
DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR
WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985). The disparity Weitzman initially reported
proved to be overstated, but the adverse impact of divorce on women and children was
undeniable.
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Martha L. Fineman, Implementing Equality: Ideology, Contradiction and Social Change: A Study
of Rhetoric and Results in the Regulation of the Consequences of Divorce, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 789,
791.
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lion’s share of domestic and caregiving responsibilities and faced widespread
discrimination in the labor market.
Critical feminists also turned their gaze to child custody, arguing that the
rise of ostensibly gender-neutral rules devalued mothers’ caregiving labor and
held fathers to a “different, much less demanding standard.”297 Some feminists
sought to balance the benefits of legal sex neutrality with a revaluation of
women’s care work. Nancy Polikoff, writing in 1982, defended a “primary
caretaker” presumption for child custody decision making, arguing that this
“sex-neutral standard” would protect mothers and children in the vast majority
of cases where women served as primary caretakers. It would also allow fathers
to benefit from the presumption if they provided “primary nurturance and care
during the ongoing marriage.”298
Many feminists reevaluated their legal priorities in the early 1980s. The
ERA’s defeat and the Reagan Administration’s threatened cutbacks in civil
rights and social spending surfaced disagreements regarding the past and
future of feminist legal advocacy. Fear of undermining the ERA’s ratification
chances had constrained some advocates in their legal arguments and others in
their willingness to dissent publicly from expedient political positions. At the
same time, a new generation of feminists enjoyed greater access to the legal
academy, publishing scholarship critical of judicial decisions that limited sex
equality, and sometimes of the feminist legal strategies that helped produce
them. Rather than inspiring caution or quiescence, the ERA’s defeat and the
conservative ascendancy liberated feminists to own publicly more expansive
definitions of sex equality.299 These setbacks also emboldened feminists to air
their disagreements about substance and strategy.
The feminist disagreement that had simmered beneath the surface in the
early nonmarital fathers cases burst into the open in the 1980s before a
Supreme Court that included Sandra Day O’Connor, the first female Justice.
Between 1982 and 1988, two cases reached the Court that explicitly presented
what one advocate termed the “feminist dilemma”: how to balance the desire
to overcome women’s default responsibility for nonmarital children with
concerns that the realities of gender inequality rendered legal sex neutrality
antithetical to women’s autonomy and to substantive sex equality. In
297.

Martha L. Fineman & Anne Opie, The Uses of Social Science Data in Legal Policymaking:
Custody Determinations at Divorce, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 107, 119. For an excellent summary of
these critiques, see Dinner, supra note 17, at 142-44.

298.
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Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes of Abilene and McNamara v. San Diego
Department of Social Services, feminists on both sides of the debate made their
case to the Justices. But the Court sidestepped the sex equality question—and
the cases themselves—entirely, and framed the two unmarried fathers’ cases it
did decide, Lehr v. Robertson and Michael H. v. Gerald D., as due process
disputes in which husbands prevailed over fathers. The winner in all of these
cases, it would seem, was marital supremacy.
1. “The Feminist Dilemma”: Unwed Mothers Against Sex Neutrality in
Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes of Abilene
Kirkpatrick was the first case to present the Court with a feminist argument
against sex neutrality in nonmarital parental rights. In a small Nebraska town,
Donald Kirkpatrick and Laura S. began an intimate relationship when he was
22 and she was 14.300 At 15, Laura became pregnant, and decided, in
consultation with her parents, to place the child for adoption.301 An adoptee
herself, Laura “had great concern for the stigma attached to a child born out of
wedlock in a small town.”302 She did what many white girls had done for
generations: entered a home for unwed mothers (in Texas), and remained
there until she gave birth.303
When Laura informed him of the pregnancy, Kirkpatrick proposed
marriage, but Laura declined.304 In Texas, biological fathers were entitled to
receive notice of adoption proceedings, but could not veto an adoption and take
custody of an unlegitimated child unless a court agreed that legitimation was in
the child’s best interests.305 The trial court denied Kirkpatrick’s legitimation
petition and placed the infant in foster care pending appeal.306 The state
appellate court affirmed. “We are not nearly so far down the road to
unrestrained egalitarianism as to hold that the Constitution guarantees an
300.

Appendix at 117a-19a, Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes of Abilene, Inc., 460 U.S. 1074 (1983)
(No. 82-647) [hereinafter Kirkpatrick Appendix]; Brief for Petitioner at 6-7, Kirkpatrick, 460
U.S. 1074 (No. 82-647) (on file with ACLU Records, supra note 225, Box 2804, Folder 2
(untitled)).

301.

Kirkpatrick Appendix, supra note 300, at 118a-19a, 128a-29a.

302.

Nancy S. Erickson, The Feminist Dilemma over Unwed Parents’ Custody Rights: The Mother’s
Rights Must Take Priority, 2 L. & INEQ. 447, 452 (1984).
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See KUNZEL, supra note 34, at 65-90 (describing the movement of unmarried mothers to
maternity homes); SOLINGER, supra note 34, at 1-3 (describing the divergent paths of white
and black unmarried mothers in the 1950s).
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See In re Baby Girl S., 628 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. App. 1982).
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unwed father parental rights in violation of the best interests of the child,” the
Texas Supreme Court had proclaimed in 1976.307 Four years later, over the
dissent of three Justices, the same court explained:
While the mother who is unmarried and pregnant is trying to figure
out what she will do with the child, the father is totally free from any
responsibility . . . . To classify him as a parent simply because he is a
biological father would give him a powerful club with which he could
substantially reduce the options available to the unmarried mother.308
As for the wide gulf between the rights of married and unmarried fathers, there
was “a rational basis for the State to distinguish” between “a sperm donor, a
rapist, a ‘hit and run’ lover, an adulterer and the like” and “the father who has
accepted the legal and moral commitment to the family.”309
Supporters said Kirkpatrick was a responsible, upstanding young man
devoted to his daughter and eager to marry her mother; detractors claimed he
was an irreligious statutory rapist with inconstant paternal instincts who
planned to turn the child over to the care of his female relatives.310 Both
characterizations enjoyed some support in the record. Laura testified that
Kirkpatrick was a “wonderful man,” but that at 15, she was not ready to marry
and start a family, and she wanted her daughter raised by “two Christian
parents.”311
After “an apparently bitter internal dispute,”312 the national ACLU agreed
to represent Kirkpatrick before the U.S. Supreme Court.313 The ACLU argued
that substantive due process and equal protection required that unmarried
fathers be permitted to legitimate their children over the mother’s objection,
veto an adoption, and obtain custody unless they were proven unfit. The Court
307.

In re K, 535 S.W.2d 168, 171 (Tex. 1976).

308.

In re T.E.T., 603 S.W.2d 793, 797 (Tex. 1980).

309.

Id. Three Texas justices disagreed with the majority’s assessment, believing it to be
inconsistent with federal and state constitutional sex equality provisions. Id. at 798-800
(Steakley, J., dissenting); see also In re K, 535 S.W.2d at 175 (Pope, J., dissenting). The U.S.
Supreme Court denied certiorari over the dissents of Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall.
Order Denying Certiorari, Oldag v. Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Galveston-Hous.,
450 U.S. 1025 (1981).

310.
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Id. at 151a, 191a.

312.
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best-interests standard in termination of parental rights proceedings. See IRA GLASSER &
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LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 15 (1983).
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should, the ACLU argued, declare the best-interests standard
unconstitutionally vague, at least with respect to terminations of parental
rights.314 And the Texas statute was “freighted with the ‘baggage of sexual
stereotypes’ so often condemned by this Court.”315 The injury to “caring
fathers” was “patent.”316 “Less obvious but equally invidious” was “the harm
done to women,” who were “inevitably locked into the childcare role, unable to
share childrearing responsibilities equally with men.”317
Before Kirkpatrick, the interests of unmarried mothers had been in the
background, as in the ACLU’s decision not to intervene in Quilloin, but never
at the forefront. Kirkpatrick was different. Feminist attorney Nancy Erickson
authored an amicus brief on behalf of “unwed mothers” who opposed
unmarried fathers’ asserted right to veto an adoption and obtain custody for
themselves.318 She quoted unmarried mothers who said they would not have
pursued adoption if it meant that the father might gain custody. Instead, these
mothers might have felt pressured to have an abortion or to raise an unwanted
child, Erickson asserted, violating their right to privacy and decisional
autonomy and flouting the child’s best interests. Mothers should also have the
right to give up their children for adoption anonymously, Erickson argued, and
men should not be allowed to use their sexual partners as involuntary surrogate
mothers.319
Erickson denied that the Texas statutory scheme reflected “an
impermissible gender bias”320 or promoted “sexual stereotypes that portray
men as incapable of good parenting.”321 Kirkpatrick himself seemed to assume
that various female relatives—his mother, sister, or grandmother—would care
for the baby if he were to obtain parental rights and custody.322 Most recently,
314.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 22-27, Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes of Abilene, Inc., 460
U.S. 1074 (1983) (No. 82-647) (on file with ACLU Records, supra note 225, Box 2804, Folder
5 (untitled)).
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Id. at 31-32; Brief for Petitioner, supra note 300, at 70; see also id. at 70-71 (“Great harm, both
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Kirkpatrick had married a “full-time homemaker” who allegedly was eager to
raise the child, leading Erickson to observe that awarding custody to a man
who did not intend to assume a caregiving role hardly served feminist
objectives.323 Feminists like Erickson embraced the goal of greater paternal
involvement in the care of children, but they worried about the effects of
formal equality on unequal social circumstances. “Our desires, as feminists, to
see men assume the parental duties that in the past they have abandoned to
women should not prevent us from recognizing that a legal rule granting an
unwed father exactly the same rights as an unwed mother could lead to
extreme oppression of women,” Erickson wrote.324
Blackmun clerk Cory Streisinger thought that Kirkpatrick had “a serious
claim of gender-based discrimination,” and advised Blackmun to support
granting certiorari.325 At first only White and Blackmun voted to grant, but
White’s draft dissent apparently persuaded Burger and Brennan to change
their votes.326 White expressed qualms about the Texas statutory scheme on
both due process and equal protection grounds.327 He reminded his colleagues
that earlier Court decisions had strongly implied that a state could not,
constitutionally, “terminate a natural parent’s rights without a showing of
parental unfitness.”328 Significantly, White also believed that Kirkpatrick had a

323.

Id. at 471. “Yet another woman appears to take over the childcare responsibilities!” Erickson
exclaimed. Id.

324.

Id. at 455.

325.

See Memorandum from Cory Streisinger, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to Justice Harry A.
Blackmun 7 (Dec. 3, 1982) (on file with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, supra note 76, at Box
386, Case No. 82-647). Streisinger noted that the sex discrimination issue was not so clearly
presented in Lehr v. Robertson, which was simultaneously before the Court.

326.

Compare Certiorari Vote Count (Jan. 7, 1983) (on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers,
supra note 161, at Box 25o, Case No. 82-647, http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell
%20archives/82-647_Kirkpatrick_ChristianHomeofAbilene.pdf
[http://perma.cc/QDL4
-5ZNU]) (recording votes to grant certiorari from Justices White and Blackmun), with
Certiorari Vote Count (Jan. 14, 1983) (on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, supra
note 161, at Box 25o, Case No. 82-647, http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell
%20archives/82-647_Kirkpatrick_ChristianHomeofAbilene.pdf
[http://perma.cc/QDL4
-5ZNU]) (recording votes to grant certiorari from Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Brennan, White, and Blackmun).

327.

Justice Byron R. White, Draft Dissent from Denial of Certiorari in Kirkpatrick v. Christian
Homes of Abilene at 2 (Jan. 11, 1983) (No. 82-647) (on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers,
supra note 161, at Box 25o, Case No., http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives
/82-647_Kirkpatrick_ChristianHomeofAbilene.pdf [http://perma.cc/QDL4-5ZNU]).

328.

Id. Justices Blackmun, Burger, and Brennan were prepared to join White’s dissent from the
denial of certiorari. See Letter from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Justice Byron R. White
(Jan. 12, 1983) (on file with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, supra note 76, at Box 386, Case No.
82-647); Letter from Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. to Justice Byron R. White (Jan. 12,
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“weighty equal protection claim” that “the challenged laws are based simply on
the sexual stereotype that women can be more trusted with children than
men.”329 Kirkpatrick’s “argument is not without force,” White wrote.330 “At the
least, there is sufficient doubt to merit this Court’s attention.”331 All in all, he
concluded, “The importance of these issues to many unwed fathers and their
children can hardly be overstated.”332
Despite the evident interest of at least four of its members who voted to
grant certiorari, the Court sidestepped the thorny issues presented in
Kirkpatrick by remanding on a state law question.333 Kirkpatrick provided an
unprecedented—and ultimately missed—opportunity for the Court to grapple
with explicitly feminist arguments for and against nonmarital fathers’ parental
rights.334 In a second case, McNamara v. San Diego Department of Social
Services,335 the ACLU seized the chance to elaborate on the feminist argument
for sex neutrality.
2. The ACLU Fights for Sex Neutrality in McNamara v. San Diego
Department of Social Services
Edward McNamara, a thirty-four-year-old carpenter, part-time salesman,
and divorced father of two, had a brief sexual relationship with a nineteen1983) (on file with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, supra note 76, at Box 386, Case No. 82-647);
Letter from Chief Justice Warren E. Burger to Justice Byron R. White (Jan. 12, 1983) (on file
with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, supra note 76, at Box 386, Case No. 82-647). Powell wrote
on White’s draft dissent: “Still inclined to deny—but BRW makes a good argument.”
Handwritten Notes by Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., on White, Draft Dissent from Denial of
Certiorari in Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes of Abilene, supra note 327, at 1.
329.

Justice Byron R. White, Draft Dissent from Denial of Certiorari in Kirkpatrick v. Christian
Homes of Abilene, supra note 327, at 3.

330.

Id.

331.

Id.

332.

Id.

333.

Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes of Abilene, 460 U.S. 1074, 1074-75 (1983). Justice Blackmun
initially was very concerned that Kirkpatrick be expedited in order to avoid further
uncertainty over the now two-year-old little girl’s parentage. Then the Texas Attorney
General suggested that Texas law could be interpreted to grant Kirkpatrick another means
of establishing paternity. See Memorandum from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to the
Conference (Apr. 4, 1983) (on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, supra note 161, at
Box 25o, Case No. 82-647, http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/82-647
_Kirkpatrick_ChristianHomeofAbilene.pdf [http://perma.cc/QDL4-5ZNU]). On remand,
however, the Texas court upheld its earlier ruling against Kirkpatrick. See In re Baby Girl S.,
658 S.W.2d 794, 796 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983).

334.

Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).

335.

488 U.S. 152 (1988).
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year-old woman in the fall of 1980.336 The two lost touch, and McNamara
did not know he had fathered a baby girl until, over dinner two weeks after
her birth in the summer of 1981, her mother asked him to relinquish his
parental rights.337 McNamara initially requested that the baby be placed with a
childless couple from his church who sometimes looked after his sons, but the
mother preferred adoption by a family who knew neither biological parent.338
After spending half an hour holding his weeks-old daughter, McNamara
later recalled, he requested custody. “I decided I wanted her, and could raise
her . . . . And I informed the county that I wanted her, and I was not going to
agree to the relinquishment.”339
But it was too late. The Department of Social Welfare placed Katie with a
foster family over McNamara’s objections,340 and a protracted legal battle
followed. When Katie was just five months old, a California trial court ruled
against McNamara, declaring that it was in Katie’s best interests to remain
with Pamela and Robert Moses, the foster parents who sought to adopt her.341
In 1984, the California Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that
custody should not be awarded to a nonparent unless parental custody would
be detrimental to the child.342 But when the case went back to the trial court,
Katie was three and a half years old and had lived with the Moses family almost
since birth. The judge found that a change of custody under these
circumstances would be detrimental, terminated McNamara’s parental rights,
and granted the adoption petition.343 McNamara appealed again, to no avail.344
When the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear McNamara’s appeal, he was
still seeking custody of Katie, who was seven years old and had seen
McNamara only once or twice, as an infant. The prospect of removing Katie
from the only home she had ever known made McNamara, as Isabelle Katz
Pinzler of the ACLU Women’s Rights Project put it, “the perfect example of

336.

Cynthia Gorney, The Disputed Kinship of Katie Moses, WASH. POST (Nov. 28, 1988), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/1988/11/28/the-disputed-kinship-of-katie-mose
s/55af462a-b507-42b0-adae-6c8b64437d20 [http://perma.cc/6EBD-VM3L].

337.

Id.

338.

Id.

339.

Id. (alteration in original).

340.

In re Baby Girl M., 688 P.2d 918, 920 (Cal. 1984).

341.

Id.

342.

Id. at 925.

343.

In re Baby Girl M., 236 Cal. Rptr. 660, 661 (Ct. App. 1987).

344.

Id. at 666. By the time the California intermediate appellate court decided McNamara’s case,
Katie was five years old. Id. at 661.
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‘hard cases make bad law.’”345 An early draft of the ACLU’s amicus brief
opened with a plea for the Court to dismiss the case for want of a substantial
federal question and strategically avoided the equal protection issue.346
A few weeks later, Pinzler and her colleagues learned, to their relief, that
McNamara was no longer seeking custody of Katie but merely visitation rights.
This decision transformed the ACLU’s brief into a full-throated argument for
sex neutrality. Unlike Caban and Lehr, McNamara did “not seek to limit the
rights of Katie’s natural mother.”347 Instead, McNamara challenged “the
right of the State to sever his parent-child relationship on grounds which
patently discriminate on the basis of sex.”348 Unmarried mothers’ parental
rights could not “be severed absent their consent or a showing of unfitness
or abandonment,” whereas an unmarried father who had no opportunity
to develop a relationship with his child could have his rights terminated under
a much less stringent “best interests” or “detriment” standard.349 This, the
ACLU argued, was sex discrimination pure and simple.
The ACLU’s McNamara brief articulated the strongest version yet of the
feminist argument for sex neutrality in parental rights. The only “respect in
which the interests of mothers and fathers are profoundly and inherently
different,” the brief declared, concerned a woman’s “fundamental right . . . to
terminate a pregnancy.”350 After a child is born, “no reason exists, outside of
social custom and stereotyped notions of the proper roles for women and men,
to support a gender based distinction in parental rights and obligations.”351

345.

Memorandum from Isabelle [Katz Pinzler], Dir., ACLU Women’s Rights Project, to
Steve[n R. Shapiro], Assoc. Legal Dir., ACLU 1 (May 13, 1988) (on file with ACLU Records,
supra note 225, Box 3527, Folder B2100, “McNamara v. San Diego Correspondence”). She
continued: “In saving this child undeniable trauma we run the risk of making very bad law
which may result in greater trauma for more families.” Id.

346.

Memorandum from Steve[n R. Shapiro], Assoc. Legal Dir., ACLU, to Ira [Glasser], Exec.
Dir., ACLU, et al. 2 (May 12, 1988) (on file with ACLU Records, supra note 225, Box 3527,
Folder B2100, “McNamara v. San Diego Correspondence”).

347.

Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae & Brief Amicus Curiae of the ACLU & the
ACLU of San Diego & Imperial Counties in Support of Appellant at 12, McNamara v. Cty.
of San Diego Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 488 U.S. 152 (1988) (No. 87-5840) (on file with ACLU
Records, supra note 225, Box 3527, Folder (unnumbered), “McNamara v. San Diego ACLU
Amicus Brief”) [hereinafter Brief for ACLU as Amicus Curiae].

348.

Id.

349.

Id. at 13-14. “[W]hatever standard California uses in terminating the parental rights of an
unwed parent, it must be the same for both parents. The standard applied to mothers is
plain: desertion, relinquishment, or, in certain cases, failure to pay for care, support, and
education. Fathers are entitled to be judged by the same rule.” Id. at 17-18 (citation omitted).

350 .

Id. at 22-23.

351 .

Id. at 23-24.
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Echoing Ginsburg’s arguments of the preceding decade,352 the brief contended
that women, men, and children all suffered harm when the State presumed
“that either gender has a monopoly on nurturance, love, concern, or the
willingness to support and care for children.”353 Channeling Sylvia Law’s
position in a classic 1984 article, the ACLU called gender-differentiated
parental rights a self-fulfilling prophecy. Law had written: “Although sexbased classifications are unjust in relation to individuals . . . who do not fit the
stereotypes . . . the primary constitutional infirmity in such classifications is
not that they are inaccurate, but rather that they are self-fulfilling.”354 The
ACLU brief noted: “An official presumption that unwed fathers are
uninterested . . . can surely help to create or perpetuate such a result.”355 Now
that nonmarital fathers could be compelled to support their biological children
financially, to deprive them of rights risked “contribut[ing] to the anger and
resentment of some fathers” and causing them, “however unjustifiably,” to
shirk both childcare and financial responsibilities.356
The ACLU’s brief in McNamara went further than any previous
submission to the Court in arguing that women’s welfare ultimately was best
served by recognizing greater rights for nonmarital fathers. More common was
the view expressed by Norah Whiting in a letter to the Washington Post: “It is a
hard fact to face,” she wrote, “but if we mothers honestly want (as we say we
do) a society filled with men who are committed, involved fathers, we cannot
also demand that men who are fathers simply disappear quietly whenever their
presence proves inconvenient for us.”357 Others disagreed. Of the California
Supreme Court decision requiring that custody be given to a willing father
unless “detrimental” to the child, adoption lawyer David Keene Leavitt
declared, “The mother can abort it; she can kill the fetus. But if she wants to
bear it to term, she needs the permission of the fellow who got her pregnant

352 .

See, e.g., Brief for Appellee at 10-13, Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (No. 731892), 1974 WL 186057 (arguing that to deny the “mother’s insurance benefit” to fathers
shortchanged mothers, fathers, and children).

353 .

Brief for ACLU as Amicus Curiae, supra note 347, at 24.

354 .

Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 995 (1984).

355 .

Brief for ACLU as Amicus Curiae, supra note 347, at 24.

356 .

Id. In closing, the ACLU warned that if the Court ruled “that unwed fathers do not share
equal rights as well as equal responsibilities for their children,” it would “send precisely the
wrong message to these fathers and may further trap the mothers of these children and the
children themselves in the cycles of poverty and dependence in which they all too often find
themselves.” Id. at 25.

357 .

Norah Whiting, Letter to the Editor, Equal Rights in the Nursery, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 1988,
at A22.
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before she can put it up for adoption. It’s a nightmare for women.”358
Syndicated columnist Ellen Goodman took a more balanced approach, arguing
that an unwed father’s rights “should be calibrated in terms of his
commitment. There’s a vast difference between the father who has lived with
his children, and the one who has deserted them.”359 But in McNamara,
“neither the mother nor the California law ever gave Ed McNamara the chance
to act like a father.”360
Once again, the Court declined to pass judgment on the relationship
between sex equality and parental rights. O’Connor clerk Sharon Beckman
judged the equal protection issue “insubstantial,” and maintained that, in any
event, it was neither raised nor decided below.361 Blackmun clerk Kevin
Kearney agreed that the equal protection issue was not “properly presented”
and that “on the merits the claim is not strong, as there are reasons for the state
to treat the mothers of newborns differently [from] fathers.”362 He wrote to the
Justice: “My strongest impression is that this case should not be here, and that
its ultimate resolution, unless it is dismissed, will be messy.”363 At oral
argument, “several justices challenged McNamara’s lawyer to point to a place
in the court record where the issue of ‘equal protection’ was raised. ‘When you
find it, say “Bingo!”’ snapped Justice Antonin Scalia.”364 Justice O’Connor also
reportedly voiced skepticism about “why someone who engages ‘in a so-called
one-night stand’ would have a constitutional right to control the fate of the

358 .

Dan Morain, “Casual” Fathers Win More Control in Adoption Cases, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1984,
at B18. Leavitt had long been a proponent of unwed mothers’ right to place their babies for
adoption. See Lilliston, supra note 198, at E4 (“A man can have seven minutes of pleasure
with a girl and then come back later and ruin her life and that of the child. . . . If there is no
affection and cooperation between the two, someone has got to have the rights and it has
got to be her.” (quoting Leavitt)).

359 .

Ellen Goodman, Exploring the Rights of Unwed Fathers, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 1978, at A19.

360.

Ellen Goodman, If a Father Has a Duty, Can He Be Denied Rights?, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 4, 1988,
at E4.

361.

Memorandum from Sharon Beckman, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to the Conference 12
(Jan. 5, 1988) (on file with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, supra note 76, at Box 529, Case No.
87-5840).

362.

Memorandum from Kevin Kearney, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to Justice Harry A.
Blackmun ii (Nov. 14, 1988) (on file with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, supra note 76, at Box
529, Case No. 87-5840). At the same time, the clerk was “not comfortable with a due process
standard which would recognize a mother’s fundamental interest and ignore a father’s. . . .
Where the mother has kept the father in the dark, there is nothing he can do during the
pregnancy to show his commitment.” Id. at 25-26.

363.

Id.

364.

David G. Savage, High Court Dismisses Case of Unwed La Habra Father, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 7,
1988, at OC1.
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child who accidentally results from the affair.”365 In an anticlimactic conclusion
to a seven-year court battle, a majority of the Court voted to dismiss
McNamara for want of a properly presented federal question.366
B. Unwed Fathers vs. Husbands in the Supreme Court, Redux
The direct involvement of feminists in Kirkpatrick and McNamara framed
these cases as centrally concerned with questions of sex equality in nonmarital
parenthood, but the Court decided neither on the merits. The two unwed
fathers’ cases that the Court did decide in the 1980s, Lehr v. Robertson367 and
Michael H. v. Gerald D.,368 included sex-based equal protection claims as well,
but like the 1970s cases did not bear overt hallmarks of feminist intervention,
and rendered mothers largely invisible. Lehr and especially Michael H.
resoundingly rejected marital status equality for fathers and submerged almost
entirely the sex equality questions simultaneously and starkly presented to the
Court in Kirkpatrick and McNamara.
1. “A Bias in Favor of the Formal Family”: Lehr v. Robertson (1983)
Jonathan Lehr and Lorraine Martz met after Lorraine’s father was killed in
Vietnam and Jonathan’s mother, Helen, took the troubled teenage girl,
estranged from her mother and stepfather, under her wing.369 Jonathan and
Lorraine became intimately involved and lived together sporadically along with
Lorraine’s daughter from a previous relationship, Renee.370 Their daughter
Jessica was born in 1976, and the couple was at one point engaged.371 Lehr
visited Lorraine and Jessica in the hospital after the birth but did not accede to
Lorraine’s request that they marry.372

365.

David G. Savage, Justices Cool to Unwed Father’s Appeal for Child, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1988,
at E19.

366.

See McNamara v. Cty. of San Diego Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 488 U.S. 152, 152 (1988) (per
curiam); Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes in McNamara v. Cty. of San Diego
Dep’t of Soc. Servs. (Nov. 30, 1988) (on file with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, supra note 76,
at Box 529, Case No. 87-5840).

367.

463 U.S. 248 (1983).

368.

491 U.S. 110 (1989).

369.

See Joint Appendix at 87-88, Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (No. 81-1756) 1982 U.S.
S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 216.

370.

See id. at 89.

371.

Id. at 39.

372.

Id. at 39, 109.
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What happened next was the subject of vigorous dispute. Lehr maintained
that he did everything in his power to ascertain Lorraine’s whereabouts when
she moved with her children to another part of New York State and then
married Richard Robertson.373 Lorraine insisted that Lehr showed no interest
in Jessica until Richard commenced adoption proceedings, though Lehr visited
with Renee on several occasions after Jessica’s birth.374 In any event, Lehr filed
a petition to establish paternity in late January 1979.375 However, filing a
paternity suit was not one of the seven circumstances that entitled a putative
father to notice and a hearing in adoption proceedings under New York’s postStanley statutory scheme. Though all parties—including the judge—were aware
of Lehr’s paternity suit, the court approved Richard’s adoption of Jessica,
effectively foreclosing Lehr’s parental rights.376
The judge’s apparent eagerness to finalize the adoption despite knowing
that Lehr had petitioned for paternity disturbed several of the Justices.377 But
after passing on the first round of voting at conference, both Burger and
Brennan voted to affirm the New York Court of Appeals decision upholding
the adoption.378 Burger assigned the majority opinion to Stevens, a dissenter in
Caban. Stevens’s first draft was, according to Justice Powell, “a mish-mash of
an opinion. Can’t believe JPS wrote it.”379 As law clerk Rives Kistler wrote to
Powell, the first part of Stevens’s opinion “refocus[ed] the constitutional
inquiry,” characterizing precedents such as Stanley, Quilloin, Caban, and the
illegitimacy cases in ways that “give only grudging approval to the Court’s

373.

Id. at 19.

374.

Id. at 88-90. It seems from the record that Lehr had developed a bond with Renee,
Lorraine’s other daughter, but the absence of a biological tie apparently precluded him from
asserting any visitation rights with respect to Renee. See id. at 56-57, 92.

375.

See id. at 2.

376.

Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 253 (1983).

377.

See, e.g., Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Handwritten Annotations to Memorandum from D. Rives
Kistler, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 1 (Dec. 6, 1982) (on file
with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, supra note 161, at Box 243, Case No. 81-1756, http://
law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/LehrRobertson.pdf [http://perma.cc/G6AK
-ZYDX]) (“I could reverse if we address merits of N.Y. law as applied in this case, where
identity + interest of putative father were known. N.Y. law is valid facially.”).

378.

Powell’s conference notes indicate that both Burger and Brennan voted to affirm on the
second round of voting, but were “not at rest.” Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Conference
Notes in Lehr v. Robertson at 1 (Dec. 10, 1982) (on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers,
supra note 161, at Box 243, Case No. 81-1756, http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell
%20archives/LehrRobertson.pdf [http://perma.cc/G6AK-ZYDX]).

379.

Powell wrote: “I’ll await other writing. J[ohn]P[aul]S[tevens]’s op. appears unsatisfactory.”
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Handwritten Annotations to Memorandum from D. Rives
Kistler, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., supra note 377, at 1.
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cases that recognize constitutional protection for non-traditional family
relationships.”380 Stevens explicitly endorsed “formal family” and recognized
family relationships as superior, citing and quoting at length a recent article by
Bruce Hafen, a prominent conservative law professor and Mormon leader.381
As Hafen interpreted recent jurisprudence, the Court had not effected a
revolutionary change in the laws of reproduction and the family in the 1970s.382
Despite easing some of the legal burdens imposed on nonmarital children and
their parents, legalizing contraception and abortion, and removing many
overtly sex-based classifications from the law, the Justices—even at their most
liberal and expansive—had never dethroned the marital family or formal family
relationships.383 Despite much wishful and creative thinking by liberal
constitutional lawyers and scholars (and a few lower court judges), “marriage
and kinship are still the touchstones of constitutional adjudication in familyrelated cases,” Hafen concluded.384 “The Court has limited some traditional
policies, but has done so only in an effort to remedy exceptional inequities.”385
And critically, “[e]ven the exceptional cases have been treated in such a way
that constitutional protection has not been extended to relationships between
unmarried adults.”386
Stevens’s majority opinion in Lehr seemed to ratify Hafen’s account, even
after Stevens removed the long quotations from Hafen’s article. Stevens wrote
to Brennan:
I know the [Hafen] article as a whole exhibits a bias in favor of the
formal family, but I do not believe that bias is any stronger than the
stance the Court has taken in several opinions. I really think all of us

380.

Id. at 2.

381.

Justice John Paul Stevens, First Draft Opinion in Lehr v. Robertson 8 n.12 (May 10, 1983)
(on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, supra note 161, at Box 243, Case No. 81-1756,
http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/LehrRobertson.pdf [http://perma.cc
/G6AK-ZYDX]).

382.

Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy—Balancing
the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463, 465 (1983).

383.

Id. at 544 (describing the “historical position of preference this society has so long assigned
to the institution of marriage”).

384.

Id. at 471.

385.

Id.

386.

Id. Hafen’s assessment was shared by a number of scholars with diverse political views. See,
e.g., Thomas C. Grey, Eros, Civilization and the Burger Court, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Summer 1980, at 90.
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would agree with each of the statements that Hafen makes in what I
have quoted.387
Stevens added, “I would rather have your vote than Mr. Hafen’s quotation but
wonder how strongly you feel about it.”388 Brennan eventually withdrew his
objection to the longer Hafen quotation, but Stevens left it out after Powell
registered his discomfort as well.389 Still, the final opinion privileged the
“formal family” and “recognized family unit.”390
Removing the extended homage to Hafen was not the only revision
Stevens made to assuage his colleagues’ concerns. Justice O’Connor expressed
qualms about the treatment of the sex-based equal protection issue. Stevens
had written in an early draft:
Before birth, the mother carries the child; it is she who has the
constitutional right to decide whether to bear it or not. And from the
moment the child is born, the mother always has a relationship of legal
responsibility toward the child. Because the natural father of an
illegitimate child can often be legally and practically anonymous if he
chooses, responsibility does not devolve upon him in the same
automatic fashion.391

387.

Letter from Justice John Paul Stevens to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. 2 (June 3, 1983)
(on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, supra note 161, at Box 243, Case No. 81-1756,
http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/LehrRobertson.pdf [http://perma.cc
/G6AK-ZYDX]).

388.

Id.

389.

See Letter from Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. to Justice John Paul Stevens 1 (June 6, 1983)
(on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, supra note 161, at Box 243, Case No. 81-1756,
http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/LehrRobertson.pdf [http://perma.cc
/G6AK-ZYDX]); Letter from Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. to Justice John Paul Stevens 1
(June 3, 1983) (on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, supra note 161, at Box 243, Case No.
81-1756, http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/LehrRobertson.pdf [http://
perma.cc/G6AK-ZYDX]); Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Justice John Paul
Stevens (June 6, 1983) (on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, supra note 161, at Box 243,
Case No. 81-1756, http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/LehrRobertson.pdf
[http://perma.cc/G6AK-ZYDX]); Letter from Justice John Paul Stevens to Justice William
J. Brennan, Jr., supra note 387, at 1-2.

390.

Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257 (1983).

391.

Justice John Paul Stevens, First Draft Opinion in Lehr v. Robertson, supra note 381, at 19
(citation omitted). The discussion in Stevens’s Lehr draft is remarkably similar to his
published opinion in Miller v. Albright fifteen years later. See Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420,
436 (1998) (“The blood relationship to the birth mother is immediately obvious and is
typically established by hospital records and birth certificates; the relationship to the
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O’Connor found this discussion “disturbing.”392 She “agree[d] that, as a
practical matter, it is easier for the natural father of an illegitimate child to
evade legal responsibility because of his anonymity.”393 She continued:
I recognize that the clause ‘responsibility does not devolve upon him in
the same automatic fashion’ is probably intended to be descriptive only.
Nevertheless, the language contains connotations of approval of a
scheme that imposes less legal responsibility on the natural father, and I
would prefer to avoid any implication of that kind.394
O’Connor thought “this generic discussion of the difference between natural
mothers and natural fathers [was] not necessary” to dispense with Lehr’s equal
protection challenge.395 Instead, she urged Stevens to rely on Quilloin and on
Lehr’s lack of a “substantial relationship” with his daughter.396 Stevens revised
the draft accordingly.397 O’Connor’s intervention appears to have been the first
time a Justice expressed concern about the detrimental effect on women of
basing superior parental rights on the assumption of weightier maternal
responsibilities.
In the end, none of the Justices disputed the majority’s ruling that
unmarried mothers and fathers could be treated differently in adoption
proceedings so long as the father had not formed a significant relationship with
his biological child and the mother had.398 The majority and dissenters White,
unmarried father may often be undisclosed and unrecorded . . . .”). For a trenchant critique
of the opinions in Miller, see Collins, supra note 5.
392.

Letter from Justice Sandra Day O’Connor to Justice John Paul Stevens 2 (May 23, 1983) (on
file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, supra note 161, at Box 243, Case No. 81-1756, http://
law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/LehrRobertson.pdf [http://perma.cc/G6AK
-ZYDX]).

393.

Id.

394.

Id.

395.

Id.

396.

Id.; see also Letter from Justice John Paul Stevens to Justice Sandra Day O’Connor 1 (May 23,
1983) (on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, supra note 161, at Box 243, Case No. 81-1756,
http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/LehrRobertson.pdf [http://perma.cc
/G6AK-ZYDX]) (proposing revision).

397.

See Justice John Paul Stevens, Second Draft Opinion in Lehr v. Robertson 19 (May 25, 1983)
(on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, supra note 161, at Box 243, Case No. 81-1756,
http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/LehrRobertson.pdf [http://perma.cc
/G6AK-ZYDX]).

398.

See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 267 (1983). Powell agreed that Lehr’s equal protection
claim was “meritless,” though he was skeptical that Stevens’s lengthy substantive due
process discussion in Part I of his opinion was necessary. See Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.,
Handwritten Annotations to Memorandum from D. Rives Kistler, Clerk, U.S. Supreme
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Marshall, and Blackmun disagreed over a different question: whether, given
Lehr’s efforts to form such a relationship—including the filing of a paternity
petition—the strict application of the statute’s requirements violated due
process.
Lehr somewhat cryptically confirmed that marital status was a legitimate
basis for sex-differentiated treatment of parental rights and responsibilities.
The briefing in Lehr addressed the sex-based equal protection question, with
Lehr and his supporters arguing that to give notice and a hearing to all unwed
mothers but only a select category of unwed fathers violated the principles
articulated in Stanley, Caban, and the Court’s constitutional sex equality
jurisprudence.399 Opponents argued that cases such as Parham had established
the constitutionality of distinguishing between unmarried mothers, whose
identity could easily be established at birth, and unmarried fathers, whose
parentage often was shrouded in ambiguity.400 Justice O’Connor’s intervention
saved the Lehr opinion from incorporating what she viewed as damaging
assumptions about mothers’ inevitable responsibility for nonmarital children,
but White’s dissent avoided the sex-based equal protection question
altogether.401 In denying even the most basic procedural rights to Lehr, the
Court appeared to retreat from its earlier precedents.402 And Reagan’s next
appointments to the Court would not bode well for nonmarital fathers’ rights.
Court, to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 1 (June 4, 1983) (on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Papers, supra note 161, at Box 243, Case No. 81-1756, http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages
/powell%20archives/LehrRobertson.pdf [http://perma.cc/G6AK-ZYDX]); Letter from
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Justice John Paul Stevens (May 17, 1983) (on file with Lewis F.
Powell, Jr. Papers, supra note 161, at Box 243, Case No. 81-1756, http://law2.wlu.edu
/deptimages/powell%20archives/LehrRobertson.pdf [http://perma.cc/G6AK-ZYDX]).
Brennan did not wish to pass judgment on the issues of consent to newborn adoption
presented by cases such as Kirkpatrick. See Letter from Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. to
Justice John Paul Stevens (June 6, 1983), supra note 389; Letter from Justice William J.
Brennan, Jr. to Justice John Paul Stevens 2 (June 1, 1983) (on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Papers, supra note 161, at Box 243, Case No. 81-1756, http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages
/powell%20archives/LehrRobertson.pdf [http://perma.cc/G6AK-ZYDX]). On Kirkpatrick,
see infra Section IV.A.1.
399.

See Brief for Appellant at 1-2, Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (No. 81-1756).

400. See

Brief of National Committee for Adoption as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at
14-15, Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (No. 81-1756).

401.

White’s dissent did not pass judgment on “whether [the statute] violates the Equal
Protection Clause by discriminating between categories of unwed fathers or by
discriminating on the basis of gender.” Lehr, 463 U.S. at 276 (White, J., dissenting).

402.

Neither Quilloin nor Caban raised the question whether a putative father was entitled to a
hearing—both cases involved what one commentator called “the more extensive, substantive
right of an unwed father to veto an adoption approved by the natural mother.” Jennifer J.
Raab, Lehr v. Robertson: Unwed Fathers and Adoption—How Much Process Is Due?, 7 HARV.
WOMEN’S L.J. 265, 272 (1984). For a contemporaneous account of the state of the law in this
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2. Affirming Marital Supremacy, Avoiding Equality: Michael H. v.
Gerald D. (1989)
By the time the Supreme Court heard McNamara and Michael H. at the end
of the 1980s, William Rehnquist, its most conservative member, had become
Chief Justice, replacing Warren Burger. Conservative D.C. Circuit Judge
Antonin Scalia had taken Rehnquist’s seat as an Associate Justice. And, after a
bruising and ultimately unsuccessful battle over the confirmation of
conservative scholar and former Solicitor General Robert Bork, Ninth Circuit
Judge Anthony Kennedy had replaced Lewis Powell, a swing voter in earlier
nonmarital father cases. These appointments solidified the rightward shift that
commenced with Nixon’s appointments of Burger, Powell, and Rehnquist in
the late 1960s and early 1970s.
Having dodged McNamara, the Court decided Michael H. v. Gerald D.,403
another contest between husbands and fathers decided on due process
grounds. Even more than Lehr, Michael H. buried questions of equality and
almost entirely ignored the interests of women and mothers. The mother in
Michael H., Carole D., had given birth to a daughter, Victoria, in May 1981.404
A fashion model married to an oil executive, Carole was involved in an extramarital relationship with Michael H. in Los Angeles, while her husband,
Gerald D., lived primarily in New York and traveled abroad on business.405
Victoria always remained with Carole, but they moved frequently between
households as a series of separations and reconciliations with Michael, Gerald,
and a third man followed.406
Though the parties disputed nearly everything else, Michael’s paternity was
not in question: blood tests had established the biological link with more than
ninety-eight percent certainty.407 Soon thereafter, Michael filed an action to
establish legal paternity.408 For two periods of several months—once when
Victoria was an infant, and again when she was two years old—Carole,

area, see Elizabeth Buchanan, The Constitutional Rights of Unwed Fathers Before and After Lehr
v. Robertson, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 313 (1984).
403.

491 U.S. 110 (1989).

404.

Id. at 113.

405.

Id.

406. Id.

at 114.

407.

Id. By the late 1980s, the accuracy of blood tests to determine paternity had increased
dramatically. For a contemporaneous assessment, see D.H. Kaye, The Probability of an
Ultimate Issue: The Strange Case of Paternity Testing, 75 IOWA L. REV. 75 (1989).

408.

Michael H., 491 U.S. at 114.
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Michael, and Victoria lived as a family in California.409 Carole left Michael for
good in 1984, and soon thereafter, Carole and Gerald reconciled again.410 By
this time, Gerald, Carole, and Victoria were living together in New York.411 An
attorney and guardian ad litem representing Victoria’s interests sought
visitation rights for Michael.412
The psychologist who evaluated the parties in order to recommend a
visitation arrangement produced a largely unflattering report, depicting Carole
as “child-like,” with a “limited capacity to be intimate or self-sacrificing to the
degree which normally characterizes relationships between parents and
children . . . .”413 For his part, Michael allegedly “exhibit[ed] virtually all of the
characteristics associated with parents who engage in incestuous-type
relationships,” though the psychologist found no evidence of inappropriate
sexual contact.414 Only Gerald, Carole’s husband, seemed promising parental
material,415 but the psychologist believed he was the least committed to
Victoria’s long-term care.416 Ultimately, the psychologist recommended that
Michael be afforded limited visitation, the best of what he evidently regarded
as an unfortunate set of options.417
Whatever their individual strengths and shortcomings, Victoria had
formed attachments to all three adults. Michael apparently had grasped the
opportunity to establish a relationship with Victoria, which, under Lehr,
presumably meant that he had a liberty interest earning him the right to notice
and a hearing before his parental rights were terminated. But Michael H.
differed from the earlier cases in one crucial respect: when Victoria was born,
Carole was legally married, to Gerald. California’s century-old marital
presumption, recently amended, provided only very limited circumstances
under which a mother’s husband would not automatically be declared the sole
legal father of any child born during the marriage.418 Accordingly, the
California trial court granted summary judgment to Gerald, declaring him
409. Id.

at 114-15.

410.

Id.

411.

Id. at 115.

412.

Specifically, Michael H. sought visitation pendente lite. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 236 Cal.
Rep. 810, 813 (Ct. App. 1987), aff’d, 491 U.S. 110 (1989).

413.

Id.

414.

Id.

415.

Id.

416.

Joint Appendix at 52, Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (No. 87-746) 1988 U.S.
S.Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1138 [hereinafter Michael H. Appendix].

417.

Michael H., 491 U.S. at 115.

418.

Michael H. Appendix, supra note 416, at 30.
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Victoria’s legal father and terminating Michael’s parental rights.419 In 1987, an
appellate court affirmed, and the California Supreme Court denied review.420
By the time the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, Michael H. was
framed as a contest between Gerald and Michael for legal recognition as
Victoria’s father.421 Procedural and substantive due process claims loomed
large, consuming the lion’s share of the briefs and commentary on the case. As
in earlier unwed father cases, though, it was also possible to view the
challenged statute as discriminating based on sex. Michael argued that
California’s statutory scheme “constitutes gender-based discrimination”:
Under its terms, the right of a biological mother to remain a parent is
never open to question without access to a full panoply of due process
protections. On the other hand, a biological father is deprived of
parental rights without any determination of his fitness and precluded
from ever asserting his parental rights notwithstanding his established
relationship with the child.422
Gerald contended that Michael was “simply wrong. . . . [T]he mother’s right to
dispute the presumption is coextensive with the putative father’s.”423 Even
assuming a gender-based distinction, Gerald argued that the statute bore “a
substantial relationship to the state’s interest of assuring parentage for the
child and protecting the family into which the child is born.”424 An amicus brief
filed by the ACLU sidestepped the equal protection question, and instead
pressed the argument that to sever the bond between Michael and Victoria
violated Michael’s fundamental right to maintain an established parent-child
relationship.425
In the end, the Court addressed only Michael’s due process claim, dealing
him a resounding defeat. The plurality opinion, authored by Justice Scalia,
exuded barely veiled disdain for Michael’s claim and for the complicated family

419.

See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 236 Cal. Rptr. at 820 (Ct. App. 1987), aff’d, 491 U.S. 110.

420.

Id. at 821.

421.

See, e.g., 2 Fathers Claim Right to Daughter, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 13, 1988, at 32 (discussing
Michael H.).

422.

Brief for Appellant Michael H. at 29, Michael H., 491 U.S. 110 (No. 87-746).

423.

Motion to Dismiss or Affirm for Appellee at 7-8, Michael H., 491 U.S. 110 (No. 87-746).

424.

Brief for Appellee at 31, Michael H., 491 U.S. 110 (No. 87-746).

425.

See Motion for Leave to File Brief Amici Curiae and Brief Amici Curiae of American Civil
Liberties Union Foundation and ACLU Foundation of Southern California in Support of
Appellants, Michael H., 491 U.S. 110 (No. 87-746); Brief of the National Council on
Children’s Rights Supporting Appellants, Michael H., 491 U.S. 110 (No. 87-746).
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situation that produced it.426 Scalia scoffed at the notion that a biological father
could invoke constitutional protection for his relationship to a child conceived
in an “adulterous” affair when his parenthood would intrude upon the
harmony of an intact marital family.427 In his concurrence, Stevens agreed with
the dissenters that Michael’s biological and relational connection to Victoria
earned him the right to notice and a hearing, but concluded that Michael had
such an opportunity.428 The dissenters expressed dismay at what they
perceived as a stunning retreat from the principles that animated Stanley,
Caban, and even Lehr, where the Court had emphasized that a biological tie
plus an established relationship sufficed to create a protected liberty interest.429
The only mention of Michael’s equal protection claim came in the plurality’s
brief note that “it was neither raised nor passed upon below.”430 Michael H.
seemed, therefore, to stand primarily for the Court’s endorsement of marital
supremacy, and for a cramped conception of due process rights more generally.
Capping almost two decades of debate over their proper scope and
constitutional pedigree, Michael H. stands as the Supreme Court’s final word
on the parental rights of nonmarital fathers. A question originally framed as
discrimination based on sex and marital status had become a battle over the
process due to nonmarital fathers threatened with termination of their parental
rights. From the beginning, some of the Justices had considered an equality
framing: early drafts of the majority opinions in Stanley and Caban endorsed a
robust rule of formal sex neutrality in nonmarital parental rights and rejected
unflattering generalizations about unmarried fathers as dissolute,
irresponsible, and uncaring. But this unqualified version of nonmarital sex
neutrality never garnered enough support to prevail. Nor were the Justices—
even those most sympathetic to nonmarital families’ plight, even in the heyday
of nonmarital fathers’ rights—ever prepared to embrace full equality for
marital and nonmarital fathers. In short, though nonmarital fathers achieved
some due process protections, they never won a constitutional guarantee of
equal treatment based on sex and marital status. And the Court never directly
engaged with the fundamental question that divided feminists: when does
legal sex neutrality serve substantive sex equality? However one believes those
questions should be answered, the consequences of avoiding them have
implications beyond the unwed fathers parental rights cases.

426.

Michael H., 491 U.S. 110.

427.

Id. at 113.

428.

Id. at 132-33 (Stevens, J., concurring).

429.

Id. at 142-43 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

430.

Id. at 116-17 (plurality opinion).
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v . d iv e r g e n c e s : n o n m a r it a l p a r e n t h o o d in t h e a g e o f
e q u a l it y
When Peter Stanley brought the first unwed father case to the Supreme
Court in 1971, he posed novel questions of sex and marital status
discrimination to a nation engulfed in cultural and constitutional change.
Though nonmarital fathers won unprecedented due process rights in the
decades that followed, they remained in many ways in a class by themselves.
Unlike many other groups that claimed constitutional rights in the Supreme
Court, unwed fathers did not have the support of established organizations or
mobilized social movements who represented their particular interests. Instead,
various groups and interests fought for their own causes on the battleground of
nonmarital fatherhood. Social movements left their mark on the constitutional
treatment of nonmarital fathers, but not in the usual way.
This Part examines the causes and consequences of nonmarital fathers’
failed pursuit of constitutional parity with mothers and marital fathers. Section
V.A considers nonmarital fathers’ unsuccessful quest to be treated as “de facto
divorced fathers” and suggests reasons for this failure. Section V.B examines
the divergence between Justices’ and feminists’ concerns in the debate over
unwed fathers’ rights. This divergence had significant ramifications for
constitutional equality law, and for the relationship between sex equality and
marital supremacy, as Section V.C. explains.
A. Nonmarital Fathers vs. Divorced Fathers
Between the 1960s, when nonmarital fathers began to attract the attention
of legal and social work professionals, and the 1980s, when the Supreme Court
last considered nonmarital fathers’ parental rights, sex neutrality became the
rule in the law of divorce. This transformation began in the early 1970s, as
feminists and divorced fathers’ rights activists—for somewhat different
reasons—began to advocate for the abandonment of maternal custody
preferences, and continued through the 1970s and 1980s as joint custody and
paternal involvement gained ground. Divorced fathers won greater access to
their children, in part through arguments for equal treatment and against
mothers’ inherently superior parenting ability. Nonmarital childbearing
became more common and less stigmatized. As a result, singling out
nonmarital fathers for inferior parental rights seemed increasingly anomalous.
Even before the sex equality revolution, nonmarital fathers could cite the
1965 case Armstrong v. Manzo,431 where the Court had recognized a divorced
431.

380 U.S. 545 (1965).
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father’s procedural right to notice and a hearing in an adoption proceeding. In
Stanley, the Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law’s amicus brief noted that
Manzo was “almost directly on point.”432 In Quilloin, Justice Marshall framed
the equal protection question as whether “the state was required to treat
[Quilloin] the same as a divorced father.”433 Quilloin’s attorney called his client
a “de facto divorced father. . . . He has done everything as far as a nurturing
instinct is concerned that a normal divorced father would.”434 But Quilloin
could not overcome the trial court’s apparent finding that he had neither
legitimated his son nor provided consistent financial support. Marshall’s
opinion for the unanimous Court affirmed the validity of distinctions between
divorced and never-married fathers, at least in cases where the father had
“never shouldered any significant responsibility” for the child.435
Advocates for nonmarital fathers continued to press the divorced father
analogy in Caban, Lehr, and Michael H. In Caban, for instance, the Legal Aid
Society’s amicus brief highlighted
the juxtaposition of Mr. Caban’s plight with the status of a divorced
father who has had no contact whatsoever with his children. Regardless
of the duration of the marriage, the amount of support provided, or
indeed, whether the divorced father had even been made aware of the
birth of the child, the child of such a father could not be adopted
[without the father’s consent under New York law].436
In Michael H., the parallel between nonmarital and divorced fathers seemed
especially strong: like many divorced fathers, Michael had maintained a
relationship with his daughter through court-ordered visitation during the

432.

Brief for Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law as Amicus Curiae at 5, Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645 (1972) (No. 70-5014).

433.

Opinion Announcement at 1:40, Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (No. 76-6372),
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-6372 [http://perma.cc/3PDX-KV5Q].

434.

Oral Argument at 9:46, Quilloin, 434 U.S. 246 (No. 76-6372), http://www.oyez.org/cases
/1977/76-6372 [http://perma.cc/3PDX-KV5Q].

435.

Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 256. “[E]ven a father whose marriage has broken apart will have borne
full responsibility for the rearing of his children during the period of the marriage,”
Marshall wrote. Id.

436.

Brief for Legal Aid Society as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant at 54, Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1978) (No. 77-6431); see also Brief for Community Action for
Legal Services as Amicus Curiae at 44-46, Caban, 441 U.S. 380 (No. 77-6431) (making
similar arguments). Community Action for Legal Services elaborated this comparison in
Lehr, repeatedly invoking Armstrong v. Manzo. See Brief for Community Action for Legal
Services, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae at 50, Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (No. 811756) (citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545).
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times when he was estranged from her mother.437 As Michael Hirschensohn
(the plaintiff in Michael H.) told the Los Angeles Times in 1987, “I lived with the
woman I loved, we split up and I think I’m entitled to see my daughter. I’m not
asking to be treated other than [as] a divorced father.”438
Nonmarital fathers’ efforts to highlight their similarities to divorced fathers
belied crucial differences, however. One key distinction was unmarried fathers’
relative lack of organization. Like feminists, divorced fathers had mobilized as a
movement by the 1970s, though they did so primarily at the state and local
rather than national level.439 Fathers’ rights activists had developed and
published critiques of the divorce system since the 1960s, and successfully
lobbied state legislatures in the following decades.440 In contrast, there is little
evidence that unmarried fathers mobilized before the 1980s, though it is
possible that they took earlier action under the radar at the state and local level.
By the early 1980s, some fathers’ rights organizations supported unmarried
fathers’ efforts to gain custody of their children, and journalists began to write
about the rights of “single dads” as a group, glossing over distinctions based on
marital status.441 Some unmarried fathers started their own organizations later
in the decade: Hirschensohn founded Equality Nationwide for Unwed Fathers
(ENUF) and claimed some credit for changing California law to eliminate the
conclusive marital presumption that deprived him of parental rights.442

437.

The ACLU’s Michael H. brief acknowledged that the “state may indeed have a legitimate
interest in protecting families that conform to the traditional nuclear model,” but argued
that interest “would not bar a biological father from visiting a child after divorce has
dissolved a marital unit.” Motion for Leave to File Brief Amici Curiae and Brief Amici Curiae
of American Civil Liberties Union Foundation and ACLU Foundation of Southern
California in Support of Appellants, supra note 425, at 28.

438.

Roxane Arnold, Fatherhood: Law Facing a Challenge, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1987, at B1 (quoting
Michael Hirschensohn).

439.

Other stakeholders in the nonmarital fathers cases, such as adoption advocates and social
workers, had long enjoyed the benefits of professionalization and organization.

440.

See Dinner, supra note 17, at 5-6.

441.

See, e.g., Marci DeWolf, United By Divorce: Single Fathers Flex Legal Muscles, CHI. TRIB., Mar.
1, 1981, at J1 (describing the efforts of the Northern Virginia Chapter of Fathers United for
Equal Rights); James T. Yenckel, Men Organizing in the Battle for “Equal Rights,” L.A. TIMES,
June 18, 1981, at I14 (describing a Houston conference uniting various fathers’ and men’s
rights organizations).

442.

Susan Karlin, The Family Way, L.A. TIMES MAG., June 21, 1992, at 6. It is not clear how large
or active these organizations were. Hirschensohn told a reporter in 1992 that ENUF had
“several hundred members.” Id. ENUF was affiliated with larger fathers’ rights
organizations that focused on divorced fathers, the National Council for Children’s Rights
in Washington, D.C., and the Joint Custody Association of California. See Charles-Edward
Anderson, Unwed Dads’ Setback, 75 A.B.A. J., Dec. 1989, at 24. Hirschensohn later attracted
the support of the Palo Alto group Fathers’ Rights and Equality Exchange (F.R.E.E.). See
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However, nonmarital fathers’ organizations did not participate in federal
constitutional litigation; the Supreme Court heard their claims through the
filter of civil libertarian and legal services groups with their own agendas and
priorities.
Nonmarital fathers also framed their arguments somewhat differently from
divorced fathers. In the 1980s, Dinner has shown, the divorced fathers’ rights
movement began to justify claims for paternal or joint custody as rights owed
to fathers in exchange for their obligation to pay child support.443 Perhaps not
surprisingly, nonmarital fathers and their allies were slower to invoke fathers’
child support obligations as the legal or moral basis for parental rights.444
Many unmarried fathers, including Stanley, were in no position to support
their children. Three of the four plaintiffs in the 1980s nonmarital fathers cases
had not had an opportunity to establish parental rights or a relationship with
their children, and so had no support obligation to fulfill. Moreover, the
organizations that filed amicus briefs on nonmarital fathers’ behalf represented
indigent and low-income individuals and families in danger of having their
parental rights terminated because of “neglect,” which many civil libertarians
and anti-poverty lawyers saw as little more than a code word for poverty. And
judges and commentators frequently drew the connection between support and
rights to the detriment of nonmarital fathers: in Quilloin, for instance, the
Court made much of the plaintiff’s alleged failure to provide consistent
financial support for his son. It was not until McNamara that the ACLU
highlighted nonmarital fathers’ support obligations as a rationale for affording
them reciprocal parental rights. By then, Congress and state governments had
enacted increasingly aggressive child support enforcement measures that fell
most heavily on poor and low-income, often unmarried, fathers.445

Press Release, Fathers’ Rights & Equality Exchange, F.R.E.E. Announces Support of
Hirschensohn Case (Oct. 24, 1994) (on file with author). The Los Angeles Times reported in
1989 that John Ryan had founded an organization called the National Organization for
Birth Fathers and Adoption Reform, which claimed 125 members. Paul Dean, Two Men and
a Baby: Birth Fathers, Adoption’s Once-Silent Partners, Seek Role in Their Children’s Lives, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 29, 1989, http://articles.latimes.com/1989-10-29/news/vw-527_1_birth-father
[http://perma.cc/SKK3-5LNV].
443.

Dinner, supra note 17, at 87.

444.

Unmarried fathers did sometimes make this argument in individual custody cases, of
course, just as individual fathers emphasized their own contributions to children’s financial
support in parental rights and adoption cases. In other words, it is not that support
obligations did not figure into nonmarital fathers’ arguments, but rather that support
obligations did not play a prominent role in their justifications for retaining parental rights
themselves.

445.

See Dinner, supra note 17, at 112-13.
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Finally, and significantly, nonmarital fathers began their quest for rights
burdened by deep-seated cultural images, inflected by race and class, branding
them as derelicts and deadbeats.446 Divorced fathers were not immune from
the deadbeat depiction, especially as child support enforcement became a
national political imperative. Nevertheless, spokesmen for the divorced fathers’
rights movement tended to embody, and represent, a predominantly white and
increasingly middle-class constituency. By the 1980s, divorced fathers claimed
rights based upon their ability to fulfill child support obligations, in sometimes
explicit contrast to nonmarital fathers, whose delinquency forced unwed
mothers onto the welfare rolls.447 Unmarried fathers presented a direct threat
to privatized dependency at a time when politicians traded on racialized tropes
such as the “welfare queen.”448 The very term “unwed fathers” conjured for
many a racialized image of the “undeserving poor,” presumptively unworthy of
rights.449 The racial politics of nonmarital parenthood were overt in the 1960s
and early 1970s: then, African-American mothers and children predominated
as plaintiffs in the “illegitimacy” cases, and advocates exposed the racial
motivation and impact of morals regulations and welfare restrictions in an
effort to undermine their constitutionality.450 Though many plaintiffs in the
unwed fathers cases were men of color, advocates did not bring race
discrimination claims on their behalf. Still, race functioned as a powerful
subtext in the unwed fathers cases and helped to shape divergent perceptions
of divorced and nonmarital fathers.
From the beginning, nonmarital fathers and their supporters protested
marital status discrimination in parenthood. Nonmarital fathers pointed to the
legal status of divorced fathers as an appropriate baseline against which to
measure their own parental rights. That baseline moved significantly during
the 1970s and 1980s, as divorced fathers won joint custody statutes in many
states, and formal sex neutrality with respect to financial allocations at divorce.
Nonmarital fathers also won important new rights during this period, to be
sure: if a biological father successfully seized the opportunity to develop a
relationship with his child and faced no competing claims to fatherhood, he
might seek constitutional protection of his parental status. Still, increasingly
rigorous and marriage-neutral child support enforcement mechanisms did not

446.

See Roberts, supra note 16.

447.

See Dinner, supra note 17, at 128, 136-37.

448.

MARISA CHAPPELL, THE WAR ON WELFARE: FAMILY, POVERTY,
AMERICA 199-241 (2010); Lefkovitz, supra note 13, 595-98.

449.

See Ann Cammett, Deadbeats, Deadbrokes, and Prisoners, 18 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 127,
130 (2011); Daniel L. Hatcher, Forgotten Fathers, 93 B.U. L. REV. 897, 898-99, 901-04 (2013).
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translate into fully equal parental rights for nonmarital fathers. For them, the
“divorce bargain” remained out of reach.451
B. Justices vs. Feminists
Throughout the unwed fathers litigation, both Justices and feminists
grappled with the meaning of sex neutrality, and the significance of marital
status, for nonmarital parental rights. Despite some overlaps and intersections,
however, feminists and the Justices debated the unwed fathers cases on
fundamentally different terms.452 Feminists struggled over the implications of
nonmarital fathers’ claims for women’s rights, substantive sex equality, and the
desired transformation of gender roles. Those with civil libertarian sympathies
also worried about unwarranted state intrusion into the lives of poor families.
For members of the Court, by contrast, the unwed fathers cases were battles
between husbands and biological fathers over the rights of men, the integrity
of the adoption process, and the superiority of the marital family. The Court’s
discussions bore the ideological imprint of the divorced fathers’ rights and
traditional family values movements more than of feminism.
For the Justices who were open to seeing nonmarital fathers’ claims as a
question of equal rights, sex and marital status discrimination arguments had
purchase primarily because the challenged laws deprived fathers of rights,
unjustly relegating them to second-class status regardless of their individual
circumstances or dedication to their children. There is little evidence that these
Justices regarded paternal involvement as part of a larger feminist agenda of
upending traditional gender roles and challenging mothers’ primary
responsibility for childrearing. In other words, whereas Justices who were
sympathetic to equality arguments were primarily concerned with whether
fathers, as a group or individually, were deserving of rights, feminists who
favored equal treatment for fathers did so largely because they hoped mothers,
and women generally, would benefit from disrupting gendered assumptions
about parenting.
For feminists’ civil libertarian allies, this commitment to sex equality for
mothers intersected with a growing concern about state authorities
451.

See Dinner, supra note 17, at 140 (arguing that tying custody rights to financial support
“undermined poor men’s capacity to experience fatherhood as a relationship defined by
caregiving rather than breadwinning”); id. at 147 (describing how the divorce bargain
“helped to legitimize cutbacks in welfare supports for mothers and children” by “affirm[ing]
child support, rather than public assistance, as the normative source of provisioning for
children outside of intact marriages”).

452.

For a perspective that emphasizes the convergence between the Court’s decisions and
feminist principles, see Hendricks, supra note 256, at 443-53.
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extinguishing poor parents’ rights in the name of children’s welfare.
Terminating the parental rights of nonmarital fathers based on nothing more
than a best-interests-of-the-child determination had troubling implications for
mothers and fathers alike. Indeed, terminations based on “neglect” arguably
had the greatest impact on mothers, who were more likely to have assumed
primary responsibility for children’s care and therefore had the most to lose
from state intervention.453
Similarly, the Justices and feminists who were skeptical of nonmarital
fathers’ rights claims diverged in their reasoning and in their underlying
motivations. For several members of the Court, the specter hanging over the
nonmarital fathers cases was that of adoptions thwarted by the need to
identify, locate, and notify biological fathers whose consent had previously
been immaterial. For these Justices, the state’s interest in finding stable marital
homes for illegitimate children outweighed the interests of nonmarital fathers,
at least those who had not developed relationships with or legitimated their
children. The desire for a smooth path to adoption at a time when the supply
of adoptable infants had plummeted converged with a persistent belief in the
superiority of marital families to motivate these Justices’ resistance to
nonmarital fathers’ claims. In contrast, feminists who were skeptical of formal
sex equality in parental rights were concerned primarily about women’s
autonomy to make meaningful choices about their own and their children’s
futures without interference from the state or from nonmarital fathers.454
Justices and feminists also disagreed among themselves and with each
other about what role, if any, marital status should play in determining
parental rights. For some feminists on either side of the fathers’ rights
question, marital status was largely beside the point. Unlike fathers’ rights
skeptics on the Court, most feminists did not assume the superiority of marital

453.

Justice O’Connor, the only Justice to express concern about assuming mothers’ primary
responsibility for nonmarital children, did not align with feminists’ civil libertarian allies on
questions of parental rights. O’Connor joined the majority in Lehr and Michael H.;
moreover, she—and Chief Justice Burger and Justice White—joined the dissent in Santosky
v. Kramer, which struck down a New York parental rights termination scheme on
constitutional grounds, see 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

454.

The Justices who resisted formal sex neutrality were not wholly unconcerned with mothers’
autonomy, to be sure. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 408 (1979) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (reasoning that to require the consent of both parents to an adoption “would
remove the mother’s freedom of choice in her own and the child’s behalf without also
relieving her of the unshakable responsibility for the care of the child”). Nevertheless, the
skeptical Justices most consistently expressed concern about facilitating adoptions,
especially of newborns. And whereas feminists and their civil libertarian allies wished for a
robust consent requirement for all birth parents, the Justices were more likely to believe that
states should be permitted to withhold veto power from both birth parents.
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families. Nor were feminists particularly invested in the efficiency of adoption
procedures except to the extent that they vindicated a mother’s truly voluntary
decision to surrender her child. And many feminists who were skeptical of
formal sex neutrality for nonmarital parents had similar qualms about the
equal treatment of men and women at divorce.
Marital status mattered to many participants in the debate over parental
rights, but in different ways and for different reasons. For the Court, formal
marriage signaled a man’s commitment to accept the full responsibilities of
fatherhood; in exchange, he received the full complement of parental
prerogatives. Nonmarriage raised a presumption, rebuttable only in certain
circumstances, that a father lacked such commitment. For many of the
feminists who were skeptical of nonmarital fathers’ claim to equal treatment,
marital primacy was a means to an end rather than an end in itself. In other
words, if sex neutrality was now required for marital parents who divorced,
then marital status-based distinctions at least helped to preserve nonmarital
mothers’ autonomy against further incursions. For others, marriage was
morally significant, but not for what it said about a man’s commitment to
fatherhood; rather, marriage signaled a woman’s consent to her partner’s (now
presumptively equal) parental rights. The Court and some feminists agreed
that nonmarital fathers should be held to a higher standard than mothers or
marital fathers. But the Justices and feminist skeptics reached this conclusion
through very different conceptions of the relationship between sex equality and
marital supremacy.
In other areas of constitutional sex equality law, social movements—often
in dialogue with countermovements—shaped each other’s positions and
together influenced outcomes in the Supreme Court. As Reva Siegel has
shown, conflict over the ERA tempered the arguments of its friends and foes
and contributed to a “de facto ERA”—an equal protection jurisprudence that
reflected mutually imposed limitations on the scope of sex equality.455 Hints of
this dynamic appear in the unwed fathers cases, such as when feminists
worried that siding with Quilloin might send the wrong signal about the
meaning of the ERA for mothers’ autonomy and parental prerogatives.456 By
and large, though, the nonmarital fathers’ cases reflect a profound disconnect
between feminist arguments and the terms of federal constitutional
jurisprudence. In part, this was a matter of timing: it was not until the 1980s
that the “feminist” dilemma made its way into Supreme Court briefs. By then,
path dependency and an increasingly conservative political climate may have
foreclosed significant feminist influence in either direction. Two other
455.

See Siegel, supra note 151, at 1332-39.

456.

See supra notes 222-230 and accompanying text.
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movements, divorced fathers’ rights and traditionalist conservatism, instead
left their ideological fingerprints on the nonmarital fathers cases.
To the extent that the Court embraced nonmarital fathers’ rights, it was
largely on terms that resonated with the divorced fathers’ rights movement. As
scholars have shown, divorced fathers’ rights activists often co-opted the
principle of formal sex neutrality to advance paternal prerogatives at women’s
expense.457 Whereas feminists hoped that legal sex neutrality would advance
substantive sex equality by unsettling traditional gender roles, fathers’ rights
advocates sought to maintain gender hierarchies within marriage.458 Fathers’
rights leaders eventually sought a “divorce bargain” that exchanged custody
rights for the fulfillment of child support obligations.459 The Court’s emphasis
on the provision of consistent financial support as a prerequisite for nonmarital
fathers’ right to consent to adoption reflects a similar calculus, in which a
father proved his mettle by assuming the traditional male breadwinner role.
Moreover, the Justices who embraced nonmarital fathers’ claims, like divorced
fathers’ rights activists, never did so on the ground that women would benefit
from shared responsibility for parenting or from the disruption of gender role
stereotypes.
Insofar as the Justices resisted nonmarital fathers’ claims, they often did so
in ways that reflected traditionalist views about gender roles and marriage. The
dissenting opinions in Stanley and Caban and the majorities in Fiallo and
Parham embraced a deeply gendered conception of parenthood. On this view,
mothers, irrespective of marital status, inevitably formed strong bonds with
their offspring, whereas fathers needed marriage to anchor them to children.
Motherhood as women’s highest calling is, of course, a mainstay of the
traditionalist vision of family.460 And Parham has long been featured on Eagle
Forum’s “Top Ten Cases that Prove the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA)
Would Have Been a Disaster,” joined more recently by Miller v. Albright, which
upheld citizenship laws that placed greater burdens on nonmarital fathers and
their children than on other parent-child pairs.461
457.

See JOCELYN ELISE CROWLEY, DEFIANT DADS: FATHERS’ RIGHTS ACTIVISTS IN AMERICA 26364, 266, 269 (2008); Dinner, supra note 17, at 110 (describing how fathers’ rights activists
“harnessed the ideals of formal equality and liberalized gender roles to better men’s
bargaining position at divorce”).

458.

Dinner, supra note 17, at 139.

459.

Id. at 87.

460. See,
461.

e.g., PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY, THE POWER OF THE POSITIVE WOMAN 45-52 (1977).

Top Ten Cases That Prove the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) Would Have Been a Disaster,
EAGLE F. (2002), http://www.eagleforum.org/era/2002/top-ten.shtml [http://perma.cc
/2TT8-C3BH] (listing as number ten Miller v. Albright and as number nine Parham v.
Hughes, “which upheld the state’s ability to disfavor procreation outside of marriage by
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The Justices’ attitudes toward nonmarital families varied significantly, to
be sure. When it came to fatherhood, those attitudes did not neatly align with
other ideological preferences. White, who took conservative positions on
abortion rights, homosexuality, and constitutional standards for parental rights
terminations,462 was fathers’ most ardent champion. Douglas, a liberal icon,
initially scorned Peter Stanley’s claim. Marshall sympathized with nonmarital
families in Stanley but stopped short of full equality for divorced and
nonmarital fathers in Quilloin. Brennan took fathers’ side in most cases, but
joined the Lehr majority. And Stevens, considered one of the more liberal
Justices on many issues, was among the most hostile to nonmarital fathers’
rights.463
Still, many of the Justices shared a commitment to marital supremacy. In
the stepfather adoption cases, the Court assumed the inherent superiority of a
two-parent marital family unit almost regardless of biological or social ties. In
the newborn adoption cases, parental rights advocates defending the integrity
of poor families battled adoption proponents who worried that consent
requirements would interfere with smooth transfers of parental rights. On
balance, many of the Justices, across the ideological spectrum, believed
nonmarital children were best raised by married parents and spared the
“stigma of illegitimacy.” In the early 1980s, Justice Stevens could credibly tell
his colleagues in the Lehr majority that they all shared Hafen’s “bias in favor of
the formal family.”464 By the end of the decade, the majority embraced the legal
primacy of marriage, upholding the termination of Hirschensohn’s parental
rights notwithstanding his established relationship with the biological
daughter who called him “daddy.”

denying certain rights to the father of an illegitimate child . . . . [The] ERA would have
precluded this [case]”).
462.

See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 187 (1986) (White, J., authoring majority opinion
upholding Texas anti-sodomy law); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 770 (1982) (White,
J., joining dissenting opinion in a case holding New York’s parental rights termination
statute unconstitutional); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 179, 221 (1973) (White, J., dissenting from
a decision upholding abortion rights).

463.

Notably, all of the Justices agreed that states could not place stringent statutes of limitation
on unmarried mothers’ paternity claims. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 463 (1988)
(holding a six-year statute of limitations on paternity suits to be an unconstitutional denial
of equal protection to illegitimate children); Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 18 (1983) (same
result for a two-year statute of limitations); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 101 (1982)
(same result for a one-year statute of limitations).

464.

See supra notes 381-382 and accompanying text.
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C. After the Constitutional Equality Revolution
In the years after Michael H., feminist ambivalence and disagreement about
unwed fathers’ rights persisted. Some, in the tradition of Ginsburg and Law,
continued to worry that maintaining traditional maternal preferences
perpetuated gender stereotypes and patterns of inequality.465 Others, such as
Mary Becker,466 Karen Czapanskiy,467 and Martha Fineman,468 rejected formal
sex neutrality for unmarried parents and for family law more generally, as
perpetuating rather than ameliorating substantive inequality. Mary Lyndon
Shanley,469 Katharine Bartlett,470 and others sought middle ground through
more functional or less exclusive conceptions of parenthood. Indeed, as legal
and cultural definitions of family became less formal, and as open adoption,
third-party visitation, and blended families grew increasingly common, the
imperative to choose between fathers became less evident. Focusing on
function rather than on marriage, biology, or gender, and thinking beyond the
two-parent dyad advanced sex neutrality and shared parenting by emphasizing
the importance of care and nurture for all parents regardless of sex. These
interventions held the promise of circumventing the feminist dilemma without
relinquishing shared feminist goals.
At century’s end, the states diverged, sometimes dramatically, in their
approach to the constitutional rights of nonmarital fathers. Courts in Texas
and California, for instance, took a more expansive view of nonmarital fathers’
rights than they had in earlier cases such as Kirkpatrick and McNamara. In
1987, the Texas Supreme Court interpreted the state Equal Rights Amendment
to invalidate the statute challenged in Kirkpatrick, which required nonmarital
fathers, but not mothers, to satisfy a best-interests test in order to legitimate a

465.

Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Barbara Flagg, Some Reflection on the Feminist Legal Thought of the
1970s, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 9, 15-16.

466.

See Mary E. Becker, The Rights of Unwed Mothers: Feminist Approaches: The Social Service
Review Lecture, 63 SOC. SERV. REV. 496, 503 (1989).

467.

See Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draftees: The Struggle for Parental Equality, 38 UCLA L.
REV. 1415, 1417-41 (1991).

468.

See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER,
OTHER TWENTIETH-CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995).

469.

See Shanley, supra note 5, at 63-65.

470.

See Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293 (1988); Katharine T.
Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives When the
Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879, 882-83 (1984) [hereinafter
Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood].
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child.471 In In re Raquel Marie X., the New York Court of Appeals held
unconstitutional a statute that required nonmarital fathers seeking to block the
adoption of an infant under six months old to have lived with the child’s
biological mother for a certain period of time.472 The California Supreme
Court, in the 1992 case In re Kelsey S., held unconstitutional a state statutory
scheme because it enabled a biological mother unilaterally to prevent a
biological father from establishing the presumed father status necessary to veto
an adoption.473 Many states, however, maintained legal barriers that limited
nonmarital fathers’ ability to withhold consent for the adoption of their
infants, and otherwise restricted the circumstances in which biological fathers
could assert parental rights.474 High-profile cases in which courts returned
children to their biological parents after many years living with adoptive
parents spurred state legislative efforts to curtail birth parents’ rights and
stabilize adoptions.475 By the turn of the century, states’ laws regarding
parentage and consent to adoption were a complex patchwork of statutes and
case law that reflected widely varying interpretations of federal and state
constitutional law.476
471.

In re Unnamed Baby McLean, 725 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. 1987); 1 JOAN HEIFETZ
HOLLINGER, ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.04[2] (2015). In 1994, the Texas Supreme
Court rejected the analysis of Michael H. to hold that the conclusive marital presumption
violated the Due Course of Law guarantee of the Texas Constitution. In re J.W.T., 872
S.W.2d 189, 198 (Tex. 1994). For more on states’ treatment of the marital presumption
post-Michael H., see June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Marriage, Parentage, and Child Support,
45 FAM. L.Q. 219 (2011). On the trend in uniform laws toward “an emphasis on quick and
easy adoption of desirable newborns,” see Berger, supra note 5, at 347.

472.

In re Raquel Marie X., 559 N.E.2d 418, 427 (N.Y. 1990).

473.

823 P.2d 1216, 1238 (Cal. 1992).

474.

See, e.g., In re Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d 1059 (Okla. 1985) (upholding a statute granting a
nonmarital mother the unilateral right to consent to her child’s adoption unless the father
had legitimated the child). For a discussion of states that took a similarly restrictive
approach, see 1 HOLLINGER, supra note 471, §§ 2.04[2], 2.54-55 (discussing the laws of
Oregon, Utah, Nebraska, Kansas, and South Dakota). See also Berger, supra note 5, at 347
(noting that “[o]nly a minority of states have statutes that permit unmarried fathers to
assert rights if they can show they were thwarted in their desire to parent or support a
child”).

475.

On the trend in uniform laws toward “an emphasis on quick and easy adoption of desirable
newborns,” see Berger, supra note 5, at 347. On the heart-wrenching cases that gave political
impetus to this trend, see David D. Meyer, Family Ties: Solving the Constitutional Dilemma of
the Faultless Father, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 753, 753-56 (1999); see also id. at 770 (describing
legislative responses).

476.

On the cases the Court avoided in the 1990s, see Laura Oren, The Paradox of Unmarried
Fathers and the Constitution: Biology “Plus” Defines Relationships; Biology Alone Safeguards the
Public Fisc, 11 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 47, 102-106 (2004). See also id. at 102, 106-07
(describing provisions of the Uniform Adoption Act promulgated after two wrenching,
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In recent years, a new generation of progressive and feminist scholars has
called for legal, institutional, and cultural reforms to bolster the role of
nonmarital fathers in the lives of their children.477 Citing the benefits to
children of fathers’ involvement and the importance of encouraging coparenting after the dissolution of nonmarital relationships, these
commentators regret the law’s complicity in maternal gatekeeping that allows
mothers to exclude willing biological fathers from their children’s lives. Others
remain skeptical, inclined to protect mothers’ autonomy and wary of fathers’
rights claims that appear insensitive to women’s subordination within and
outside the family.478 Once on the cutting edge of constitutional sex equality
law, debates over nonmarital parents’ parental rights now occur largely outside
its ambit. 479
1. Collateral Consequences: The Derivative Citizenship Cases
Whether one sees the Court’s withdrawal from this constitutional
controversy as a salutary opportunity for federalist experimentation or a
regrettable instance of judicial abdication, the Court’s avoidance of equality
questions in the unwed fathers’ parental rights cases has had significant
collateral consequences for constitutional sex equality law.480 Although the
Court ignored feminist arguments in the “unwed fathers” cases of the 1970s
and 1980s, at the turn of the twenty-first century equal protection challenges to
sex-discriminatory citizenship transmission requirements forced a reckoning.

high-profile “failed adoption” cases). Oren notes that the general trend in state courts is
toward enforcement of a “biology plus” standard, even in newborn adoption cases. See id. at
109.
477.

See Huntington, supra note 4; Maillard, supra note 4; Maldonado, supra note 6, at 336-350.

478.

See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY
(2004) (arguing that public policy should support caregiver/dependent dyads rather than
assuming the privatization of women’s and children’s dependency within the nuclear
family); Carbone & Cahn, supra note 3, at 1229 (describing “a new system of family law”
which “accords unmarried women greater power in the family by looking the other way”).

479.

The recent case Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl involved a nonmarital father who would have
had only a limited right to object to his child’s adoption under the law of South Carolina
and many other states. 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013). His claim to parental rights rested upon the
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Several briefs in Adoptive Couple addressed the
fundamental right of unmarried mothers to place their children for adoption, but these
discussions generally avoided the language of sex equality or equal protection for mothers
and fathers. Professor Bethany Berger has offered a compelling analysis of the race, gender,
and class implications of Adoptive Couple. See Berger, supra note 5.

480.

In other words, one could remain agnostic, as I do here, about the proper resolution of the
feminist dilemma and still lament the Court’s failure to engage the questions it presents.
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Miller v. Albright481 and Nguyen v. INS.482 at last impelled the Court to grapple
with the feminist case for—though not against—sex neutrality for nonmarital
parents. Lorelyn Penero Miller and Tuan Anh Nguyen challenged provisions of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) that operated to prevent their
fathers from passing on U.S. citizenship, under circumstances in which a
citizen mother, marital or not, would automatically have been able to do so.
Unlike the parental rights cases, these citizenship cases posed no “feminist
dilemma.”483 As in Stanley, Wiesenfeld, and Fiallo, the fathers’ opponent was the
state, and a victory for sex neutrality would not come at mothers’ expense.
Indeed, feminists made powerful arguments in law review articles and amicus
briefs that limiting fathers’ ability to transmit citizenship to illegitimate
offspring hurt women at least as much as men by perpetuating mothers’
primary responsibility for the care and support of nonmarital children.484 As
director of the ACLU Women’s Rights Project more than two decades earlier,
Ginsburg had badly wanted to present such arguments as amicus in Fiallo.485
Now a Supreme Court Justice, she made them in dissent.486 In Miller, Justice
Stevens’s plurality opinion elaborated the views first articulated in his Caban
dissent almost two decades earlier, deeming sex-differentiated laws to be
justified by “the undisputed assumption that fathers are less likely than
mothers to have the opportunity to develop relationships” with nonmarital
children.487 Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, declared “singularly
unpersuasive” the contention that erecting higher barriers to citizenship
transmission for nonmarital fathers promoted gender-based stereotypes about
paternal disengagement.488

481.

523 U.S. 420 (1998).

482.

533 U.S. 53 (2001).

483.

The unwed fathers’ parental rights and derivative citizenship cases are analyzed together
relatively rarely. For exceptions, see, for example, Albertina Antognini, From Citizenship to
Custody: Unwed Fathers Abroad and at Home, 36 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 405 (2013); and
Katharine Silbaugh, Miller v. Albright: Problems of Constitutionalization in Family Law, 79
B.U. L. REV. 1139 (1999).

484.

See Brief of the National Women’s Law Center, et al. in Support of Petitioners, Nguyen v.
INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (No. 99-2071), 2000 WL 1702034; Davis, supra note 56; Cornelia T.
L. Pillard & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Skeptical Scrutiny of Plenary Power: Judicial and Executive
Branch Decision Making in Miller v Albright, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 1; Collins, supra note 5.

485.

See supra note 172and accompanying text.

486.

Ginsburg’s dissent in Miller was not as strong on this point as perhaps it might have been,
due to an incomplete history of citizenship transmission laws and their implementation,
later excavated by Kristin Collins. See Collins, supra note 5.

487.

Miller, 523 U.S. at 444.

488.

Id. at 434. Stevens relied on his own majority opinion in Lehr for support. See id. at 441.
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A torrent of criticism greeted Justice Stevens’s position. Even scholars
sympathetic to the feminist arguments against sex neutrality in the parental
rights and adoption contexts condemned the challenged INA provisions,
noting that the concerns Stevens raised in Caban and Lehr simply did not
apply.489
Because only four Justices reached the merits of the equal protection
question in Miller, the same provisions came before the Court again in Nguyen
three years later.490 This time, a 5-4 majority upheld the disparate requirements
for nonmarital fathers, over Justice O’Connor’s vehement dissent. Eighteen
years earlier, O’Connor had persuaded Stevens to omit his language about
mothers’ inevitable responsibility for nonmarital children in Lehr. Now, armed
with quotations from 1930s National Woman’s Party leaders supplied by
scholars and amici,491 and with three decades of constitutional sex equality
precedents,492 she wrote that the challenged law was “paradigmatic of a historic
regime that left women with responsibility, and freed men from responsibility,
for nonmarital children.”493 Most recently, in Flores-Villar v. United States,
scholars and advocates submitted briefs articulating the feminist case for sex
neutrality.494 Though Justice Elena Kagan’s recusal left the Court equally
489.

See Silbaugh, supra note 483; see also Pillard & Aleinikoff, supra note 484, at 30 (noting that
“[a] sex-neutral INA would not have the same zero-sum effects as between fathers’ and
mothers’ choices” as it might in cases like Lehr).

490. Nguyen

v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 56 (2001).

491.

Id. at 92 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Burnita Shelton Matthews’s 1932 protestation
that “when it comes to the illegitimate child, which is a great burden, then the mother is the
only recognized parent, and the father is put safely in the background”). An amicus brief
from the National Women’s Law Center and other feminist organizations, and the 2000
Yale Law Journal Note by Kristin Collins on which the brief heavily relied, had also quoted
from Matthews’s testimony. See Brief of the National Women’s Law Center, et al. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (No. 99-2071), 2000
WL 1702034; Collins, supra note 5, at 1695.

492.

See, e.g., Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 92 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The majority, however, rather
than confronting the stereotypical notion that mothers must care for [nonmarital] children
and fathers may ignore them, quietly condones ‘the very stereotype the law condemns.’”)
(quoting J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 138 (1994)). For another trenchant critique of
Nguyen, see Laura Weinrib, Protecting Sex: Sexual Disincentives and Sex-Based Discrimination
in Nguyen v. INS, 12 COLUM. J.L. & GENDER 222 (2003). See also Nina Pillard, Comment:
Plenary Power Underground in Nguyen v. INS: A Response to Professor Spiro, 16 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 835 (2002) (suggesting that the plenary power doctrine, though not directly applicable,
operated to dilute the sex discrimination analysis in Nguyen).

493.

Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 92 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).

494.

See, e.g., Brief of the National Women’s Law Center et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, Flores-Villar v. United States, 564 U.S. 210 (2011) (No. 09-5801), 2010 WL
2602010; Brief for Professors of History, Political Science, and Law as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, Flores-Villar, 564 U.S. 210 (No. 09-5801).
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divided, resulting in affirmance of the lower court decision upholding the
challenged provisions,495 these laws are likely to come before the Court
again.496
The limitations of the Court’s reasoning in Miller and Nguyen suggests that
the Justices’ failure to engage with feminist arguments for and against sex
neutrality in the adoption cases had consequences beyond the parental rights
context. The Court failed to acknowledge, much less answer, the fundamental
question posed by the unwed fathers cases: what would true sex neutrality look
like in the context of nonmarital parenthood, and when does sex neutrality
serve women’s autonomy and equality interests? In other words, when is
formal equality an effective tool to combat substantive inequality, and when
does it fall short? If the Court had seen the central question posed by
nonmarital fathers’ rights as one of the relationship between formal sex
neutrality and substantive sex equality, then the answer in the citizenship
transmission cases should have been clear. Sex neutrality in derivative
citizenship served the interests of both men and women and posed no feminist
dilemma.497
2. Beyond Marital Supremacy: Unintended Consequences?
Today, the constitutional law of the family stands at a crossroads. As the
advent of marriage equality coincides with an unprecedented socioeconomic
and racial marriage gap, the future of marital supremacy is among the most
pressing outstanding constitutional questions. In the years since the Court
495.

Flores-Villar, 564 U.S. 210, aff’g 536 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2008).

496.

See Morales-Santana v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 520 (2d Cir. 2015) (finding gender-based
discrimination in the physical presence requirement for derivative citizenship
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause). As Kristin Collins’s incisive historical
work has demonstrated, these requirements are constitutionally vulnerable on grounds
beyond their gender asymmetry, namely their nativist, racially exclusionary origins. See
Kristin A. Collins, Illegitimate Borders: Jus Sanguinis Citizenship and the Legal Construction of
Family, Race, and Nation, 123 YALE L.J. 2134 (2014); Kristin A. Collins, A Short History of Sex
and Citizenship: The Historians’ Amicus Brief in Flores-Villar v. United States, 91 B.U. L. REV.
1485 (2011); see also Villegas-Sarabia v. Johnson, No. 5:15-CV-122, 2015 WL 4887462 (W.D.
Tex. Aug. 17, 2015) (citing Collins’s work to support holding the differential physical
presence requirement unconstitutional).
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It is possible that the interests of non-U.S. citizen mothers might be adverse to those of U.S.
citizen fathers in a small number of instances in which the transmission of American
citizenship to a child would preclude that child from being recognized as a citizen of her
mother’s nation. Most countries today, however, allow for dual citizenship. It is also
possible that a U.S. citizen father might, for example, gain the upper hand in a custody
dispute with a noncitizen mother if he alone is able to transmit U.S. citizenship to his child.
I am grateful to Kristin Collins for alerting me to this point.
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decided the unwed fathers cases, lesbian and gay individuals and families have
fought state-level battles for legal recognition of parental rights irrespective of
marital status or biology. Many have worried that marriage equality—
especially given the majority’s glorification of marriage in Obergefell v. Hodges—
bodes ill for the constitutional status of nonmarital families.498 Recent work by
Douglas NeJaime suggests, to the contrary, that marriage equality may
support, rather than impede, the recognition of intentional and functional
parenthood, with salutary implications for nonmarital as well as marital
families.499 In the absence of marriage rights, some states have granted
parental status to unmarried women and men based on intent and function,
rather than gender and biology; contemplated the possibility of recognizing
more than two legal parents; and reconsidered the historic link between
marital status and parental rights.500
Notably, advocates for LGBT parents made creative use of the unwed
fathers cases as they sought to detach parentage from biology, gender, and
marriage. The Court’s emphasis in Lehr on whether or not a nonmarital father
had “grasp[ed]” the “opportunity” to parent offered by his biological tie
suggested that, in the absence of marriage, parental status depended on
conduct rather than on a mere genetic link. In a trio of landmark California
Supreme Court cases decided in 2005, LGBT rights advocates used the unwed
fathers cases to support their argument that parentage should depend on
whether a biological parent’s partner intended to, and did, function as a parent,
rather than on formal marital status or on biology.501 Remarkably, these
advocates even harnessed Michael H.’s protection of the “unitary family” to
suggest that a same-sex couple’s marriage-like relationship should support a
finding of parental rights for a nonmarital partner.502
The unmarried fathers cases, with their emphasis on parental conduct
rather than mere biology, unexpectedly aided non-biological LGBT parents
who lacked access to marriage but who clearly had demonstrated their

498.

See, e.g., Melissa Murray, The New Marriage Inequality, 104 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming
2016) (arguing that Obergefell’s reasoning marginalizes nonmarital families and undermines
their constitutional rights). I take up this question in greater depth in Serena Mayeri,
Marriage (In)equality and the Historical Legacies of Feminism, 6 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 126 (2015).

499.

See NeJaime, supra note 23.

500.

Id.

501.

Id. at 1228 n.263.

502.

Id. at 1223 n.231. Basing parental rights on partners’ marriage-like relationships, of course,
arguably reinforces marital supremacy in a functional, rather than formalistic, guise. For
more on how functional definitions of family can reinforce traditional family law values such
as the privatization of dependency and the primacy of marriage, see Melissa Murray, Family
Law’s Doctrines, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1985 (2015).
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commitment to parenthood. Conversely, conferring parental status based upon
functional and intent-based criteria rather than formal categories such as
marital status and biology could redound to the benefit of many committed
nonmarital fathers. Even more promising is the prospect of legal recognition
for more than two parents.503 If courts had not felt compelled to choose one
father to the exclusion of the other, after all, Quilloin, Lehr, and Hirschensohn
might have maintained relationships with their children without precluding
the establishment of legal relationships with new stepfathers.504 Open
adoptions, in which birth parents maintain ties with their children,505 could
have allowed Laura S. and the mother of Ed McNamara’s biological daughter
to effectuate their preference for adoption by legal strangers without
terminating Kirkpatrick’s and McNamara’s (or their own) parental rights
altogether.506 Whether the sequel to marriage equality is a challenge to marital
supremacy or its retrenchment, a departure from legal formalism or its
reinstantiation, only time will tell.507

503.

Louisiana is a rare state to officially recognize the possibility of “dual fatherhood.” See, e.g.,
Smith v. Cole, 553 So. 2d 847, 854 (La. 1989) (holding that the existence of a nonbiological
legal father with a support obligation did not extinguish the support obligation of a
biological father). California recently passed a law permitting the legal recognition of more
than two parents under certain circumstances. See S. Bill 274, ch. 564, § 1, Legislative
Counsel’s Digest, Oct. 4, 2013, (abrogating In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856 (Ct. App. 2011)).
For discussions of the potential impact of non-exclusive parenthood on nonmarital fathers,
see, for example, Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood, supra note 470; Nancy E. Dowd, Multiple
Parents/Multiple Fathers, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 231 (2007). See also Josh Gupta-Kagan, NonExclusive Adoption and Child Welfare, 66 ALA. L. REV. 715 (2015) (arguing for the benefits of
multiple parenthood for children in foster care); Meyer, supra note 475, at 813-45 (proposing
an alternative model of adoption in which the parental rights of birth parents need not be
terminated).
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The guardian ad litem representing Victoria’s interests in Michael H. recommended that
both Gerald and Michael be afforded some parental rights. See Brief for Appellant Victoria
D., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (No. 87-746), 1987 WL 880074.
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On the rise of post-adoption visitation arrangements, see Carol Sanger, Bargaining for
Motherhood: Postadoption Visitation Agreements, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 309 (2012).
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There are, of course, costs as well as benefits to recognizing multiple legal parents, but a
deep consideration of the topic is beyond the scope of this article.
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See Serena Mayeri, The Functions of Family Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 331 (2015)
(responding to Melissa Murray, Family Law’s Doctrines, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1985 (2015)).
Though it is too soon to identify a long-term trend, the early years of marriage equality
suggest that racial disparities in marriage among same-sex couples may be significantly
smaller than among heterosexual couples. See Gary J. Gates, LGBT Parenting in the United
States, WILLIAMS INST. 1, 5 (Feb. 2013), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content
/uploads/LGBT-Parenting.pdf [http://perma.cc/C4LU-YTY4].
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c o n c lu s io n
The unwed fathers cases receive little attention from constitutional
scholars, and they are often relegated to a footnote in the history of sex equality
law despite a significant (albeit small) body of feminist scholarship that
critically engages them. In part, this neglect reflects how the Court framed
these cases as questions of due process, rather than equal protection, and as
contests between nonmarital fathers and prospective stepfathers, rather than as
questions of sex and marital status equality vis-à-vis mothers and divorced
fathers.
Integrating the unwed fathers cases into the larger history of equality
jurisprudence helps to illuminate the nature of the law’s limitations. Since the
1970s, scholars have observed that the Justices have misconstrued sex
differences as “natural” or “biological” rather than socially constructed and
essentially malleable. As a result, the Court has often been unwilling to see men
and women as “similarly situated” for the purposes of equal protection
analysis.
The unwed fathers cases invite us to consider how the rhetoric of sex
differences intersects with and sometimes obscures another primary axis of
differentiation in constitutional equality law: marital status. In cases involving
marital households, formal sex neutrality largely prevailed in the Supreme
Court; no longer could the government distinguish between husbands and
wives, widows, and widowers in the provision of public benefits such as Social
Security. States could neither limit alimony to wives, nor, increasingly, overtly
discriminate between marital mothers and fathers as presumptively preferable
custodial parents. Stereotypes about women as naturally superior nurturers
and caregivers and men as primary breadwinners became illegitimate bases for
differentiating between spouses—and to a large degree, between marital
parents.
Ironically, then, while the law of marriage had long been a bastion of
gender differentiation, in the 1970s and 1980s, marriage effectively became a
prerequisite for formal legal equality in parental rights. A sex-neutral approach
to parenting within marriage seemed clearly to advance feminist aspirations for
an egalitarian division of labor at home, a prerequisite for freedom and equal
opportunity in the public sphere. Divorce tested the utility of sex neutrality in
parenting, but the feminist dilemma proved particularly acute in the context of
nonmarital parental rights. Absent the definitive moment of maternal consent
to paternal involvement in a child’s life implicit in marriage, feminist skeptics
required more than a biological tie and good intentions to overcome maternal
prerogatives.
Like the feminist campaign against illegitimacy penalties, the feminist
debate over nonmarital fathers’ parental rights never infiltrated the Justices’
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deliberations, much less Court opinions. Unlike the feminist campaign against
illegitimacy penalties, debates over parental rights reflected real differences
among feminists over the utility of sex neutrality as a principle of legal reform.
For some, parental sex equality seemed like a luxury only the privileged could
afford. Others believed the time had come to negotiate a new nonmarital
bargain.
The story of nonmarital fathers’ quest for equality complicates our
understanding of the historical relationship between feminism and marital
supremacy. Where mothers’ and fathers’ interests coincided, feminists could
wholeheartedly attack the legal privileging of marriage. When fathers’ rights
threatened mothers’ freedom, marital primacy shielded unmarried women
from the downside of sex neutrality. But that protection came at a price: the
Court’s failure to grapple with the demands of substantive sex equality or to
question the superiority of marital families.
The revolution in constitutional sex equality law laid important
groundwork for the success of the marriage equality movement. By making
marriage formally gender-neutral, feminists unseated the most powerful
traditional argument for limiting marriage to the union of a man and a woman.
Marriage equality for same-sex couples is now the law of the land,508 but the
marriage gap shows no sign of closing. Nonmarital parenthood increasingly is
the rule rather than the exception, especially among lower-income Americans,
and in communities of color. How, if at all, the Constitution will speak to
burgeoning inequalities between marital and nonmarital families in this new
age of marriage equality remains to be seen.
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Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015) (“[S]ame-sex couples may exercise the
right to marry. . . . [T]he reasons marriage is fundamental under the Constitution apply
with equal force to same-sex couples.”).
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